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FOREWORD

THE war which broke out in 1914 created a revolution in the attitude of Americans. This revolution was not merely the result of our active participation in the war on the soil of Europe, but involved likewise immense changes in our thoughts. Barring the comparatively few who have come from Syria, I presume most Americans thought of Syria in terms of foreign missions. We knew something of the educational work which had been done in various countries, but it all seemed apart from our life. After four years of conflict the world now seems very small to us. The statements which come to us have been so diverse and conflicting that it has been impossible to get a clear vision. Nevertheless, we are conscientiously endeavoring to interpret what has taken place and we are striving to know what existing conditions are.

In planning for this volume the above facts were kept in mind and the officers of the Academy sought to obtain first-hand testimony from competent and trustworthy observers who have had exceptional opportunity to know the conditions about which they write. Each man speaks for himself and the viewpoints represented in this volume will be found to be quite divergent. This indicates perhaps that the different observers have seen things from different angles and thus their various accounts may blend to produce a more harmonious and complete picture in our own minds. It is believed they will be found worthy of careful consideration.

One of the trouble spots on the earth for the last century has been the district about the eastern Mediterranean. If some solution can be found which will make it possible for the peoples of this region to adopt a civilization which will correspond to the opportunities offered by nature, it will be a blessing to the world. The final development of this country, moreover, would make it easier to work out some basis of harmony in the tangled situation which confronts us in mid-Europe. Probably no one believes that the Slavic states will fail in the long run to find some basis of

union. This will in turn make possible peace and prosperity in the great Danube valley.

Russia is a mystery; none the less interesting and fascinating because so mysterious. Reports with reference to conditions in Russia are so divergent, the judgments of observers vary so greatly, that our final judgment must be suspended until the scene clears somewhat. The form of government adopted by the Russians is primarily their own concern. The principles, however, which animate that government in its dealings with the rest of the world are matters of no little importance to us here.

Lack of space prohibits consideration of other areas of the earth where conditions are today unsettled.

The fourth part of the present volume deals with a very different type of questions, but they are all questions growing out of the interrelations of nations. How our industries are to be organized; how our foreign trade policies are to be developed; how the control of the sea is to be maintained; are matters of no little concern to us all. The last section presents careful consideration of the League of Nations as now proposed. Whether or not the constitution, as outlined at Versailles, is ideal, is not the main question. The big question is, I take it, whether or not it is a workable compromise. Our own American Constitution is highly exalted. Yet when it was adopted it satisfied very few people and the change of a handful of votes in states like Pennsylvania and New York would have defeated it. The courts have found it possible to introduce elements not contained in the written document. In spite of the great changes in conditions in the United States our experience has shown us that it proves the basis for substantial and harmonious adjustment. All the details of the plan proposed at Versailles are not known. When they are it is obviously the duty of our government to consider them most carefully to determine whether or not we should bind ourselves to accept them. The papers here presented both support and criticize the plan now outlined.

The editor in charge believes that the papers will be found deserving of careful consideration by all who are seeking to obtain information on these great current problems. He believes that by the publication of such a volume the Academy justifies its

existence. The Academy as such has no viewpoint on any question, but it seeks to secure men of the best thought and widest experience who can give the rest of us the benefit of their information. The members of the Academy owe the contributors a great debt of thanks for their generous participation in the Academy work.

CARL KELSEY.

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Origin and Purpose. The Academy was organized December 14, 1889, to provide a national forum for the discussion of political and social questions. The Academy does not take sides upon controverted questions, but seeks to secure and present reliable facts, and to assist the public in forming an intelligent and accurate opinion.

Publications. The Academy publishes annually six issues of its "Annals" dealing with the six most prominent current social and political problems. Each publication contains from twenty to twenty-five papers upon the same general subject. The larger number of the papers published are solicited by the Academy; they are papers of discussion, not doctrinaire expressions of opinion.

Meetings. The Academy holds five meetings annually each year during the winter months and holds its annual meeting in April, extending over two full days and including six sessions. The papers of permanent value presented at the meetings are included in the Academy publications.

Membership. The subscription price of THE ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science is \$5.00 per year. Single copies are sold at \$1.50 each. THE ANNALS are sent to all members of the Academy, three or more of the Annual membership fee of \$5.00 being for a subscription to the ANNALS. Membership in the Academy may be secured by applying to the Secretary, 36th Street and Woodland Avenue, Philadelphia. The membership fee is \$5.00; life membership fee, \$200. Members not only receive all the regular publications of the Academy, but are also invited to attend and take part in its scientific meetings, and have the privilege of applying to the Editorial Council for information upon current political and social questions.

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Problems in the Reconstruction of the Ottoman Empire

By HON. ABRAM I. ELKUS

Ambassador of the United States to Turkey

IT is a matter of deep concern—this story of the Ottoman Empire and what is to become of that country—not only to us who live in America, but to all the world, at least to all the civilized or European world, because during the past two centuries, if not longer, every European war has had its origin or its cause in that Ottoman Empire. Greed upon the part of one or more of the great European Powers for territory, or for some advantage or gain, has brought about this result, and I do not except this last war.

HISTORY OF THE TURKISH DOMINATION

When the Turk, hundreds of years ago, began his forward and ever victorious march from Central Asia westward, conquering one nation after another, one people after another whose inferior he was in civilization and in all that goes to make up a great people, he swept over the following lands one by one: Egypt, Syria, Armenia, Palestine and Lebanon. He was not even halted by the Straits or by the Bosphorus, but finally crossed into Europe. Five hundred years ago, he drove from Constantinople the Greeks who had ruled there for hundreds of years. So successful was that onward march of the Ottoman Turk, so wonderful was the progress he made, that he came to the very doors of Vienna before he was finally stopped. Then, after centuries, there began the period of retrogression. The Turk, while he may be a conqueror, has failed signally to be a real administrator. He has failed to understand the theory or the practice of government—not only of his own people, but of those nations which he has conquered. So we find today that there live in what is known as the Ottoman Empire some 20,000,000 people, among whom are nations within a nation, peoples within a people, countries within a country—people diverse in thought, in language, in ideas, in ideals, and in all that goes to make up a

nation. Probably about 5,000,000 are Ottoman Turks. The great majority have little or no education—ignorant, illiterate, mostly peasants or workingmen, simple-minded, peaceful, intensely superstitious and pious or religious. A few, perhaps a hundred thousand, are men of education, men of culture, men of refinement, men who possess the European manner and the European education. These few thousands, until this war came, were the rulers of the land. They dominated the affairs of the country. They were the spokesmen of the Ottoman Empire. Between these two extremes of the Turks—between, on the one hand, these few thousands of men who held all the positions of trust in the government, and the Turkish peasant and workman at the other extreme—came all of the rest of the peoples of Turkey, the peoples whose ancestors made up the nations which Turkey conquered. Millions were Arabs who, like the Turks, were Moslem in their religious belief, but who had little or nothing to do with the Turks and seldom if ever intermarried with them. Millions were Greeks who still speak the Greek tongue. There were hundreds of thousands of Jews, some of whom spoke Spanish, or a mixture of Spanish and Hebrew and Turkish. There were Lebanonites and Syrians, descendants of those peoples and nations over which the Turkish army swept; and then there were still probably a million, no one can tell exactly, perhaps a million and a half or two million, of those wonderful people who have withstood such persecutions and such outrages upon them during these past four years that one wonders when one hears the story that any remain alive to tell the tale—those Armenians who are said to be descended from the first of the pagan tribes which accepted the doctrines of Christ and who have suffered for it ever since. Part of Armenia, or what perhaps is real Armenia and in which there now live about 2,000,000 Armenians, was taken by Russia. It is what is called Russian Armenia. These peoples, other than the Moslem Turks of whom I have spoken, stand in between the two extremes of the Turks, and are in theory subject races.

Strange to say, today there is what is called a liberal monarchy in Turkey. Until eight or nine years ago it was an absolute one, dominated by the Sultan. Even the Turk was unable to stand it longer, and there was almost a bloodless revolution during which

they deposed this absolute monarch and placed his elder brother upon the throne; and he ruled only in name until he died a few months ago. He has been succeeded by a younger brother, who now reigns by the permission of the great Powers of the world until it shall be decided what is to be the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The rulers of the land during this period were the members of the Cabinet. Then, gradually, the power came to be placed in the hands of two men of this Cabinet, men whose names are known, Enver and Talat—men who threw their fortunes into league with the Central Empires and who, as the war progressed and after Turkey entered the war in the fall of 1914, were but the agents of the German Emperor. They today are fugitives, and it is interesting to note that it is said that they have gone back to the original home of the Turk, to the far off country of Turkestan, whence the Turk centuries ago began his foray into the civilized world. There, according to the stories that the newspapers tell, these two men are preaching the doctrines of the majority, otherwise called bolshevism, and trying to arouse the people to begin a new campaign against the Ottoman Empire and the countries of that part of the world which we speak of as the Near East.

With a land like that which I have indicated, with peoples of different religious beliefs, tongues and customs, there are, indeed, presented many problems for consideration. It is said that America has a great interest in that land, an interest which has been shown by our sending large numbers of missionaries there and creating and maintaining wonderful institutions of learning. But, to my thinking, our obligation is now to see that those peoples who are persecuted, downtrodden, oppressed, murdered and massacred, shall have that right to live in the sun as all men and women under God have a right to do.

CONSTANTINOPLE

Many plans are proposed. First, there is the great problem of what shall be done with that part of the Ottoman Empire which lies within the boundaries of Europe. There is the wonderful city of Constantinople with its fine harbors—a great port opening the way to all of southern Russia, permitting access to the Black Sea, and on both sides of it a strategic position which all the nations of the earth, except America, have coveted and which all

the nations of the earth, even today, except this land of ours, would be willing, perhaps, to possess. The disposal of Constantinople is one problem.

THE TURKS IN EUROPE

Then it has been said that the Turk, because of the atrocities which the Turkish government has permitted against the Armenians, should be driven from Europe. Now, there are between 700,000 and 1,000,000 Moslem Turks in that part of Turkey in Europe between Constantinople and Adrianople. They have lived there for five hundred years—they and their families. It might be almost as cruel to deport them from that land and from their homes as it was cruel to send out those hundreds of thousands of Armenians from their homes where they had lived for centuries.

Side by side with that suggestion comes a proposition to internationalize, or place under international control, the whole of the Turkish Empire, leaving the land and its peoples as it is. This might permit the working out of its salvation by each nation.

CONFEDERATION OF TURKEY

The next plan which I have seen proposed is one that meets with little favor from any one. It is to make a sort of confederation, as it were, of all these countries—to try to make a kind of a United States out of Turkey, some states to be free, some to be partly free, some to be placed under the guidance or under the protectorate of a great foreign power, all to have some measure of independence—all, I presume, with the idea of working out as time goes by their own independence. For the Moslem Turk himself there would be reserved a new country carved out of Asiatic Turkey, where the greatest number of the Moslem Turks reside.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

Syria, according to this plan, would be semi-independent with France for her guidance and protection. But those of Syrian birth would feel dissatisfied with any guidance or with any protectorate, claiming that they themselves are entitled to be an independent people. Yet France claims certain ancient and inalienable rights, as she puts it, in Syria. Also the Lebanonites, in-

habiting that ancient country of Lebanon, assert the right of independence, and over them, too, France claims certain rights of protection and guidance.

ARMENIA

Armenia likewise claims, with reason and justice, that she should be given, some say, full independence and freedom. Speaking of her history, of her peoples, of her requirements and what she has accomplished, Armenians point with real pride to what their people have become throughout the world, as an example of what they may be able to do if they live under a free government of their own. Some say, however, that there should be a protectorate over that land, and to America many of the Armenians offer this task.

ARABIA

Arabia presents another problem. The Arabians, when the war came, with the assistance of England, proclaimed themselves an independent kingdom and set up a power of their own, and they, too, claimed the right to have a government of their own.

I have thus briefly outlined the story of the Ottoman Empire, its history, the problems of its future. There are other problems—Palestine, for instance, but all these can be solved with intelligence and thought, and solved in such a way as to bring to these peoples the realization of their aspirations for liberty and freedom and justice. We are today turning over a leaf in history which for those peoples of the Near East is momentous. For them the pages of the past have been written in letters of blood. Now we turn for them and for the whole world to a much fairer and a brighter page: the one whereon will be inscribed the victories of peace and the triumphs of the right—the right for which those peoples in that far off land have looked so far in vain. We hope and believe, however, that this time it shall not be in vain.

The Future of the Ottoman Empire

By HENRY W. JESSUP, M.A., J.D.

New York

“**M**ENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHARSIN. MENE: God hath numbered thy kingdom and finished it. TEKEL: Thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting. PERES: Thy kingdom is divided.” These words uttered to the reckless Belshazzar are equally applicable to the Sultan of Turkey. “The writing is on the wall.” By successive breaches of trust, by cruelties beyond recording, by a congenital incapacity to appreciate the restraints of civilization, by the very nature of his religion, and, I regret to add, by the very record of his experience in overreaching the great powers after each relapse into savagery, it is no longer a question what shall be done to protect the Turkish empire or to safeguard its integrity, but what shall be done to assure security of life “and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development to the oppressed nationalities heretofore under Turkish rule.” And this question relates itself to four of such nationalities: the Armenians, the Greeks, the Syrians and the Arabs. The separation of the last two is intentional.

AMERICA'S RELATION TO THE TURKISH PROBLEM

First, however, what is the relationship of the United States to this problem? It would be idle to speak of the interest of the American people in the sufferings of those upon whom the combined savagery of Turk and Teuton has been unleashed since 1914. Torturings beyond the ingenuity of the inquisition; deportation of entire communities into the deserts; indiscriminate slaughter and robbery; rapings and ravishings; systematic starvation of whole villages by blockade;—all these, thus too mildly summarized, aroused and shocked the conscience of America and elicited a degree of benevolent helpfulness never before paralleled. Hence I may safely assert as my premise that the American people demand of the government of the United States that never again shall it take, in respect to such conditions and such sufferings, the attitude of indifference and trustfulness which the records of our

state department show that it took on the occasion of the last massacres, to go back no further than 1909. I refer to the massacres under "Abdul the Damned" which preceded the so-called "Constitution of July, 1908," which Mr. Leishman, and many others, thought was a real revolution of reform calculated to bring about an era, according to our easy-going minister, "of universal good-will and fraternity among all the races and creeds of the empire." His reports are recorded in a book entitled, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which is readily accessible. In this same book is recorded the attempt of Congressman Bennett to secure some intervention on the part of the United States to put a stop to the massacres of the Armenians which were again arousing the attention of the civilized world. A petition had been presented to the President, and the Department of State made the following answer:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, JUNE 28, 1909.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 18th, enclosing a petition from the representatives of the Armenian Evangelical Alliance, addressed to the President, urging the influence of the United States for the amelioration of the condition of the Armenians.

The petition has been read with attention and interest. This question has from time to time had the earnest consideration of this government for many years, and the recent terrible events in Asia Minor have served to further manifest the deep sympathy of the American people and the abhorrence of the President over the atrocities perpetrated. While the government of the United States, not being a signatory to the Berlin Treaty engagement, deems itself—as the petitioners seem not unaware—precluded from any consideration on its part of a question of intervention in the present circumstances, or of sharing in those treaty responsibilities, the sentiments of this government and its earnest desire that the Armenians shall possess absolute security of life and property are common knowledge to the concert of great powers who by the treaty compact aimed to accomplish that result.

Every thinking American deplors the antagonism, differences, and opposing ambitions which have arrayed the racial and religious elements of the Turkish population against each other. The sufferings of the innocent victims in the late outrages have deeply touched American sympathies. Neither in these events nor in times past has this government looked on unmoved. It has always wished that it had the power to prevent such sufferings, but it is convinced that, in the obvious impossibility of intervention, it is powerless. The broader tendencies developing in the Near East and the moral suasion of the Christian treaty powers must be trusted finally to prevail to reconcile the opposing factions.

It is no longer a question of dealing with a government implicated in the Armenian massacres. It is earnestly believed that the best course now for the betterment of the unfortunate people concerned is to exhibit a degree of confidence in the newly established constitutional government, whose Sultan has solemnly proclaimed to Parliament his horror over the awful slaughter among his subjects, his firm intention to punish the guilty, and his purpose to use his fullest power to maintain peace, justice, and tranquillity throughout his dominions and among all races and religionists. The magnitude and difficulty of the task of the new régime should win the sympathy of all well-wishers of peace and justify a fair opportunity of accomplishment without interference.

The hopeful promise of reforms seems to be confirmed by the recent official reports from Turkey that the constitutional government is taking vigorous measures for the complete restoration of order in Asia Minor, for a rigid investigation of the massacres, and for the effective military protection of the disturbed districts. All of which, it is hoped, will prevent a recurrence of the recent lamentable events, which are deplored as keenly by the President as they can be by any citizens.

A copy of the petition of the Armenian Evangelical Alliance will be communicated to the American ambassador to Turkey, who is fully aware of the President's views in the premises.

I have, etc.,

HUNTINGTON WILSON.

Publicity has been recently given to the trial and execution of one or more individuals as an evidence of the good faith of the new Sultan, Mohammed VI, who expresses disapprobation of all the acts of his predecessor and of the Pasha generals who had control of affairs during the war. It is barely possible that these executions have actually taken place, but in any event the widest publicity is being given to them in the conviction which the Turk has long entertained that the Occidental mind will interpret an act of this sort as being done for the reasons and pursuant to the motives that would dominate an Occidental government in such an inquiry and punishment. Nothing of the kind is true of the Turkish attitude. They are merely laying their offenses upon scapegoats and dismissing them into the wilderness. If necessary, a hundred or a thousand victims would be offered for the purpose of clearing the skirts and saving the suzerainty of the Sultan. The American mind, without the actual experience of living under the Turkish government and with the subjects of Turkey, cannot readily appreciate the attitude of the Mohammedan Turk to his non-Moslem subjects. Justice to the Christian populations of Turkey impartially administered is absolutely incompatible with

the Mohammedan religion or with the Ottoman Turk's theory of government, and the sooner that is realized the better. In Mohammedan law there is only one word expressing the relation of the Moslem to the non-Moslem, and that is *Jehad*, i.e., Holy War.

In a report on the capitulations of the Ottoman empire, published in 1881 by our state department,¹ Edward A. Van Dyck calls attention to the fact that of all consuls residing in the various Moslem countries along the shores of the Mediterranean those that are sent by the government of the United States are, perhaps, more deficient than any others in an acquaintance with the growth and history of the peculiar and exceptional relations that have long existed between the Christian nations of Europe and the Mohammedan nations of North Africa and Western Asia. The writer observes:

It accordingly happens quite often that a newly appointed consul arrives at his post in a Turkish city without a knowledge of the principles that govern the relations of his fellow-citizens residing in the consular district to which he has been sent with the authorities and natives of the land, between whom he is the only proper medium of official communication. . . . He knows not the native language and he has scarcely any, or in most cases, no acquaintance at all with the commercial and diplomatic languages of the Levant, which are the French and Italian.

With one or two notable exceptions, this same criticism might apply to the ministers of the United States at Constantinople. They have been almost uniformly ignorant of the fundamental characteristics of Turkish character and of Oriental customs and habits of thought and expression. Themselves direct and truth-speaking, they have been easily overreached by exaggerated courtesy and hyperbole of speech.

The Arabs have a tradition that when the devil set forth to distribute lies over the earth, he lay down with his seven bagfuls on a mountain to take a nap. An inquisitive Syrian got six bags opened, and liberated their contents, before Shaitan awoke. Hence the superfluity of falsehood in the Near East.

Kent in his *Law of Nations* observes that, "international

¹ Largely based on the English translation of the introduction to Dr. Ratteschi's *Manual on Ottoman Public and Private Law*, and on DeTesta's *Collection of Treaties with Turkey*, on Brunswick's work on the *Reforms and Capitulations of Turkey*, and on Arabic and other sources.

law, as professed by the civilized nations of Christendom, is the offspring of the communion of ideas subsisting between them, and is based upon a common origin, and an almost identical faith." In the light of this statement, Van Dyck states that the intercourse between the Christian world and the Mohammedan world is not founded upon the principles of the law of nations and that the relations of the one to the other for years had to be regulated solely with a view to political expediency and in accordance with treaties entered into between them. Anyone familiar with the Mohammedan religion and with the science of Moslem jurisprudence knows that there is, as above noted, only one relationship between those who recognize the apostleship of Mohammed and those who do not, i.e., *Jehad*. Someone has recorded of Brian Boru, the first king of Ireland, that he was a mythical character who never existed, and was succeeded by his son. It may be similarly stated that the fictitious will or command of Mohammed called in some ancient records, "The Treaty of Mohammed with the Christians," and often referred to as proof of Mohammedan justness and equity, is equally mythical. It never existed, and the successors of Mohammed have entertained the same sentiments as Mohammed did with regard to non-Moslems. The purpose of Islam is the propagation of faith in one God and in Mohammed as his prophet. And the mode of such propagation is by a holy, perpetual war against unbelievers, in order to convert them, or subject them to the payment of tribute. This right to wage war is the only principle of international law taught by Mohammedan jurists. Moreover, the "justice of the Cadi," and the equity of the Caliphs is evidence of the Arab nature and characteristics, not of those of the Ottoman Turks.

Singularly enough, the early European jurists took an identical position, recognizing no international law as against Moslems and holding that there ought always to be war with them. But about the middle of the nineteenth century the Sublime Porte under the stress of international events, recognized and itself exercised the right of legation and entered into many international obligations, capitulations or treaties. Since the Treaty of Paris in 1856, it has had a place in the political concert of Europe. This is not to say that there were not capitulations or treaties between Moslem rulers before the Turks, and between the Turks themselves, relat-

ing to certain commercial rights and the rights of citizens of various powers within the domains of the Sultan of Egypt or of Turkey. But it is a sufficient introduction to the statement that the United States of America, even since the Treaty of 1862 with Turkey, which was abrogated in 1882, has held an attitude of aloofness, with regard to affairs in Turkey and the treatment by Turkey of its non-Moslem subjects. An attitude, which, however consistent with the Monroe Doctrine, is at times inconsistent with those high principles which the government of the United States has from time to time asserted by force of arms; notably in the case of the Spanish War and the Philippines. Once in awhile the cruelty of the Turks, always ready to manifest itself, has found an opportunity. Such opportunities have arisen when the great military powers, of which alone it was afraid, were so engaged, that, before anything could be done by way of prevention, the Turks have by massacre attempted to cut the Gordian knot of their total inability to administer justice for and among their non-Moslem subjects.

I append extracts from the constitution of the Ottoman empire as revised in 1909 after the revolution of July, 1908, which constitution gave to our state department, as well as to the subjects of the Turkish empire, great hopes of a real reform. Note the following articles in particular:

4. That the Sultan is, in his character of Supreme Caliph, the protector of the Mohammedan religion.

5. His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, is irresponsible; his person is sacred.

10. The liberty of the individual is absolutely inviolable. No one can under any pretext be arrested or made to suffer any penalty except according to the forms and in the cases prescribed by the religious and civil laws!

11. Islamism is the religion of the state.

26. Torture and examination by torture in all forms are entirely and absolutely forbidden!

And then note, after the provisions protecting civil rights, establishing judicial machinery, etc., Article 113:

In case of a state of affairs or indications of such a nature as to render disturbances probable at some point in the territory of the empire, the imperial government has the right to proclaim a state of siege.

The effect of a state of siege is the temporary suspension of the civil laws.

So that we may say that all that has been done by Turkish soldiery acting under military orders in respect to the subject

Christian peoples of Turkey since the war began has been done under the constitution.

AMERICA'S RELATION TO TURKEY DURING THE WAR

But before discussing the direct subject of this paper, it is proper to inquire whether the United States is under any particular obligation, moral or otherwise, to take an active part internationally in enforcing a settlement of this Turkish question. I contend that it is; and this by reason of the following facts:

When Turkey entered the Great War as an ally of Germany she declared war on France and England. Thereupon the United States government, through its consular and diplomatic agents, was intrusted with the protection of the interests of the French and English nationals in Turkey. With few if any exceptions these nationals in Syria were missionaries, or missionary teachers, representing English and French missionary activities which had been established for several generations in Syria. Many of these missionaries were aged men and women, gentlefolk, refined, loved by the people. *Suffice it to say that they were non-combatants and entitled to reasonable opportunity to leave the country.* They were promptly arrested by the Turkish governor of the province, who was a member of the Turkish war cabinet and a general in the Turkish army. These people appealed at once to the American consul, who sent back word by the messenger (who was, of course, one of the governor's soldiery) that he "could do nothing." One of the English missionaries sent back a protest saying that if the situation were reversed and an American in like case appealed to the English consul, "the English consul would secure his release in fifteen minutes." To this the American consul sent back the reply that his "instructions were explicit, *not to embroil the United States.*"

It seems inconceivable that our state department could have intended to "welch" on its international obligation of trust to protect the rights of these nationals by any general or explicit instructions. Nevertheless, as the matter developed, the United States was not embroiled! These French and English missionaries were interned in dirty dungeons, their rights ignored, and that stage of the incident was closed.

But, the Turkish government was in possession of the informa-

tion that the instructions of the American consuls were that they must not embroil the United States. Whereupon step number two was taken. When the American consul had assumed the responsibility of protecting French and English interests he had proceeded to the French and English consulates and sealed the archives and the offices with the United States seal. The Turkish governor-general repaired to the French consulate, broke the United States seal and claimed to have discovered, as was afterwards recorded in his proclamation, published in the Cairo newspapers, documents implicating the loyalty of members of the Syrian reform committee, who had for years been endeavoring to secure reforms in taxation and the administration of justice in the province of Syria. On the strength of these alleged proofs of disloyalty he arrested and executed a number of the members of this committee. One member of the committee who was not arrested and escaped has told me these facts in my own office.

I have been unable by careful inquiry to ascertain that the United States ever secured any satisfaction for this outrageous insult to its dignity, although I gave the fact the utmost publicity at the time that I learned of it. My information is that nothing was done by the United States at the time. The incident in its second stage was thus closed.

This brings us to the early part of 1915. The United States, in 1909, had, as above stated, expressed itself as precluded from any consideration of a question of intervention, in the matter of the atrocities perpetrated in Asia Minor, because it was not a signatory of the treaty of Berlin. This was a public document and, of course, thoroughly well known to the Sublime Porte. France and England were the only powers fear of whom would have deterred the Turks from what they were about to do. Germany was its ally, and, if we are to believe the testimony even of Germans, was in part an instigator of the events that followed. But, for the purposes of this paper, I wish to emphasize the fact that it was not until after the United States had been felt out, and it had been discovered that the representatives of the United States had explicit instructions "not to embroil the United States," and after the United States had made no sign, *although the United States seal had been placed* by its consul upon the French consulate, and had been violated by the Turkish governor-general, and noth-

ing had been done, that the massacres commenced in the spring of 1915. They did commence. They were continued. News of them leaked out, and in the long cruel years since that time persons in the United States have been contributing to the relief of the victims of Turkish savagery, trying to keep body and soul together of the wretched survivors of the families raped, robbed, deported and massacred by the brutal Turkish soldiery under direct orders from Constantinople. Yet the United States, so far as its official activities have been concerned, did not declare war on Turkey! We finally declared war upon Turkey's ally, Germany, but we limited our diplomatic representations as to these massacres to a request through Germany that Berlin would exercise its kindly and humane offices to persuade the Sultan to put an end to these atrocities. A request that must have aroused that sense of humor which the Oriental possesses in such marked degree. Talaat and Enver have been known to smile.* Keen and intuitive as is the Oriental mind, it was difficult for the Turk to understand how he could be an ally of Germany and we could be at war with Germany and yet not at war with him. The argument *post hoc propterea hoc* may not apply, but it suggests itself. The United States when it entered the war did so with assurances to the world that gave to our entry into the war the character of a crusade in support of freedom, liberation of oppressed peoples and the determination to crush those powers of savagery that seemed to threaten the world. But so far as Turkey was concerned we refused to strike a blow to free her cruelly oppressed subjects—nor was our flag seen in the operations that laid those people under eternal obligations to their liberators.

These facts, however, I believe lay us under the compulsion of a moral obligation at the present juncture.

AMERICA'S POST-WAR RELATION TO TURKEY

But now that the war is over and the covenants of the League of Nations are being welded the situation has changed.

Consider first the attitude of the several nations interested in the solution of the problem before us. The attitude of isola-

*NOTE: Our state department even sent a cable message felicitating the Sultan on his august birthday! Even the melancholy monarch must then have smiled.

tion of the United States may be assumed to have been changed forever.

In the 12th of Mr. Wilson's fourteen points uttered January 8, 1918, he demanded:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an *absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development*.

In his rejoinder, of February 11, 1918, to the Central Powers, i.e., formulating his "four principles," he denied the right to barter provinces from sovereignty to sovereignty, and demanded that every territorial settlement must be made "in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned," but added as the fourth principle that, "all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them *without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism*."

In his Mount Vernon address July 4, 1918, he propounded as one of the "four ends" being fought for and which must be conceded before there could be peace:

The settlement of every question whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship, *upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned*.

There can be no argument on the proposition that Armenia and Syria can claim rightfully that as nationalities under Turkish rule, whose interests are vitally concerned by any territorial settlement of the Turkish situation, they must be protected by the fourteen points, the four principles and the four great ends.

As to the attitude of Russia in relation to Armenia, the memorandum presented by the delegates of the Armenian Republic to the Peace Conference on February 26, 1919, pointed out that after the breakdown of the Russian-Caucasian army and the withdrawal of their support of the Armenians, who had so loyally coöperated in the war up to that point, the Russians by the infamous treaty of Brest-Litovsk completely deserted their Armenian allies. This treaty left to the Turks the provinces of Turkish Armenia, which had been conquered by the Russian and Armenian armies, and also turned over to the Turks the purely Armenian provinces of the Caucasus, of Kars and Kaghisman, of Batum and Ardahan.

The Bolshevik government gave publicity to a so-called "Secret Treaty" that had been made by Great Britain, France and Russia, by which Turkish Armenia was to be partitioned between France and Russia. France was given Syria, and England was to receive Mesopotamia and the Palestinian ports of Acre and Haifa. Whether the President of the United States had knowledge of this treaty when he made his pledges to the oppressed nationalities in Turkey at the time we entered the great crusade now proves to be immaterial. I do not believe he had such knowledge. The Arabs, who revolted, and were achieving their plan of a free Arabia and Syria, certainly did not—Prince Faisul so states. But, as I say, it is now immaterial, for, in documents—presented by the Rev. Dr. Bliss, the president of the Protestant College of Beirut, when he was invited to appear before the Peace Conference on behalf of the people of Syria, who petitioned to be consulted as to their political future before any government were imposed upon them by the Peace Conference—it appears that in 1918 a declaration had been agreed to between the British and French governments and communicated to the President of the United States of America. This was published in the *Palestine News* of November, 1918, and the following is an extract therefrom:

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East the war let loose on the world by German ambition, is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the people themselves.

To realize this, France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving and to recognize those governments immediately they are effectively established.

Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution, they have no other care than to ensure, by their support and practical aid, the normal workings of such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted; to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the two allied governments have set themselves to play in liberated territories.

In addition to this I quote the nineteenth section of the League of Nations Covenant, as presented to the Peace Conference

February 14, 1919, so far as I am able to quote it in its last-known form:

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

I learn that a commission has accordingly been despatched from the Peace Conference to elicit such wishes on the ground.

THE FOUR NATIONALITIES

We have mentioned four groups or distinct nationalities to be protected in any international arrangement for the future of the Ottoman empire. If the claims of these four groups are recognized to any substantial extent the direct result will be to restrict the Sultan of Turkey to the territorial boundaries of the so-called province of Anatolia; to internationalize Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and the Bagdad railway; and to leave the Sultan shorn of his suzerainty of the Greeks of Asia Minor to the west, the Armenian republic to the east, the province of Syria to the south, and to the south of that the kingdom of Arabia.

THE ARAB CLAIMS

Each of the groups above mentioned makes its peculiar claim to recognition. The Arabs revolting against the Turks, have occupied the entire Arabian peninsula, have organized a government under the King of Hedjaz, have seized the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and rendered substantial service to the Allies by furnishing troops that were used by General Allenby in his expeditionary force for the occupation of Palestine and Syria. The recognition of their rights presents an interesting feature with regard to the future of Mohammedanism. The original Caliphs were Arabs. The language of Islam is the Arabic. Mecca and Medina are Arab cities and holy cities of the religion. With the conquests of the Ottoman Turk the Osmanli assumed rights of leadership and control in the Moslem world against which there has always been strong protest. The Sheikh-ul-Islam has been located at the capital of the Ottoman empire and has interchangeably been

dominated by or has dominated the politics of the empire. To de-nationalize Constantinople might conceivably result in the Sheikh-ul-Islam repairing to the Holy City of Mecca and in restoring the purity of the original Islamic rule. Or the King of Hedjaz, who was himself Shereef of Mecca, or even his picturesque son, Prince Faisul, under the influence of the romantic ideals of Lawrence, his Fidas Achates, might assume the Caliphate.

The Arab hatred and distrust of the Turkish claims could not have been lessened by the brutal threat of the Turkish garrison of Medina, when they were attacked, to blow up Mohammed's Tomb! The Arab Moslems may again come into their own. They would include the wandering pastoral Bedawins who are simple monotheists and, though regarded by the government as Mohammedans, have no religious sheikhs or imams, no places of worship, no hours of prayer, rarely keep the Fast of Ramadan, or make the pilgrimage to Mecca. So the Moslems say: "There are three classes who have no religion, muleteers, Bedawin Arabs, and women."—(*Kamil*, H. H. Jessup.)

The character of the pure Arab, on the other hand, has been unchanged through the centuries. His dignity, his cult of hospitality, his pride of race, his ambition, his independence, his virility, all give promise of the emergence of a nation apt for self-government and capable of centralizing within itself the hopes and aspirations of the Moslem world with all that that implies.

CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF SYRIA

The adjustment of the boundary between the kingdom of the Arabs and the province of Syria, supposing the latter to extend from the angle formed by the Asia Minor coast with the easterly coast of the Mediterranean, from Antioch and Aleppo down to the Egyptian frontier, would be a matter not unattended with difficulties. Damascus is, in a sense, one of the Holy Cities of Islam, but it is also the historic capital of Syria. Yet Prince Faisul desires to have his boundaries extend to include the region around Damascus. On the other hand, the province of Syria, if it is to be self-supporting, must control the hinterland including Aleppo and Damascus. It should include the whole coast from Alexandretta down to Egypt, and should go right back to the desert and include the Damascus plains. The plains of the Bukaa or Coele-

Syria, between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges are the most fertile part of Syria. Nothing would be gained by continuing the separation of Lebanon from the coast cities.² As a matter of

NOTE.—The following letter expands this suggestion of incompatibility:

¹ *To the Editor of The New York Times:*

Thus far the objections raised against the claim of the King Hedjaz to rule Syria and Mesopotamia have been that the Syrians and Mesopotamians are not of Arab race; that historically they possessed, and still possess, a much higher stage of civilization, and that socially and intellectually they are way ahead. The logical inference is, therefore, that they cannot hope to reap many economic and educational benefits if their countries join Arabia.

But there is another and more cogent reason why such a political union is inadvisable, and that is religion. Religion, we should bear in mind, is the controlling factor in the affairs of that part of the Near East of which I am writing. When, a few years ago, D. Saaty of Providence, R. I., took to Mosul an ice-making machine, he was told by the authorities there that the ice making was the work of the Creator and that, therefore, it was against the will of Allah to grant him a permit. The difference between the inhabitants of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and those of the Arabian peninsula, as far as enlightenment goes, is like that which exists between the Americans and the Mexicans.

What the various parts of Turkey need, and need very badly, is the establishment of a just and tolerant government. But no native race at present can administer such a government, whether Arabs, Syrians, Assyrians, Armenians, Turks, or Kurds. For they all lack the sense of political justice and the spirit of religious tolerance as are embodied in the principles of our western institutions. How could they be otherwise when they have been for many centuries living in the environments created by the crooked and oppressive Turk? There is no feeling of race unity among them; religion is their sole guiding principle. But the conflicting beliefs have kept them apart and tend to prevent their union as a single nation. The most deplorable fact is that there are no native influences to counteract these divergent tendencies. Hence comes the urgent need for foreign mandatories.

We may admit, I think, that the Arabs are as just in their dealings as any nationality of their neighbors. But it must be conceded also that the people of Al-Hedjaz are the most intolerant. This is attested by the undeniable fact that no person not belonging to their creed can enter Makkah, where the King of Arabia resides, and come out alive if he is caught. Now, how the Makkans will be able to make good in Syria and Mesopotamia, where live so many Christians, Jews, Druses, Devil Worshipers, and what not, is very hard to understand. It is still harder to comprehend how enlightened European statesmen, who were a while ago making so much noise about the rights of small nationalities, allow themselves to be persuaded that narrow-minded nomads can advantageously govern civilized communities.

The natives of Mesopotamia desire the establishment of an independent state along modern lines, under the trusteeship of Great Britain, to be administered

fact, taking the population of the cities on the coast, and of Damascus together with the population of the Lebanon villages, the Druse, the Maronites,³ the Nusairiyeh, diverse as they are, hostile to one another as they are, yet, there are influences that would set the province on its feet in less than twenty years. These are the influences that have been at work through Christian missions for three generations, the tutelage of a disinterested, impartial mandatary, the intelligence of the people, and the long-developing desire for independence together with a just system of taxation and an opportunity to develop the resources of the country and a wise system of re-forestation. One of the interesting landmarks on the Eastern slope of the Lebanon is a stone with the inscription:

DELIM	} i. e.
SYLV	
HADR	
IMP.	
	Hadrian's
	Forest
	Preserve.

Under the Turks there has been no "forest preserve" and even the Cedars of Lebanon have been decimated. The commissioners who have been sent by the Peace Conference to Syria to ascertain

for all of its inhabitants without distinction as to race or creed. I say Great Britain because of the peculiar interest of England in that part of the Orient, and because of her immense sacrifices in bringing deliverance to all Mesopotamia, including the province of Diarbekir, which lately has been occupied by British troops, but above all because we have a great confidence in the British sense of justice and in the British virtue of religious tolerance which she has so brilliantly demonstrated in India and Egypt. For this reason we are respectfully petitioning the Peace Conference not to entangle our fair land of the Two Rivers with the dreary land of the desert.

ISYA JOSEPH.

Port Chester, N. Y., Feb. 10, 1919.

³ Maronites: "A papal sect, the ancient Monothelites, who accepted the papacy 1182 A. D., during the Crusades. They get their name from John Marōn, monk, priest and patriarch, who died 707 A. D. They adhere to the Oriental rite, conducting service in the Syriac, a language not understood by the people. The only sin unpardonable by the priests is reading the Bible. The people are chiefly peasants, in Northern Lebanon, an illiterate people, and an educated priesthood, sworn to allegiance to Rome and yet having a married parish clergy. Their head is the Patriarch of Antioch, living in Lebanon, and regarded by the people as hardly inferior to the Pope."—(*Fifty-three Years in Syria*, H. H. Jessup.)

the desire of the people by some form of referendum with regard to the power which they would ask to have exercise the mandate of the League of Nations, will ascertain the ratio now subsisting between the Moslems and the so-called Christians of this province. In the Lebanon the Christians are in a majority, unless the systematic starvation practiced by the Turks has decimated them. This includes the Maronites, Greek Catholics and Protestants, but in the cities other than Damascus the Moslems probably would be in the majority. I do not here take into account the Druzes⁴ of the Lebanon nor the Nusairiyeh⁵ in the mountains

⁴ Druzes: The Druzes are neither Moslem nor Christian, but a peculiar, secret, mystic sect, having no priesthood and no assemblies for worship, claiming to be Unitarians, or believers in one God, infinite, indefinable, incomprehensible and passionless, who has become incarnate in a succession of ten men, the last of whom was the mad Egyptian caliph, Hakim b'amr Illah, who was assassinated A. D. 1044. They are more of a political than a religious society, and the national spirit is intense. The Druse nation can neither increase nor decrease. It is lawful to pretend to believe in the religion of any sect among whom they dwell. Among the Moslems they are Moslems, among the Jews, Jews, among the Greeks they are Greeks, among the Romanists they are good papists, and among the Protestants they are Evangelical Biblical Christians. In politics they look to the English for protection, and have always favored the American schools. They are courteous, hospitable, industrious, temperate and brave. The okkal, or initiated class, use neither tobacco nor liquors of any kind. Any one leaving their sect for Christianity would be disinherited."—(*Fifty-three Years in Syria*, H. H. Jessup.)

In the year 1872 they suffered a serious disappointment. It was the year predicted as the final crisis or cataclysm of their religion. Their prophet El-hakem, who claimed to be an incarnation of the Deity, promised when he died, 1021 A. D., to return with an immense army from China, overthrow Islam and subject the earth to his sway.

⁵ Nusairiyeh: They hold to the transmigration of souls, that the souls of all men at death pass into new bodies, and that unbelievers are at death transformed into some one of the lower animals. They believe that the spirits of Moslem sheikhs at death take the bodily form of asses; that Christian doctors enter swine bodies; that Jewish rabbis take the form of male apes; that wicked Nusairis enter into domestic animals; great sceptics among them into apes, while persons of mixed character enter bodies of men of other sects. They simulate all sects, as do the Druzes, and on meeting Moslems swear to them that they likewise fast and pray. But on entering a mosque they mutter curses against Abu Bekr, Omar and Othman and others. They say, "We are the body, all other sects are clothing; but whatever clothing a man may put on, it does not injure him, and one who does not simulate is a fool, for no reasonable man will go naked in the market-place." So they are Christians with the Christians, Jews with the Jews, and all things, literally, to all men.

north of Tripoli. It has been reported that during the war by the systematic starvation of village after village in the Lebanon the number of the Christian population has been diminished, some estimates reaching as high as 100,000. Whether this be true or not there would be no expectation of a constitutional government in which the Christians of Syria could have the majority.

It will be noted that this discussion of the province of Syria makes no account of the so-called Zionist state, to include Jerusalem and perhaps the province of Judea. To the writer this plan presents no features entitling it to consideration. Politically it is an iridescent dream. That there should be, under a constitutional government to be erected under the tutelage of a mandatory of the League of Nations, absolute freedom of immigration to the Jews is unquestionable, but the movement, judging from the past, is not a national movement on the part of the Jews. Many of their leaders are lukewarm in their advocacy; many of them are frankly opposed to it, and, so far as a Jewish population in Syria is concerned, it might be said as a broad generalization, that the Yahudi or Jew as a member of the community is anathema alike to the Arab and to the Turk. Under international protection and as a place of refuge for the pauper Jews of Russia and southeastern Europe, the scheme of Baron Hirsch, philanthropic as it was, has not even yet resulted in creating an adequate nucleus for a national life. I am aware that this Zionist propaganda has ardent supporters in Eng-

They have secret signs, questions and answers by which they recognize each other. For example, one says on meeting a stranger, "Four, two fours, three and two, and as many more twice over in thy religion, what place have they?" Answer: "In the Journeying Chapter," etc. They use signs, and they use the interlacing triangle. In their secret worship they partake of bread and wine. They have borrowed from the Bible, the Koran, and from Persian and Sabian mysticism. They teach that out of man's sins God created Satans and devils, and out of the sins of those devils He made women, and hence no woman is taught their religion. When the initiated meet for prayer to Ali, guards are placed to keep the women at a distance. Their most binding oath is to swear by the faith of the covenant of Ali, prince of believers, and by the covenant of "Ain Mim Sin." Soleman bribed one of the chiefs of the "Northerner" Sect of Nusairis to tell him the "hidden mystery," which proved to be that the heavens are the impersonation of Ali Ibn Abu Talib; the wine-colored river in heaven is Mohammed; and the milk-white river is Salman al Farsi; that when we are purified from earthly grossness, our spirits will be elevated to become stars in the Milky Way, etc.

land and in this country, but, so far as I have any opinion in the premises, it is adverse to the erection of a separate state interrupting the continuity of the province of Syria to the Egyptian frontier, and is not based upon any of the fundamental ideas of opportunity for autonomous development to a race or nationality outlined above. It does not represent a national purpose so much as a racial sentiment. The Jews in the United States as a class covet the name of Americans and deprecate hyphenation. But in any event, should there be recognized such a community or state, it should not be allowed to extend its boundaries beyond the old province of Judea, except perhaps that it might have access to the sea, say at Jaffa.

ARMENIA

The situation of Armenia seems to have been more perfectly crystallized than that of any other one of these groups. The so-called "Secret Treaty" made in 1915-1916 during the war, between France and England, relating to the responsibilities of each in respect to Syria, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and other parts of the Ottoman empire, was in the nature of counting chickens before they were hatched. In another connection I have asked whether President Wilson, when he enunciated his fourteen points and four principles and four great ends, was or was not in ignorance of the provisions of this treaty. If he had knowledge of them then he would not have uttered these great pledges to the provinces of the Ottoman empire without knowing he would have the approval and coöperation of France and England in fulfilling them. If he did not know of them, the provisions of this treaty may be deemed to be waived, by the joint declaration above quoted, no less than if the powers that made it enter into the peace treaty and the concomitant covenants of the League of Nations. For to whatever power that league shall issue its mandate in respect to Armenia, it could only be France, England or the United States, to which such mandate would issue. Their consent to the peace treaty and the covenant of the league would amount to the abdication of any special privilege or right which either may believe herself to have achieved by virtue of these stipulations plus their joint victory over the Turk. Armenia comes to the convention requesting recognition of her independence. She has history and

geography to aid in her claims to definite national boundaries. But her neighbors-to-be constitute the reason of her willingness to be under a temporary tutelage. The Turk will be on her western border. The province of Syria on the south will give her little concern. Persia on the east is and will be too weak to trouble the new nation unless incited or helped by the Great Bear on the north, whose claws of aggression may be assumed to be clipped if the Dardanelles be "opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations."

To what should this tutelage extend, and what is the Armenian purpose in desiring it? The answer is reasonably obvious. The new nation contemplates:

1. A constitution guaranteeing to all its inhabitants the institutions of free government, including a representative congress.

2. A judicial system under which the rights so guaranteed can be protected, and life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness be realized.

3. A fiscal system, internal and external (for it will have littorals on the Black Sea and on the Mediterranean) including the administration of a preliminary national loan, a just tax law and a plan for development of the great mineral and other natural resources without sacrificing their ultimate control by the people of Armenia when and as developed.

4. A military and police system adequate to the purpose of self-defense and self-control.

But such plans must not be rushed or hurried. For, assuming the recognition of the new Armenia by the powers forming the League of Nations and the posting of "No Trespassing" notices on the Turkish and Russian frontiers, time is indispensable in which expatriated Armenians may return, give in their allegiance, and participate in the deliberations and elections requisite to launch the new government.

As to the constitution and the system of judicial administration no doubt much preliminary work has been done.

As to the details of a fiscal or military system, outside aid or advice is imperative. A national loan to be expended wisely and without extravagance, would doubtless be subject to a condition as to supervision of its expenditure for a period within which the new nation could reasonably be expected to get on a firm footing of

development of its own resources. Without such a loan there would be the temptation to raise money by improvident exploitation of their rich mineral and other resources through concessions, as a result of which the bulk of these great assets might fall under foreign control.

GREECE IN ASIA MINOR

With the demands of the fourth group, the Greeks in Asia Minor, the following situation presents itself. From classic days they have been indigenous to the soil. Crossing the Aegean as colonists they settled in another jurisdiction and took the chances of such settlement. But at the same time they have created the agriculture and commerce of western Asia Minor. Numerically, they are in certain districts in an overwhelming majority, and, so far as oppression goes, they come within the purview of protection of the President's promise on entering the Great War. They figure their losses by the massacres as but little less than do the Armenians. To those of us who favor the constricting of the boundaries of any Turkish rule to the narrowest possible limits, the idea of extending the power and sovereignty of Greece over the western shores of Asia Minor, and for a considerable distance back into the hinterland, commends itself as in the interest of justice and of civilization. The limits of Greece are too narrow to contain her population. And it is true in a large sense that the government of Greece under its present Prime Minister would give promise of restoration of order and of the establishment of a just government in western Asia Minor. Moreover, the relation of the Greek Church to the civil and political life in Greece is such as to afford a guaranty of the continuance of such just government if the Grecian sovereignty were so extended. The Greeks are naturally maritime traders—the Turk is a naval joke.⁵

THE RESIDUARY LEGATEE

As to the future of the Ottoman Turk—shorn of his territory, disgraced in the judgment of the civilized world, confined between boundaries having a stronger Greece on the west and an industri-

⁵ NOTE: This prefiguration of the matter has been since justified by the landing of two divisions of the Greek Army at Smyrna, under protection of Allied warships.—ED.

ous and flourishing Armenian state on the east under the tutelage and guardianship of one of the great powers of the world—his fate calls for no sympathy. It is astonishing that from British sources there is a constant reëmergence of the sentimental appeal to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman empire! That such a sentiment should effectually sway the judgment of the great powers seems inconceivable.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

Leon Dominian in a review in *The Geographical Review* for January, 1919, of Morris Jastrow's book on *The War and the Bagdad Railway* points out that the whole history of Asiatic Turkey is a record of traffic and transportation. It is this fact that, so far as Egypt was concerned in its relation to the Babylonian dynasties in the past, and so far as the whole world is concerned today in questions affecting the Near and Far East, makes the question of control of the caravan trade avenues overland to the Far East always a question of intimate international concern. The caravan routes from Egypt up through Palestine to Hamath are now replaced with railroads connecting the new Bagdad railroad, making available, not only for the support of the new Armenia but for the world, its rich agricultural resources, its manufactures of silk and woolen rugs, and also its resources of iron, silver, coal, zinc, manganese and copper, practically combining all the previous problems of transportation in the problem: what is to be the future of the Bagdad railway? Except for outside foreign influence in localities and the existence of the so-called "caravan routes," there is no adequate system of roads in Armenia or Syria or Arabia. Dominian points out, as it had been previously developed by Ratzel,

That periods of prosperity in Asiatic Turkey corresponded to periods when roads were adequately policed and travel was safe. That there was such a condition existing from a time some six centuries before Christ and lasting through Byzantine times, but that the coming of the Turks brought desolation and stopped human circulation. Poverty grew as travel diminished.

It is obvious that the railroad as now projected and built (the exact facts not yet being fully known as to the continuity of the line through to Bagdad to meet the military lines built by the British during the war) was due to German money and influence

in Turkey. But the fruits of this great project are to be reaped primarily by the regions through which the railroad runs, and the regions which have railway communication connecting with it as a trunk line; and, secondarily, by international trade. This railroad would run when completed through the dominions of several powers, and therefore ought, as much as Constantinople and the Dardanelles, to be internationalized. Whatever the powers given to any mandatory under the League of Nations Covenant, assuming it to come into operation, one of such powers to be expressly stipulated in the decree appointing the mandatory, should be the governmental power of consenting to the internationalization of such an important commercial trade route.

CONCLUSION

To sum up:

1. Turkey should be shorn of her suzerainty over the four groups above enumerated.

2. The Armenian Republic should be recognized with the probably immediate result that much of the Turkish population within its new boundaries will remove itself to the Turkish districts of Anatolia, and the Armenians scattered through Anatolia and the remaining fragment of European Turkey may be expected to return in large numbers to their native land. The Greeks of the Black Sea littoral have always been on good terms with the Armenians, and there is no reason why they should not become willing subjects of the new Armenian state. In fact, the present Greek government has expressed its willingness to have the Greeks of Pontus attached to an independent Armenia.

In respect to both of these groups it is well to repeat what has been elsewhere asserted, that the mere fact that the United States might be a mandatory for the new Armenia would not mean that it would be the sole link between Armenia and the world. French influence or French capital might have free access to the new republic, and at the expiration of the period fixed in the mandate to the United States, the people would be free to relate themselves to any sphere of influence and to have accepted as their creditor any power whose business men are willing to make their investments in the new dominion. No mandatory in addition to accepting the responsibilities laid upon it of preserving order, of developing

a stable government, would for a moment reject the capital that might be offered, from whatever source, in the development of such resources and in assisting to put the new nation upon a sound self-supporting basis. The selection of the mandatary should depend largely on its disinterestedness and the implied guarantee that it will not endeavor to exploit the province for its own profit.

3. Whether the province of Syria could become a nation in as short a time as that of Armenia is doubtful, because of the diverse and heterogeneous elements to be dealt with and of the fact that Syria has been the stamping ground for contending races, religions and armies since the days of Rameses, Thotsmes, Tiglath Pileser and Assur bani Pal. The rocks above the Dog River at Beirut still retain records of the achievements of these great warriors, and at one time had graven upon them a record by Napoleon, which was afterwards, it was reported, chiseled out by direction of the British! But under the influences of education the Syrians have developed a high degree of intelligence, alertness and ability and are fully capable, if internal jealousies and factions do not impede or prevent their national development, of becoming a self-sustaining nation.

I do not agree with the claims of Prince Faisul that the Arab kingdom should include Syria. Arabia is huge. Its interior table-land has vast possibilities if capital and industry are admitted to develop its resources. Syria is a separate entity, has distinctive resources and ought not to be relinquished to the intolerance of purely Moslem rule. I confess I do agree with Faisul's objection to a French protectorate. He points to northern Africa and says that while French colonial government is benign and orderly it does not develop the people governed into good Arabs but into "first-class sham Frenchmen." The Oriental mind is keen and in this instance his analysis is profound. Mr. Lewis S. Gannett thinks Prince Faisul as the leader of the Arab army should be selected as the ruler of Syria. I believe such a selection would be unwise as tending to the ultimate aggrandizement of the kingdom of Arabia, and not in the real interests of separate Syrian autonomy.

4. As to the kingdom of Arabia—it is a question whether it would require to be under the tutelage of a mandatary of a league

of nations. They do not ask military protection. They have all the seacoast their commercial needs require. It would be interesting if, under international recognition they were protected from outside attack, and coming into the sisterhood of nations, were required to abandon their exclusion of outside influences, and were subjected to the civilizing processes of Christian education. They might renew then their title to international respect and achieve a position of dignity and power among the nations of the world.

The Turks and the Future of the Near East

By MORRIS JASTROW, JR., PH.D., LL.D.

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THE Eastern Question, which is primarily involved in any discussion regarding the future of the Turks, may be called the ghost that stalks across the hall at Paris in which the representatives of the great nations are at present assembled for deliberation at a crisis in the world's history; and there is only one of those nations that can address the ghost and truthfully say,

"Thou canst not say I did it,
Shake not thy gory locks at me."

That nation is the United States. Let us be fair even to the Turk, and recognize at the outset that but for the diplomatic game played by all the Great Powers of Europe in the past—England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, without exception—the ghost would have been laid years ago. Acting entirely from motives of expediency, instead of basing their diplomatic policy on principle, when at the close of the eighteenth century the definite decline of Turkey brought the Eastern Question to an acute stage, the European Powers alternately supported the "Sick Man of Europe" or administered a dose in the hope of hastening his demise. The famous remark of Lord Salisbury after the Crimean War, in which he apologized—as it were—for England's taking what turned out to be the wrong side, by declaring that she had unfortunately backed the wrong horse, is characteristic of the policy that was pursued in regard to Turkey by all the Powers. It was a question not of the right side, but of the winning side. Rivalry between England and France dictated the policy of both nations towards the Eastern Question, just as Russia's ambitions in the East engendered the attitude both of the Powers that favored Russia and of those that opposed her. Germany, directly responsible for the latest phase of the Eastern Question, which was the root of the present war, was merely playing the same game that had previously been played alternately by Russia, England and France. Each endeavored to secure an

advantage for herself through the decline of Turkish prestige, without much reference to what was equitable towards the people within the Turkish Empire.

It is, therefore, the severest condemnation of the old style European diplomacy in the East—and which, it is to be feared, is not quite dead—that we should be confronted today by an appalling situation in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Arabia; that in the twentieth century we should witness such a tragedy as that of Armenia; that in a part of the world where a high order of civilization flourished thousands of years ago, large portions of the population should today be sunk in the depths of ignorance. Such occurrences and conditions are not to be explained as due solely to Turkish misrule—disastrous as this misrule has been—nor can they be entirely accounted for through Turkey's neglect to provide any proper system of education for the peoples within her domain. In part, at least, the conditions in Asia Minor and in adjacent countries are the result of the kind of diplomatic policy followed by European Powers concerned for their own interests and actuated by motives of rivalry, or fear of a predominating influence of one power over a portion or the whole of the Near East. Rivalries among European Powers, abetted by intrigues on the part of others, succeeded just a year before the outbreak of the Great War in breaking up the Balkan League, which was the creation of the eminent Greek statesman, Venizelos, and which came near to settling the Turkish Question in 1912. Had the league been maintained intact, Germany's plans for the domination of the Near East would have been foiled, with Servia and Bulgaria blocking the road to Bagdad; and who knows but that the war of 1914–1918, which Germany risked in order to carry out her plans, might have been averted?

All that, however, is past history. What of the future? What can be done for a section of the world which has suffered from an inefficient government, from corruption, from extortion, from neglect and, not least of all, from exploitation on the part of the European Powers and their representatives? Will we avail ourselves of the opportunity presented by the end of the war for solving the question of Turkey and Asia Minor on the basis of principle instead of on diplomatic expediency?

EARLY HISTORY OF ASIA MINOR

A significant feature in the history of Asia Minor has been the part played by that region as the great passageway from the more remote East of migratory hordes driven by pressure from the rear. Now the natural trend of these hordes is towards the south and not northwards. The Turks, who obtained a strong hold in Asia Minor in the eleventh century, would have been confined to extending themselves within this region and to branching out southwards, had it not been for the internal quarrels of the Byzantine Empire, which led one of the rulers in 1341 to call upon the Turks to assist him in the struggle against a rival. Geographic conditions in Asia Minor are not favorable towards the formation of a great central empire. The country is cut up by mountain ranges, mostly running north and south. It is separated by a formidable mountain range from what is known as the "fertile crescent," the strip along the Mediterranean which is the bridge connecting the African continent with Asia, and which as it leaves the Mediterranean forms a crescent, the other end of which runs along the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf. This "fertile crescent," the seat of an advanced civilization thousands of years ago, with the Euphrates Valley at the one end and the Nile Valley at the other, has always been a magnet attracting the northern hordes that passed from some eastern region into Asia Minor. But in Asia Minor itself no empire was ever formed that succeeded in welding the various nationalities of the region into a definite and permanent union. We must here also be fair to the Turk, and recognize that his failure to establish a strong empire in Asia Minor was not due entirely to his inefficiency, but in part to natural conditions, which even Greece and Rome failed to overcome. Even the old Hittites, a most warlike people, who ruled in Asia Minor about fifteen hundred years before this era, never had complete control of it. Moreover, the mixed population of Asia Minor added another barrier to the natural one, for an attempt to weld a heterogeneous population into a larger nationalistic or political unit lay beyond the political horizon of antiquity. It is distinctly a modern and more particularly a western point of view that prompts us to make the endeavor—as is done on so large a scale in this country—of uniting a variety of nationalities and of various races into a political unit. Even a small island like

Great Britain includes three nationalities, English, Scotch and Welsh, each distinct in origin, but together forming a great nation. In ancient times such a process was impossible, and the East has always been behind the West in that respect. Despite the great contributions of the ancient and of the later East to civilization, politically it has always lagged. For this reason it is hardly presumable that within any conceivable period a movement for the political combination of the different ethnic elements—not to speak of differences of religion—in Asia Minor and the contiguous countries, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia, would have any chance of success. Perhaps in the far distant future, when under western influences more advanced political ideas make their way through the East, a federation of the nationalities of Asia Minor may be possible, but for the present we must deal with conditions as they have developed historically in that region. This suggests a division into a number of states according to geographical and ethnic boundaries.

MESOPOTAMIA

Beginning with countries contiguous to Asia Minor it must, of course, be evident that Mesopotamia can be expected to flourish only if organized as a separate state under the tutelage either of an international commission or of a western mandatory power. The Euphrates Valley, with its northern extension along the banks of the Tigris up to the point to which the Tigris is navigable, has always formed an independent state along natural geographical lines. To this day the population in Mesopotamia, to use the conventional though somewhat inaccurate designation, is much more homogeneous than the rest of Asia Minor. To a large extent the population represents the descendants of the old Babylonians and Assyrians, though with considerable mixtures, in the course of ages, of other peoples, notably of Persians, Turks and Syrians, not to speak of large Christian settlements composed of those belonging to Indo-European races. English influence has been pronounced in Mesopotamia, particularly in the southern portion, ever since the end of the eighteenth century. A good deal of educational work has already been done among the population through missionary efforts in Bagdad, Mosul and elsewhere. On the whole, conditions are much more stable in Mesopotamia

(except for the outlying marshy districts in the south) than, for example, they are in Arabia. During the years just preceding the outbreak of the war, English engineers, under the leadership of Sir William Willcocks,¹ were active in building the first of a great series of contemplated barrages, the cost of which would in time have been more than repaid by the increased yield of the land. The first of these barrages was actually completed in December, 1913, and ready for operation; and no doubt English enterprise will see to it that the work, which will transform a neglected country into a veritable paradise that marked it in ancient times, will be carried on under peaceful and more auspicious conditions. With the establishment of an orderly government, with the introduction of a system of education and with the regulation of the finances of the country, we may expect Mesopotamia to play an important part in the resuscitation of the East under western tutelage.

ARABIA

Coming next to Arabia, one gathers the impression that that vast region is at present very much in the same condition in which it was prior to the appearance of the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century—broken up into districts under the control of tribes, without much semblance of unity among them. Since the outbreak of the war, a portion of Arabia, which contains the two sacred cities, Mecca and Medina, has made itself independent; and the authority of the Sherif (or, as he is called in European parlance, "king") of Hedjaz has been recognized by England. It may be that by once more transferring the headship of the Moslem Church from Constantinople to Mecca the political union of Arabia will be brought about. Such a union, however, will demand a strong personality, and if such a one should arise there would also be the possible danger of outbursts of Islamic fanatics, seized with the idea—as were the followers of Mohammed—of spreading Islam by force of arms. The religious question, which can hardly be separated from the rise of a large empire in Arabia, requires delicate handling. Even at the present time, despite the existence of a railroad up to Medina—and which

¹ Sir William Willcocks, *Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (London, 1911). The full plan calls for six barrages at a total cost of 29 million Turkish liras,

eventually is to reach Mecca—a non-Moslem cannot enter either of the sacred cities under pain of death. This of itself shows how difficult the task will be of bringing Arabia under the influence of modern and western ideas. For the present, nothing further can be done than to aid the Sherif or the King of Hedjaz to establish order in the country controlled by him, and to make sure of the establishment of a decent government in southern Arabia or Yemen which, it is fair to assume, will not be willing to recognize the supremacy of any ruler of the Hedjaz.

PALESTINE AND SYRIA

In Palestine and Syria the situation is much simpler. Conditions are more favorable in both these countries for a rapid recovery from misrule and neglect, because they have come during the past half century more directly under western influences than other parts of Asia Minor, in part through settlements of Europeans—Christians and Jews—attracted to the country because of its historical association or for other reasons, and in part through educational efforts in which our own country has taken an important and distinguished part. In the success of the Protestant college at Beirut, of Robert College of Constantinople and the schools established in various parts of Palestine and Syria, by English, American and French missionaries—to which we must add the activities of the Alliance Israelite Universelle in organizing schools for Jewish children in various parts of Palestine—one sees the beginning of a *genuine* solution of the Eastern Question. Such educational efforts interpreted aright the real meaning of the decline of the Turkish Empire as affording an opportunity for western lands to bring about a resuscitation of the East.²

WESTERN INFLUENCE

The country is there—Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia—as it was thousands of years ago. The physical conditions are the same, the people even, to a large extent, are the descendants of those who produced a high order of civilization millenniums ago. All that is needed to bring about a resuscitation is to reproduce the favorable conditions that existed in the “fertile crescent” in

² I have endeavored to set this idea forth in greater detail in my book *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, pages 138–152.

antiquity. In Egypt through a broad liberal policy, involving the education of the people, England has changed an utterly neglected and ruined country into a great center of modern activity, with western influences and western methods dominating the life of the people. This may be taken as an index of the changes for the better that will be wrought in Palestine and Syria once those countries are more completely brought under the sway of western ideas of education, western methods of government, western sanitation, and western commercial and industrial activity.

This brings me to my main point, to wit: That the resuscitation of the East, which alone would furnish a satisfactory solution of the Turkish Question in Asia Minor and adjacent countries, cannot be accomplished without the direct support of the western powers—precisely as Egypt, Algiers and Tunis have been so vastly benefited through the two great western powers, Great Britain and France. What applies to Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine and Syria is also applicable to Armenia, which will without question be organized as an independent state through the efforts of the Peace Conference. Armenia, too, needs to be brought under western influences. The intelligence of the Armenian population is such that by their own initiative they promoted educational efforts among the population, even while they were under Turkish dominion. It will, therefore, not be long before, with the support of the West, an orderly form of government will be established, a proper system of education introduced, and steps taken for the building of necessary roads and railroads, and for otherwise improving the internal conditions. Armenia, we may feel assured, will welcome western influence, whatever shape that influence may take.

THE RECONSTITUTION OF TURKEY

Assuming that the reorganization of an Armenian state will cover the eastern part of Asia Minor, running from the Black Sea just east of Samsun, diagonally in a southwestern direction with an outlet on the Mediterranean, the part to the west up to the Aegean should properly be set aside for the reconstitution of Turkey in Asia Minor. The Turks belong to this region, in which they had been settled for almost a millennium before they crossed over into Europe. Here in Asia Minor they established, under the

Selyuk branch, a government which prior to the coming of the Ottoman Turks, had made notable contributions to civilization, more particularly in the domain of architecture and the decorative arts. But the Turks themselves, as the history of Turkey since the revolution of 1908 has shown, need to be placed, for a time at least, under western tutelage. The young Turkish party has bitterly disappointed the high hopes that were set in it. It lent itself to political intrigues of an even more mischievous character than those which characterized the régime of Abdul Hamid. The young Turkish party gave a helping hand to Germany's sinister scheme for the political dominion of the Near East. They were willing to see Turkey reduced to the rôle of a mere pawn in the hands of Imperial Germany. It is generally said that a people has the government that it deserves. An exception must be made in the case of the Turks, who have always been better than their government. The testimony of those who have lived for a long time in Turkey and who know the Turk best bears witness to the fact that, when not stirred up to fanaticism by a crafty and intriguing government, the Turk shows many good traits. He has always suffered by having a government that was dishonest as well as inefficient. The peace of the world would again be in danger if we allowed the Turks in Asia Minor to fall under the influence of crafty and scheming leaders. For self-protection as well as for the betterment of the Turk, we must place Asia Minor under western tutelage.

THE TUTELAGE OF THE EAST

Now, how should this tutelage over Turkey in Asia Minor, over Armenia, over Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia be exercised? My own feeling, based upon many years of study of the ancient and modern Orient, and which I have endeavored to set forth in various publications, is decidedly in favor of a tutelage of the East under the guise of international commissions. I cannot help feeling that things would be safer and that economic, political and educational development in Asia Minor and in adjacent countries would be more normal if it were possible to place these countries under the protection of the League of Nations, with international commissions established in each of them as the directing hand in constructing democratic forms of government, in

educating the people to self-government, in regulating finances and in promoting economic growth. The disposition, however, of those to whose hands we have entrusted the regulation of international affairs at the Peace Conference appears to be in favor of handing over each one of the countries involved to a single power entrusted by the league with mandatory authority.³ If this view should finally prevail there are only three countries among which the mandatory power for the Near East can be distributed—England, France and the United States—for Italy is hardly prepared to undertake at present a work of such character. It would be admittedly unfortunate both for England as well as for the world if she alone were to be the mandatory power for the entire Near East. If she accepts the commission for Mesopotamia, Arabia and Palestine, she will have her hands completely filled. France, it is generally believed, will not care to extend her mandatory power beyond Syria, in which she has for the past sixty years and more taken a special interest and where she has done so much to improve conditions and to safeguard the lives of the population.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

There remains, then, the question whether the United States should accept the mandatory power for Armenia and for the re-constituted Turkish state in Asia Minor. I exclude Constantinople for there appears to be a general consensus of opinion that it should be placed under the control, for the present at least, of an international commission, somewhat similar to the International Danube Commission, established by the Peace Conference of 1856. I venture to think that if the offer is made to this country to undertake the task of political guardianship over a portion of the Near East it will be impossible for us to refuse. And that for two reasons. In the first place, we are pledged in a measure by the valuable constructive work that we have done in the domain of education for the countries of the Near East to continue such

³ It is to be hoped that an exception will at all events be made in the case of the Bagdad Railway, the affairs of which ought not to be placed in the hands of any single western power. The enterprise should be internationalized with a board of directors composed of representatives of various countries. Had such an organization been effected at the inception of the railway, the pan-Germanic scheme would never have been developed. See further on this point, Jastrow, *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, page 146.

beneficent activities. This kind of activity indicates the attitude of America towards the East; and it should be a source of justifiable pride for us to realize that the European powers have perceived the necessity of *aiding* the East to recover some of her lost prestige as the policy that must be substituted for mere political power and commercial exploitation. There is no reason why that which has been done so successfully by Americans unofficially should not be carried on officially under the direct auspices of our government.

Furthermore, it is impossible to suppose that the world can pass through such an upheaval as the last war and leave any great nation like ours in the same position of isolation from world politics as we lived in before this war. We are forced by circumstances beyond our control to participate in the momentous problems at present engaging the attention of the conference at Paris. We were drawn into the war after it had been going on for over two years and a half. In case of another international conflict it is almost a certainty that we will again be involved. We must, therefore, from motives of self-protection participate in the present deliberations to solve international problems, with which we as a nation have no direct concern, both because of our part in the war that has come to an end and because in the event of another conflict we certainly will want to have something to say at the time of its *breaking out*. We must, therefore, be willing to take a share of responsibility for conditions in the Near East, because the East has been and will continue to be one of the danger zones. Prior to the war of 1914-1918, there were two other international conflicts, the Crimean War of 1854 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-1877, in which the European Powers were all directly or indirectly involved and which broke out over the Eastern Question. X

One can well understand the hesitation of many thoughtful people in this country at the prospect of our becoming involved in the problems of the East. But the answer to all such objections must be that we cannot shirk the opportunity of aiding in the resuscitation of the East, if such an opportunity comes to us. It would, to be sure, be no gain to this country to undertake the mandatory direction for Armenia and western Asia Minor; and it is possible that we may also be asked to undertake the guardian-

ship of Constantinople. It would be, however, a great opportunity for service, for continuing on a larger scale and in an official capacity what we began more than half a century ago by establishing educational institutions in the East through missionary and other private efforts. If there is such a thing as destiny in the fortunes of a people, events at present would seem to point to our undertaking a part of the work of the resuscitation of the East. New conditions always involve new duties. If the conference should decide on the plan of mandatory powers for the countries of the Near East, instead of international commissions which, let me emphasize once more, appears to me to be the far better and safer plan, we must be willing to take our share and to render further service in the work of progress and enlightenment to which this country has been committed ever since its birth.

The Disposition of the Turkish Empire

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THE disposition of the territory now composing the Turkish Empire does not dispose of the Turk. Nearly all plans for the division of Turkey into new states overlook the fact that the Moslem population of Turkey is at least four-fold the Christian population. Force from without would be necessary to disfranchise and hold down the Moslem—a task which the Christian population would be wholly unable to achieve. This Christian population is certain to be in a majority in only sections of the Turkish Empire in Asia. In but one of the vilayets or departments in Asia Minor, namely Smyrna, it is in a fair majority of about 50,000 in a population of 750,000. In nearly all other parts of the littoral of Asia Minor the Turk holds a majority in every unit save possibly one city, Trebizond. The Armenian is in the minority in every vilayet and in every city except two and these are smaller sized. The Armenian provinces of Russia added to the Turkish vilayets, in which there is a strong proportion of Armenians, give a total in favor of the Armenians. In Syria the Moslem is in a majority of at least four, probably five, to one. Taking the country around Syria and Palestine a vote would place a Moslem government in control. In Syria, however, the Moslem population is Arab. In Armenia, with small fractions of Turks, the Moslem population is Kurdish. In Asia Minor, out of a population of 10,000,000 there are about 7,000,000 Turks. These fill the center of Asia Minor so completely that the Christian population is negligible; they are in a majority along the entire coast districts of Asia Minor, except part of the Cilician plain, already pointed out as Smyrna, the vilayet of which it is the center, and Trebizond.

This population of 7,000,000 Turks is the core and power, the strength which has given the Ottoman race its supremacy in the Ottoman Empire. However, the question presented by Turkey cannot be limited by Turkey. The Turkish race began to play its part in history in 732 A. D., when it was a strong and fully

organized state on the borders of Kansu, a northeastern province of China. It already had a written language, a language still spoken by the Youruks of Asia Minor. This race expanded until it reached Constantinople on one side and Peking on the other, and there have been periods in which it ruled both and all the lands between.

It is possible today to start from the gates of Scutari, a suburb of Constantinople, and ride to the gates of Peking and in the long journey of 9000 miles never be more than two days from a village in which Turkish is spoken. No other tongue in the world has this span. No other has so nearly preserved its solid foundation of ancient Turkish, and assimilated a vocabulary for the purposes of faith and philosophy drawn from Arabic in its roots, and in administration and in letters from Persia. The only language which compares with it in this lingual structure is English, with its basis of Saxon, its addition of Norman and French and its assimilation of a great vocabulary obtained directly or indirectly from the two classic tongues of antiquity. This Turkish race once held Asia in fee. It has ruled in China, it conquered the Abbasside, Caliphate in Bagdad in the eleventh century, and four and a half centuries later it reached the Danube. Even three centuries ago, there was a period when different branches of this race were dominant from the headwaters of the Danube to the mouth of the Amur. Cruel, relentless, murderous, stained with historic crimes, no race with the record, with the staying power, the independence, the sobriety and the decision of the Turk can be set aside as negligible in the history of the world. Tolerant in the period from the fifteenth to eighteenth century—when European countries remorselessly crushed all dissenters, from the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain to the expulsion of the Huguenots from France—Turkey tolerated in its empire races alien in language, in religion and in culture. Among them the Armenian was the oldest and most powerful, and still possesses ability and knowledge, unmatched by any other race in the Turkish Empire.

The result of this early tolerance was that Turkey has been guilty in this very decade of massacre and deportation, once familiar in Europe, but now justly condemned. The Turk has lost the right to rule. He is condemned by the civilized world. He will never

be allowed to exercise political power or rule in our generation over any subject race.

But it is not possible either to deport or to massacre the Turk. He remains the largest single factor in the Turkish Empire, 7,000,000 strong in the field and cities of Asia Minor. While other races are nowhere in an unbroken majority, the Turk covers the center of Asia Minor and at more than one point overflows to its coast. Ignorant, without mercy, likely to explode in massacre, knowing nothing of modern civilization, he has been led to destruction by those of his own race who were "Made in Germany." The failure of the Turkish Empire began when Abdul Hamid sent his young officers to be trained in German military schools and added relentless methods of Prussianism to the sporadic and fanatic massacre.

If the Turkish Empire were held together and administered as a whole the Turkish race would surely but slowly come to the front. If the Turkish Empire be divided, there will remain in the central strategic point of Asia Minor a race which multiplies as fast as other races—some think faster—solid, calm, warlike, but needing civilization in order to equal that period in its past when it assimilated the art and letters of Persia, the faith and philosophy of the Arab, and the law and administration of the Roman Empire.

A recent proposal from England is that the Turks of Asia Minor shall be organized as a protected state under the rule of the house of Seljuk—whose last representative still lives at Konia (though at present an exile at Beirut) and represents the ancient glory, the serene faith and urban manners of the old Turk. Such a state would be not unlike the realm ruled by the Nizam of Hyderabad in India and it would be twice as large in area. It would have a far stronger population and in another generation its army would be the strongest within the current boundary of Turkey. The presence of such a Moslem state, once its leaders were educated and its people had gained the advantages of civilization, would be a perpetual menace to all the Christian states about it. It would have sympathies with Bulgaria and Hungary. It would be the hope of the Moslem populations of the empire. Nothing but a league of nations strong enough to suppress war could prevent an eventual explosion.

This central kingdom looking out on the Mediterranean, the

Aegean and the Black Sea would be also the natural center, the leader of the entire Turkish race across Asia. This race today—ignorant for the most part, without laws, with a Moslem faith for many still little more than superstition, and an economy and culture similar to that of a thousand years ago—would in due time develop a spirit of race. The Turkish question then would loom large across the whole distance which separates the Far East from the Near East. The first consciousness of this is apparent in the attempt at a union between Afghanistan and the Central Asian Khanates.

Whatever solution we propose we come back to the great fact that the disorganized condition of Turkey is such that any arrangement which does not provide a fostering rule for all these different races and tongues, until education and civilization have made federation possible, renders certain some collision in the future. This is certain whether Turkey be divided into integral or autonomous parts, or be partitioned among many European nations, or part partitioned, and part held under European flags, Constantinople meanwhile being an internationalized city.

The primal difficulty through all this is that the Turkish Empire is not an accident, but an integral and economic unit composed of the plateaus, of Armenia, of Kurdistan, of Asia Minor; an Asian steppe dotted with lakes, with its two rivers of Mesopotamia, and last the Syrian coasts. For prosperity, for development, for civilization and for lasting peace these different portions need each other, and have not in a history of four thousand years ever been separated without a final and inevitable union.

Divide the Turkish Empire and economic disaster is inevitable. Divide it between European powers and in due season you will have a group of Polands. Set Christian minorities long subject to govern warlike Turkish majorities and explosions will follow. Carve out, as can be done by adding Russian Armenia to Turkish Armenia, an area with narrow Armenian majorities and an unstable equilibrium is certain, with a costly rule entailing heavy taxes. Do this in Asia Minor for vilayets partly Greek and you will have between these two unstable areas, a solid Moslem population, certain to gravitate to an *irredenta* movement and worse than Balkan wars will follow. Imagine the area from Maine to Nebraska and Dakota with New England 45 per cent Moslem ruled by 55 per cent Greek,

and in Minnesota and Iowa 55 per cent of Armenians ruling 45 per cent of Moslems and the region between pretty nearly solid Moslem with 10 per cent Christian. Would there seem to you a stable basis for peace in the future over such a region without schools or railroads and embittered by racial and religious wars for a thousand years? Map drawing will not solve this problem.

None of these difficulties, however, is any excuse or pretext for Moslem rule over any Christian populations. This cannot be. As German and Austrian have forfeited the right to rule any subject races, so has the Turk for worse reason and greater crimes. Germany and Austria at least brought order and a more advanced civilization. Not the Turk. He has destroyed all that he built. His economic failure is as complete as his administration by massacre. The Turkish Empire is gone, never to return. The Turk remains, economically incapable. His taxation of subject races is as ruinous as his pillages. Great in a distant past, he has no future until schools, justice and order have again developed his race. Today he is without modern economic assets of any kind, except a dagged industry in the field and some capacity as a retailer in the city. Into the modern economic world, he has never entered. His religion itself is a bar. Trader in the dawn of his race, he has not advanced.

The Turkish Empire has gone after six centuries, four of conquest and two of defeat. Turkish territory remains, offering the world's most insoluble problem—racial, civil and economic. Both race and territory are bankrupt. Here is an area as large as New England, the Middle States, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota and Nebraska. It includes lands as fertile, mineral resources, except in coal, as great. It has the only coal in the Mediterranean. It holds a situation without parallel on the earth's surface, linking three continents, connecting the seas of Central Asia, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and offering the shortest sea and rail route from the two great city centers of Asia in China and India with the great city center of Europe from Moscow to London. No possibilities today are greater and no reality more desperate. A census does not exist. Estimates based on poll-tax returns, corrupt, unreliable, manipulated, run to a population for this entire region of 20,000,000 in most books of reference. The calculation made

ten years ago, when for a brief season there was sanity, purpose and patriotism in the conduct of Turkish affairs at Constantinople, reduced the familiar estimate of 20,000,000 to 15,000,000. Today, I believe the population of Turkey is not more than 10,000,000. The land is empty. The war alone has cost 1,000,000 lives in hostile operations. Massacres, famine and pestilence have slain at least 3,000,000 at the lowest and most moderate estimate. Refugees come back to tell me that a city which I knew in childhood with 40,000 inhabitants has but 6,000, with empty houses where dogs are devouring the dead, under the great basalt walls behind which Bdisarius withstood the shock and assault of Sapor, 1,400 years ago. In Mosul, cannibalism was rife last winter and the remains of six children, used for food were found in one house. "I do not expect you to believe this," runs a letter, "but I speak of what I know and have seen." The country-side is empty; brigandage is rife; the fields untilled. Great wastes stretch between what were once the lines of Russian, Turkish and English troops fighting for the empire for four years, wastes once populous.

This whelming disaster leaves this entire region without resources. Domestic animals are gone, neat cattle, horses, mules and asses destroyed for army food and transport, fruit trees ruthlessly cut under the direction of German officers to keep moving the solitary railroad which connects the capital with the interior and beyond to Arabia and its branches, a line 3,000 miles in all for a region that would cover our maps from Maine to the Mississippi. (The aggregate mileage of Massachusetts and Connecticut spreads over 600,000 square miles or eleven of our states.) By Moslem law, fruit trees have been sacred in war for 1,200 years and were spared when massacre swept away population. The German officer spared nothing. The entire area has been swept of metals. Fire has taken whole quarters of cities. Irrigation channels are dry. Seed-corn is absent. In whole districts everything woven has been seized to clothe troops. German system added to Turkish cruelty has left a land naked, peeled and forsaken.

At best in peace, Turkey was poverty-stricken. The vain effort was made to raise \$125,000,000 of revenue at the rate of \$10 a head of the population, when \$5 would have been rapacity.

Even Egypt raises only \$8 per head after thirty-eight years of English administration. Of Turkish revenue 43 per cent went to a debt charge yearly growing. Every efficient means of raising revenue was turned over to European usurers who sucked the life-blood of the realm. Germany has added to all these heavy charges for war-supplies. The aggregate of the Turkish debt none can know. Of the interest on the old debt 62 per cent goes to French bondholders and 29 per cent to German. French concessions siphon off all the profits of the trams and the wharves of the ports. Such railroads as there are, have for twenty years paid bondholders at the expense of development and equipment. The Turkish government has been corrupt and cruel, but no administration the world over has ever functioned under such pressure of foreign plunder. This was worked under a machinery of bond and treaty pushed inexorably by diplomatic pressure. All the embassies looked only to the spoils of their nationals and their bond concessions, privileges and opportunities under tariffs, exemptions and extraterritorial courts, always partial, and often corrupt which gave the lands, the investments, the industries and the products of Turkish subjects neither growth nor profit, neither justice nor protection.

If Armenia be given a bare preponderance of Armenians by including Russian Armenians in a territory of about a quarter of Turkey, it will not for years be able to raise a revenue sufficient to meet current expenditures for civil necessities, let alone the needs of a costly armed gendarmerie to keep savage and armed Kurds—long superiors—in order. Syria has but fifteen persons to the square mile to tax; its 1,454 miles of railroads feeds 114,500 square miles (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Connecticut with the same area have 46,000 miles) and its coal costs \$41 a ton—though oil in the new region opened by England in the Kerbuk Bagdan and Karun River oil-fields will give Turkey all the fuel wanted at a cheap rate. Here, as elsewhere the future of all this territory is secure, if it can once be freed from usurious European bondholders who have rolled up a debt of \$750,000,000 to which Germany added \$204,000,000 in the war. As it stands, at par value the debt would be \$1,000,000,000, or \$500 per family on a population of not more than 10,000,000 starving, in dire poverty and without resources.

Kept together or divided, the territory of the Turkish Empire cannot be given an administration capable of sustaining development unless there is a large provision of new capital, whose future and whose security is certain, but whose credit and whose revenue must be provided for a decade to come or even more. This is the basic difficulty of the Turkish situation. Order can be easily gained and maintained. Conflicts between races and creeds can be adjusted. National aspirations can be secured by autonomy and local self-government until economic prosperity has come. The real difficulty is one of providing the capital by which any development is possible. This is not a new or untouched source, or one possessing forests, or vast water power. It is instead a territory long since cropped to the limit. In it is an area which could raise 300,000,000 bushels if it were once irrigated; it has mineral resources which made it the early center of the development of metals through all the period before the Christian era, but a rainfall barely sufficient for cultivation and needing the opening of irrigation on a great scale, and by provision in the shape of cattle and machinery yet to be made for either agriculture or manufacture.

These economic causes, not less than the jealousies between the European powers have led to the movement beginning in England and accepted by all Western Europe, proposing that the United States should be the mandatory to which the administration of the Ottoman Empire should be made. All the European countries are already carrying a debt which make new issues impracticable. The heavy losses of war have made all their man-power needed at home and they are without the capital necessary to develop a region whose development cannot for at least ten years meet the ordinary charges of government.

If the region is divided into different areas—Armenia, Mesopotamia and Syria—if the interior of Asia Minor is going to the Turks, and the coast parceled between different powers, whether this division be between European Powers, or between subject races, the same difficulties are to be met, and the same economic needs to be provided. The instant these divisions are made questions arise sure to cause contention in regard to the proposed boundaries of Armenia, of Syria and of Asia Minor. In brief, it leaves the interior of Asia Minor in the hands of the Turks, and the coast under other powers an arrangement doomed to economic failure.

If Asia Minor be parceled into a Greek end to the West, an Italian colony in the South, and some division along the Black Sea, its railroad development will be impossible except with the costly lines that come from the competing and conflicting management of transportation. Whether this should be done on the basis of giving the Christian minority a rule over the Ottoman majority, or the effort be made to furnish Christian majorities by gathering the Turkish population into the center of Armenia and frankly accepting the majority of the Moslem in Syria, the same racial and economic difficulties will exist. The country instead of having one Balkan peninsula as in the past forty years—source of innumerable woes—will have a Balkanized area in the center of Europe, another Balkanized area in the Balkans, and a third Balkanized area in the Turkish dominion.

Next November it will be one hundred years since American missionaries first landed in Turkey. During that period the American and his nation have been known only for works of mercy, of healing, charity, of education and of faith. The college education of Turkey in its most efficient shape is in the hands of American colleges endowed by this country. Every city has its American hospital. All creeds and all races have confidence in the American. The United States is the only land which is looked upon as unselfish, having no ambitions, and representing a system which desires not empire over the earth, but freedom in the world.

This sentiment is so strong that it alone would be more valuable in maintaining order than soldiers or gendarmerie. The security for the capital which would be invested, which would not be less than four or five billion dollars, would be the richest, the most fruitful and the best situated land on the earth's surface. What American administration can do has already been proved in the Philippines. Greater success would be met in Turkey. If this duty and this opportunity is declined—and the feeling against any enterprise of this order is strong in the United States—Turkey will be divided. The effort will be made to raise capital to organize governments, taxation will be heavy, resources will only be obtained at exorbitant rates of interest. Military expenditure will render a sound pledge as impossible as it has proved in the Balkan states, the army will play its share both in influence,

and in industrial development, jealousies will arise, and South-eastern Europe, and Southwestern Asia will again set the world in flames, as they have in the last five years. The United States, true to its traditions, will struggle to remain out of the whirlpool of war, it will fail as it has already failed, and in the end it will expend far more than would be necessary for the peaceful solution of the problem of the Turkish Empire. It would have only a debt charge to show instead of a new guarantee of peace in the solution of the Eastern Question through justice, science and the establishment of judicial rights.

An Eyewitness of the Serbian Apotheosis

By MADAME SLAVKO GROUITCH

BEING an American married to a Serbian and having spent my early years in Europe as a traveller and student, it was as a cosmopolitan that I came to Serbia. Here for the first time in my European wanderings I had the impression of reaching home, so very similar were the conditions of life to those of my native state, West Virginia. The resemblance extended to the atmosphere of the home and to customs of farms and villages, but more particularly to that attitude of mind towards life which we consider peculiarly American, and which I may describe as liberty so great that it is not conscious of laws. The Serbian people have a conception of duty toward the state and a public spiritedness from choice which I have encountered elsewhere only in Switzerland and the United States. No change was necessary in order to meet the women and men of my adopted country. They knew more about America than America did of them.

I soon learned that the singleness of patriotic purpose which had impressed me in my husband was peculiar to everyone I met from King to peasant, from prime minister to goat's herdsman. All were dreaming, as their fore-fathers had dreamed for centuries, of a united Yugo-Slav kingdom which should include the whole 13,000,000 of their race. As I listened I wondered.

There were barely three and a half million souls in the little Serbia of that day. To the south there was a region spoken of as Old Serbia, because there had arisen the Serbian kingdom of the eleventh century; beyond that was the region we speak of as Macedonia (and which in my mind, until I became Serbian, had not been associated geographically with the Balkans) containing a million and a half inhabitants of pure Serbian race still under Turkish rule. I learned very quickly of loyal little Montenegro—proud of the fact that in the veins of every peasant was the blood of the heroes who had survived from the great battle of Kossovo in 1389, in which the Serbian people had lost their independence, all but that one towering citadel. I learned of Croatia, which I had, in common with most people, always thought of as a province

of Austria; of Dalmatia with its republican traditions; of the Adriatic, a kind of Floridian Indian River bordered with pleasure resorts for the opulent Viennese. Very few people had ever realized until lately that this inland sea was as essential to the life of the peoples who bordered upon it as are the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the United States.

As I listened to statesmen and people making prophecies of the day when all these would be united to Serbia from that farthest point on the map, called Carinthia, to that extreme point called Monastir,—I felt it could happen only a long time after I should have passed away. Nevertheless, within the period of fifteen years I have seen these dreams come true. I myself have witnessed the tragedies—and there have been many—which have brought about the conquest of Old Serbia and of Macedonia, the liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Dalmatia, and also the invasion of Serbia and Montenegro during the war. I have seen the miracle accomplished, and the wonder of it is that it was brought about by impulsions as irresistible as those which “rule the stars and tides.” Every little child felt them; every little child contributed; its mother tossed it playfully in the air naming the great Serbian battles in a nursery rhyme; its mother put it to bed in poverty and simplicity, teaching it how to live humbly but to think grandly, sublimely, patriotically.

As the years went by and my diplomatic home was in Russia and afterwards in England—the two countries to which Serbia looked for aid in the achievement of her dream—I came only from time to time to my adopted people. But always their first words were of this wonderful thing that was in the bud, waiting to happen—and yet, so far as I could see, with no preparation for it, any more than there is external action to hasten the coming of spring. In Serbia as well as in all the allied countries at that time there were hopes for arbitration on the questions of liberty of peoples and territorial boundaries. It was the period when the Czar and England made the most intense concessions in settlement of ancient disputes to unite in an Entente with France to prevent war. I watched this accord with a certain fear, because I felt that it surely would mean the buckling in of the aspirations of my adopted people. How were the Yugo-Slavs all to be freed and united if there were an Entente to preserve that present state of injustice?

The Great Entente was made in 1906. Shortly afterward I went home to Serbia. Naturally I talked with everyone I met of the new conditions. No one showed depression. The answer invariably was, "It will come about. It is bound to come." I was in England when in 1908 Austria-Hungary, as an act of defiance to the Entente, forcibly annexed the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The whole Yugo-Slav nation went into mourning for a deed that seemed to fasten the chains of despotism that much more firmly upon the greater portion of its race, but did not cease to repeat, "The hour of our deliverance will soon be at hand." Then came the war of 1912. I was sent on a mission here to my own country as the representative of the Serbian Red Cross, to ask aid for the sick and wounded soldiers who filled our hospitals. As a child I had heard from American missionaries of the horrors of the Turkish rule long before I had learned them from the stories of my adopted people who had suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Turks in Macedonia, and therefore I was astonished to find so little understanding of the causes of the Balkan war, so little sympathy for the suffering that was taking place in the Balkans. I believe the United States contributed ten times as much for relief to Turkey at that time as it contributed to any of the Balkan States. Again I asked myself, "Whence the help that is to liberate and unite Yugo-Slavia, if England, France, Russia, and America combine in the idea that no people shall ever again rise and call out for its own freedom?"

In 1913 there came the terrible tragedy of the Serbian-Bulgarian war, when I saw our Balkan block torn asunder by the agonizing torment of civil war—for war between sister nations is surely civil war. It seemed to me then that the dream of liberty and union for the Yugo-Slavs would fade into yielding, as had been once before the case in Serbian history when the late King Milan declared that Serbia was in the position of a young woman who had a strong affection and inclination for one young suitor—in that case the suitor was Russia—but who must make a *mariage de raison* with Austria. A secret treaty that would afford to Serbia greater economic prosperity, at the expense of Yugo-Slav freedom, was concluded between the King, his ministers, and the Austro-Hungarian government. The result of that deflection from the dream was that the King had to abdicate, for the Serbian people

repudiated a concession that should be for their material profit, but would enslave further their brethren in Austria-Hungary.

In 1913, looking conditions in the face, I could not see the way out to freedom and union for the Slavs of Austria. The great nations of the Entente had decreed a long era of peace, for which the weak peoples must pay the price in self-restraint, humiliation, and degradation.

Nowhere about me—in our own legation or in the allied countries—had I heard the suggestion that the liberty bells would ring in July, 1914, for Yugo-Slavia as they had rung in July, 1776, for this country. But the dream began to come true. The first cannon shot across the Danube proclaimed that the hour had come; that the beginning had been made, made by Austria-Hungary herself in an attack on the free peoples of Serbia. The beginning was not made by dreams of freedom, for the enslaved peoples of Austria-Hungary had never descended to plans for ruthless slaughter of women and children, as was done by the bombardment of the Serbian capital before its population could flee towards the interior of the country.

In the months that followed—when three times the Serbian people, though unaided by their allies and with insufficient ammunition for their cannon, resisted the invasion and overthrow of their country; with the dead so close together that I had to step over them in our hospitals to reach the living soldiers lying on straw; without any means of dressing wounds; with disease claiming thousands of victims—how could one hope for victory? And yet I saw hope on every face. No man in authority throughout those terrible months ever within my hearing spoke of a separate peace, of capitulation or surrender. And our splendid old prime minister when asked to capitulate on terms so advantageous to Serbia that it would have seemed at that time wisdom to accept them, replied: "Better to die in glory than to live in shame."

In the month of December, 1914, there happened a real miracle in Serbia, despite the fact that one-third of the country, and that the best of the farming and industrial region, had been invaded by the enemy. With one single railway line from Saloniki supplying its economic and military needs, the Serbian army manoeuvred its forces until the enemy was routed and driven from its country.

For eight months longer Serbia maintained her own frontiers,

Austria being powerless until Germany and Bulgaria joined with her in a fresh attempt at invasion. This time they succeeded in cutting the railway line, encircled our forces, and compelled a general retreat to the Adriatic coast.

For three months, October, November and December, 1915, we tramped over those terrible mountains of Albania without food, without shelter, leaving thousands of dead by the roadside. Day by day I watched the faces of the Serbian statesmen, officers, and soldiers who escorted the diplomatic caravans, in one of which I had been placed. With that curiosity of the American intelligence to probe the very essence of other people's souls I eavesdropped at their minds to know what they were thinking now that their country was invaded, their army forced to retreat, their women and children given over to martyrdom, and all that the army had accomplished in 1912 and 1913 lost by retreat. We were retracing the steps of the victorious army of 1912—retracing them as a defeated army. Where were their hopes of union now? The answer was, "We are bound for Saloniki to join our allies and fight for the freedom of Serbia and of Yugo-Slavia."

With their people scattered, their government living in a borrowed Greek island, it seemed futile to speak of Serbia as a nation. They were reduced to just a little group of men depending upon their allies for money to pay their army, to feed their prisoners of war, and the few thousands of their own people in exile all dependent upon the charity of the allied nations, including America, which, although not as yet an ally had shown its sympathy and charity. Inside the country the women and children wept under the martyrdom meted out to a conquered people. They were tortured by the Bulgarians, and oppressed in every conceivable way by the Austro-Hungarians, and yet the army and government dreamed and worked for the deliverance, not only of Serbia but of the whole Yugo-Slav nation. The prisoners in German camps, the martyrs under the Bulgarian lash dreamed of Yugo-Slav freedom.

While America played a glorious and noble part in that deliverance, the action on the Western front was, of course, the event that permitted the attack on the South. Was it not the will of Divine Justice, as well as by consent of the great allied com-

mander to whom we all owe so much, that the Serbian army, a few thousands of men, the remnant of the nation, should aim the first decisive blow of allied victory? The advance of the Serbian troops over mountains so high that only eagles or aeroplanes could be supposed to cross them struck the final blow for Yugo-Slav liberty, and the blow struck in the Macedonian mountains resounded to the extreme limits of Yugo-Slavia. "Where are you going?" asked a general of the French army of a Serbian wounded soldier whom he met on the road bleeding from a wound in the head. "That's not the way to the hospital." "I am not going to the hospital—I am going to Serbia and beyond that—I am going home to free Bosnia!" Within a month the face of every soldier of the Yugo-Slav forces was set towards home and the fight still to come for the liberation of the Slav provinces of Austria. There were men from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina as well as from Serbia fighting in that army—citizens all of a united kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the national trinity of the Southern Slav race.

They found their country in a terrible condition. There were no roads; the population which came out to meet them was in rags; there was no fire; roofs had been taken off of the houses, floors had been torn up, even windowsills and doorsills had been burned by the enemy. The trees had been cut down in their cemeteries; and in certain sections in an effort to prove that the population was other than Serbian, the very names had been erased from the tombstones. But what did it matter? That for which the Slav peoples had toiled and died throughout a thousand years of conscious history had been accomplished—their complete freedom and union. I, an adopted daughter, have lived this Gethsemane of a people—this apotheosis of a nation—as a Serbian woman; my heart beating with the wonder and the glory of the sacrifice.

Now that this great inspiring gift of freedom and union has come to my adopted people, if we in Yugo-Slavia may look forward to a century of union and development of our material, ethical, and moral forces, and to the assimilation of whatever foreign elements there may be within our borders, the decisions of our peoples to rule themselves cannot but aid to promote the peace of the world. The rights of self-determination cannot apply to a single

town, or one side of a street; certain minorities must remain even after the wisest alignment of frontiers. Unhappily one cannot ask for the freedom of all the Yugo-Slavs: there are Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who must be content with other citizenship, although they have racial rights to be a part of this wonderful Yugo-Slavia.

The broad lines of the Slav nationality with its open-minded religious tolerance offers guarantees to religious liberty: the Orthodox faith under the Patriarch of Constantinople is very like that of our own Episcopal Church. Among the Catholics of Croatia and Slovenia there exists a feeling of brotherhood towards the other religions of their nationality, as shown by the fact that many dignitaries of the Catholic Church in those states helped loyally to lead the movement for freedom. In no country in the world does the Jew have greater opportunity and honor than he has in Serbia and than he will have in the whole of the new Yugo-Slav kingdom if he proves himself as good a citizen there as he is in Serbia. For the Turk I have seen proofs of tolerance in the efforts to preserve Mosques, and Moslem schools, ordered by our Crown Prince. After the war of 1912 every assistance was given to Turkish women from Macedonia who wanted to go to Turkey to look for their husbands if living or for their bodies if dead.

In my travels about Macedonia I have remarked the just treatment of the Serbian authorities towards the other nationalities, Greeks, Turks, Albanians, and Bulgars, and have discussed with them the fact that it is perfectly possible for people of different strains of blood to live together under the same flag and same government, if equal rights of citizenship are accorded to all their citizens. I believe firmly that we, the Slavs—if aided by America in this difficult hour of our transition when we suffer physically and mentally from the ravages of war—will be able to construct quickly a United States of the Balkans, and that before many years we may yet hold that Educational Peace Conference at Vienna which was interrupted by the Austrian ultimatum.

An Experiment in Progressive Government

The Czechoslovak Republic

By HON. CHARLES PERGLER

Commissioner of the Czechoslovak Republic in the United States

IN the Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Republic by its then provisional government, issued on October 18, 1918, we find the following statements:

Our democracy shall rest on universal suffrage. Women shall be placed on equal footing with men politically, socially and culturally. The rights of the minority shall be safeguarded by proportional representation; national minorities shall enjoy equal rights. The government shall be parliamentary in form and shall recognize the principles of the initiative and referendum. The standing army will be replaced by militia. . . . The Czechoslovak Nation will carry out far-reaching social and economic reforms; the large estates will be redeemed for home colonization; patents of nobility will be abolished. . . . Our nation will assume its part of the Austro-Hungarian pre-war public debt; the debts for this war we leave to those who incurred them. . . . In its foreign policy the Czechoslovak Nation will accept its full share of responsibility in the reorganization of eastern Europe. It accepts fully the democratic and social principle of nationalism and subscribes to the doctrine that all covenants and treaties shall be entered into openly and frankly without secret diplomacy. . . . Our constitution shall provide an efficient, rational and just government, which will exclude all special privileges and prohibit class legislation.

This quotation is in itself a program, and at the same time it succinctly states the problems and tasks with which the new Czechoslovak Republic is confronted. These problems are not dissimilar to those found in the other new states formed as a result of the defeat of the Central Empires: Poland and Jugo-Slavia, as well as in united Rumania. In approaching these questions the American public must remember that the situation in Europe differs fundamentally from that prevailing in America. One can defend very plausibly the individualistic school of political economy, and equally so—if not with even more plausibility—what may properly be called the coöperative school of thought. But the most beautiful theories frequently collide with hard facts, and it is hard facts with which European statesmen must deal. They must satisfy, first of all, the demand of their peoples for

decent livelihood. It is only too obvious that to permit matters to drift as the extreme individualist so frequently demands would be worse than suicidal. When we think of the density of population in western and mid-Europe, and the comparative sparsity of population in the United States, we realize in a moment how fundamentally the situation differs, and how fundamentally different the approach to solution of social questions and problems of social reform inevitably must be.

An indication of how thoroughly democratic the new Republic is, is found in the fact that one of the very first acts of the National Assembly was the abolition of all patents of nobility. Thus the new nation, through its duly authorized representatives, with one stroke gave earnest of its intention to do away with everything savoring of medievalism.

THE LAND QUESTION

Of the economic and social problems one of the most important confronting the new state was that of the large landed estates. You will remember that hesitation to deal with this question was perhaps the fundamental reason why the Russian provisional government was wrecked, and why bolshevism gained the upper hand. Czechoslovak statesmen do not propose to be caught unawares in this fashion. The estates in most cases are those held by alien nobility and the late imperial house. More often than not they came into the hands of these various clans during the carpet-bagging period of the Thirty Years War, when Bohemia was plundered right and left by the Hapsburgs and their retainers. On April 16th the National Assembly adopted a law expropriating all large estates exceeding 150 hectares¹ of land under cultivation, or that can be cultivated, and 100 hectares of woodland. Under this law the state will take over 1,300,000 hectares of cultivated land, and 3,000,000 hectares of woodland, which will furnish livelihood to 430,000 families. In the case of estates of the imperial family, estates illegally acquired, and estates of persons who during the war had been guilty of treason against the Czechoslovak nation, no compensation will be paid. There will be compensation to all those who have not legally forfeited their right to it, or whose possession was not based upon robbery, theft or fraud.

¹ A hectare is a measure of area containing ten thousand square metres, or 2.471 acres.

THE LABOR QUESTION

Immediately following the abolition of all patents of nobility and the making private citizens of various princes, dukes and counts, the National Assembly passed a law establishing the eight-hour day. According to latest advices, the National Assembly is about to pass legislation aimed at doing away with unemployment and, in so far as this may not be possible, to alleviate the condition of the unemployed. No doubt ultimately this legislation will include some sort of a scheme of insurance against unemployment, against sickness and accident, and similar features of what is known in Europe as social legislation. The establishment of workingmen's chambers is being contemplated. This should not be confused with soviet institutions. In Europe chambers of commerce and similar institutions have a legal status, and logically, if there can be chambers of commerce, there is no reason why there should not be workingmen's chambers, which will be the legally authorized representatives and spokesmen of the workingmen, even as the chambers of commerce speak for the manufacturer and the merchant. In the meantime, the government is undertaking emergency public works to reduce the number of unemployed and it has appropriated millions of crowns for these works, particularly in the City of Prague.

Radical as certain features of this legislation may appear to some Americans, considering European standards and the advanced standing of the labor movement in particular, as well as its tremendous influence, it is simply what the times call for, if violent upheavals are to be avoided. After all, we must remember that the laws of social development were not suspended on the day we were born, and that history is also a record of transition from one order to another. The problem for the statesman and the sound thinker is to seek an orderly way, one which can be pursued with the minimum of suffering to society as a whole, and to the individuals composing it. The art of real statesmanship may be said to consist in bringing about new social formations without violence and without bloodshed. This, so far, the Czechoslovak Republic has accomplished. It seems to have taken a leaf out of the book of Anglo-Saxon history, as exemplified both in Great Britain and the United States, the most marked feature of which is the fact that in most cases fundamental changes in government and society were accomplished peacefully.

Certainly the methods adopted by the Czechoslovaks are diametrically opposed to bolshevism. The latter, if it has come to stand for anything, means revolutionary changes by violence, by civil war. It stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and for the soviet system of government. There is not a trace of that in the measures I have enumerated. On the contrary, everything is being done in an orderly and legal way; by the parliamentary methods so well known to western democracies and to the United States.

THE ARMY

Czechoslovak statesmen will be careful to prevent anything resembling militarism from striking roots in the Republic. The Czechoslovak army still standing in Siberia is very democratic, as is inevitable from its origin, having been organized voluntarily by the men themselves for the purpose of fighting for the independence of their native land, and against German, Magyar and Prussian militarism. President Masaryk himself is squarely opposed to militarism which means rule by an army clique, and the subordination of civic ideals to those of the military martinet. In a recent public speech in Prague, the President declared that the new nation must have a democratic army based upon free and voluntary discipline and convinced of its mission to defend the country against external enemies. This democratic army will be solely for purposes of defense. Naturally it will be governed by the exigencies of the international situation, and by the fact whether or not an international organization can be achieved which will do away entirely with the necessity of any armies except for purely police purposes.

WOMAN SUFFRAGE

Woman suffrage is already an accomplished fact in the Republic. Even now eight members of the National Assembly are women, among them Dr. Alice Masaryk, daughter of the president, well known in America. During the war, she was held by the Austrian authorities in jail for a period of nine months.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Under European constitutional practice the power of the president is usually meagre indeed. It seems likely, however,

that the Czechoslovak state will somewhat follow American examples. Thus, in accordance with a recent recommendation of the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly, the president shall have the right to name and dismiss cabinet ministers, negotiate and ratify international agreements and treaties; shall be present and preside at the meetings of the Council of Ministers, having also the right to make recommendations to the National Assembly in matters of state. This does not mean that parliamentary control will be done away with, and that the president will have anything like autocratic powers. But it does mean that he is to possess a larger freedom of movement and more initiative than a European president usually has.

GERMAN POPULATION

In mid-Europe no state can be created without certain national minorities, and this is a troublesome problem indeed. There is going to be in the Czechoslovak Republic a minority of Germans, not nearly so large as the Germans themselves claim, but still a minority. This fact entitles us to all the sympathy the world can give us, especially when we bear in mind that this is a German minority. This minority is entitled to fair treatment. The Czechoslovak delegation at the Peace Conference, in outlining our claims, declared that the New republic will guarantee to national minorities full freedom of development and cultivation of racial individuality. Dr. Charles Kramar, the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, in a speech delivered to the National Assembly in Prague on December 20th, 1918, said that complete cultural, social and economic freedom will be granted to Bohemian Germans. Dr. Kramar said:

We do not want to be oppressors. We do not want to follow the former German policy in Austria, as we have seen what it leads to. The Germans in Bohemia, with their great economic strength, are shrewd enough calculators not to have any particular desire to be incorporated into Germany. For the Czechoslovak Republic the whole world is open. Germany, on the contrary, will be in the worse imaginable position. Even if there were no direct economic boycott, the indirect moral boycott will be far more terrible.

The Czech Social Democrats of Bohemia are certainly not jingoes, and their chief organ, the *Pravo Lidu*, on December 7, 1918, in writing on the question of the German minority, said:

The present German possession in Bohemia is not the result of natural development, but of terror and oppression. In the natural development and a free course, the German possessions in the north of Bohemia would assume quite another aspect. In spite of the terror and oppression and so-called assimilation, we can prove that German Bohemia does not exist, as this territory is everywhere mixed with the Czech population, which in many places forms, as a matter of fact, majorities. According to reliable estimates, there were in 1910 in the district of Most, in northern Bohemia, which the Germans claim, over 40,000 Czechs; in Litvinow, over 30,000; in Duchov, over 35,000; in Bilina, about 30,000; in Teplice over 20,000, etc. Since 1910 the development was in favor of the Czechs, so that it may be safely assumed that in many places the Czech minorities have now become majorities.

As regards the attitude of the Germans in Bohemia themselves, it is interesting to quote the German paper *Prager Tagblatt* of December 23, 1918:

Masaryk claims the integrity of Bohemia, but he wants to assure the German minorities not only equal rights, but also full rights of nationalities. This is a new idea. If a really democratic autonomy is introduced, we shall have no reason to complain.

THE NATIONAL POLICY

In any event, because the Germans and Magyars oppressed the Czechoslovaks, it does not follow that the latter will oppress the former. It is a significant fact that during the whole of the nineteenth century not a single Czech statesman appeared who in any way advocated the oppression of other peoples. On the contrary the Czechs always emphasized the fact that they would accord their German citizens complete civil rights which, of course, includes cultural rights. It was the great Czech historian and statesman, Palacky, who said that we never had, nor ever shall have the intention of oppressing other people; that, true to our character, rejecting all desire for the revenge of past wrongs, we extend our right hand to all our neighbors who are prepared to recognize the equality of all nations without regard to their size or political power. And it was Havlicek, the Czech leader in 1848, who said that oppression never brings good results, and in time brings vengeance upon the heads of its own originators.

The new Czechoslovak Republic is the greatest experiment in really liberal and progressive government ever undertaken on the European Continent, and it is entitled to the sympathy and aid of the great American democracy.

Reconstruction Among the Small Nations of Middle Europe

By STEPHEN P. DUGGAN, Ph.D.

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THE French Revolution gave birth to two political principles—the principle of nationality and the principle of democracy. As long as the French revolutionary armies remained true to those two political principles, wherever they went throughout Europe they were received with acclaim and enthusiasm, but when they repudiated those two political principles they were rejected by the peoples of Europe. They did repudiate them when the Revolution fell under the control of Napoleon Bonaparte, and from a democratic revolution it was transformed into an autocratic imperialism. Bonaparte was destroyed because the peoples of Europe insisted upon the validity of the very principle to which the French Revolution had given birth, namely, the principle of nationality. It was the aroused national spirit of Spain, Germany, Russia and England that overthrew the greatest military autocrat of his day.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

When the Congress of Vienna was held in 1815, one would have supposed that the statesmen and the kings, who had assembled there and who had called upon their peoples to rise against the foreign usurper, would have remembered the strength of the revolutionary principle and would have made their territorial readjustments conform to it. Unfortunately they did not. At that Congress two political principles fought for supremacy—the dynastic and the nationalistic—and the dynastic won out in every conflict. The territorial readjustments made then were made without any consideration of the principle of nationality. Peoples that were opposed to each other were united in one state, and peoples that formed one nation were divided among several states. The Dutch, who were Teutonic in origin, Protestant in religion and commercial in their economy, were compelled to form a single state with the Belgians who were Romance in race, Catho-

lic in faith and agrarian in their economy. In other words, two peoples that disliked each other were compelled to live in one state. On the other hand, Poles and Italians forming one nation were divided among several states. The result was that the history of Europe from the treaty of Vienna down to the present day has been the story of attempts on the part of the various peoples and nationalities to tear up that treaty and any other treaty that has since been made which did not conform to the principle of nationality.

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

In Western Europe by 1870 that principle had won out everywhere, and Western Europe, thereafter, was made up of national states. But although Western Europe by 1870 had realized the principle of nationality, that was not true of Eastern Europe. It would seem as if statesmen would never learn by experience. The Congress of Berlin of 1878, which assembled to readjust Eastern Europe after the Russo-Turkish war, paid as little attention and as little respect to the principle of nationality as those who had assembled at Vienna in 1815. No statesman had ever less reason to return to his capital and to speak of having brought back "peace with honor" than Disraeli, because few treaties of peace were more dishonorable than the peace of Berlin of 1878. The principle of nationality was violated in every respect. Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited exclusively by Serbs, was given over to Austria; Bessarabia, largely inhabited by Roumanians, was torn from Roumania and given to Russia; and Macedonia, inhabited by Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks, was given back to the mercy of the Turk. The result has been that since 1878 the determination of the peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been to tear up that treaty and to attempt to do what had been done in Western Europe—realize the principle of nationality. The first principle, therefore, upon which the reconstruction of Middle Europe must rest is that nationality must be the basis of territorial readjustment. It must be recognized that if on any great scale the people of one nation are placed within the borders of another nation, they will never rest content as long as there is a chance to break the peace and attain to national unity.

THE EVOLUTION OF SMALL STATES

You read in your history books that political evolution has been towards the formation of big states. That is not true. During the past century two great states of Europe have attained national unity—Germany and Italy. But, on the other hand, during that same period Belgium gained its independence in 1815, as did Serbia about the same time. Furthermore, in 1829 Greece became independent, followed, in 1856, by Roumania, and in 1878 by Bulgaria. Finally, in 1905, Norway, that had been united to Sweden by the treaty of Vienna, declared its independence. Now we have another group of small nations that have arisen in Central Europe—Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia. Political evolution has been really towards the development and the constitution of small nations, not large nations.

In 1914, Europe was organized politically as follows: In Western Europe there was a series of uni-national states, states made up of one nation. England, Spain, France, Germany, and Italy, are all one-nation states. Eastern Europe on the contrary was made up entirely of one great pluri-nation—the Russian Empire, including within its borders many nations. Right down through Middle Europe from Cape North in Lapland to Cape Mattapan at the end of Greece was a series of small nations and suppressed nationalities—Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Finns, Poles, Bohemians, Hungarians, Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars. This Middle Europe, made up of these small nations, became the danger zone of Europe.

There are two reasons why this situation in Middle Europe endangered the peace of the world.

SUPPRESSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

First because everywhere throughout that region the principle of nationality was violated. Poles and Finns in Russia were allowed no national rights and few rights of citizens. Poles in Germany were not privileged to speak their language in public; their newspapers were suppressed; they were not allowed to send their children to school where Polish was taught; they were not allowed to attend church where the service was in Polish; they were not allowed to form Polish unions to study Polish culture. All this was partly or wholly true of the Czechs in Austria, the

Slovaks in Hungary, and, of course, still more true of the suppressed peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Not only were there suppressed nationalities throughout Middle Europe, but nowhere did nationalities correspond with territorial boundaries. There were more Serbs outside of Serbia than inside of Serbia, and the Serbs outside of Serbia wanted to be inside of Serbia, and the Serbs inside of Serbia wanted them. Under the existing conditions they could not realize their nationality, but they were determined that sometime they would do so. That was the condition of unstable political equilibrium throughout the whole of Middle Europe. It was an invitation to war. Arbitration would not have settled it. You cannot arbitrate a condition where part of a nation outside of its boundaries want to be inside of them. The only settlement is to let them go inside.

AGGRESSION BY THE BIG NATIONS

The second reason why Middle Europe was the danger zone of Europe was that the very weakness of these small nations was an invitation to aggression. When the war broke out Sweden was pro-German. Why? Because she lived in fear and terror of Russia. Denmark was anti-German because she lived in fear and terror of Germany. Little Serbia was land-locked and without access to the sea and had practically but one market, Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary attempted to bring her to her knees over and over again by strangling her economically, by raising tariff duties on her products to such an extent that she would starve. The very weakness of these little nations was an invitation to aggression on the part of the big nations.

PROTECTION OF THE SMALL NATIONS

What is the second principle, therefore, for a sound reconstitution of Europe and of the world? It is to understand that in the new world reorganization or even in the new European reorganization, the majority of nations are going to be small nations and must be protected in their rights and in their needs. Now what are their rights and their needs? It would take a long time to go into a thorough discussion of them, but there are a few that are self-evident. Some of these nations of Middle Europe, like Czechoslovakia and Poland and Hungary are absolutely land-

locked. They have no seacoast. They have no access to the sea, and in this industrial era if there is not free access to the sea for a state it means the death of that state. How are they to get it? They cannot get it by their own might. Czechoslovakia, to take an illustration, is an industrial nation. It has made remarkable advances in the last generation industrially. It paid much beyond its proportionate share of the taxes of Austria before the war. It will starve if it cannot get the raw materials from beyond the seas that are necessary for its industries. Any nation will starve under those conditions. The electrical industries today contribute enormously to our necessities and conveniences and comforts. Electrical industries are dependent particularly upon two raw materials, rubber and copper. Rubber is localized in Central Africa and Central South America. Copper is localized in only a few places in the world and none in Czechoslovakia. If she is to continue her industrial life she must have the opportunity to bring freely from over the seas raw materials, and she must have free access to the coast to send her products across the seas to other countries. She must have the right to send those goods to the seaboard over railroads going through other countries, with the knowledge that she will not be charged preferential freight rates or be interfered with by tariff duties of any kind. Not only must these land-locked states of Middle Europe have access to the sea, but they must have the free use of ports. Anyone who is familiar with the port rules knows how easy it is to put obstacles in the way of ships that are loading and unloading—to give preferences to the ships of one state over another. At Danzig, which is the outlet for Poland, and at Fiume, which is the outlet for the Jugoslavs, the Magyars and the Bohemians, there must exist what was agreed to at the end of the second Balkan War in regard to Saloniki. There part of the port itself was given over to the Serbs so that they could have their own docks and warehouses and also a spur of the railroad going down to those docks and warehouses. Their products then could be loaded upon the ships coming from abroad at those docks without interference on the part of any other people.

There are other needs of these people which I cannot take up now. I shall just touch on the third principle that is at the basis of a sound reconstruction of Middle Europe, namely, the political

principle of confederation. During the war the three Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, formed an informal kind of confederation which will probably continue for some time. If with that Scandinavian confederation in the North there were a Danubian confederation to the South there would probably be a greater feeling of security in Central Europe. If there were added to this a Balkan confederation reconstituted to be what it was in 1912, the prospects for continued peace in Southeastern Europe would be very much brighter than they ever have been in the past, and there is very little reason why this should not take place. Once the boundary lines are settled at Paris, and this abnormal period of turmoil and national resentment is over, in all probability, the peoples of the Balkans will settle down to the normal life that existed before the great war. The need of mutual help in the form of unions for tariff and other economic purposes will make itself so felt that in all probability a political confederation will follow.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Nevertheless, although so much benefit would accrue to Middle Europe by the principle of confederation being realized, I do not believe that we can expect peace and stability and security to exist there without a greater confederation being formed—the League of Nations. The great states, the great powers, have been able always to command respect for their rights in the past. They have insisted upon them as inherent in their moral personality. Just as in municipal life, a man is equal before the law because he is a man, without reference to his being wealthy or intelligent, poor or ignorant, so today we shall expect under a league of nations that all nations, the little as well as the great, will have their moral personality observed. The realization of greater international coöperation is the only hope for the little nations, the small peoples, not only of Middle Europe, but of the earth.

A Danubian Confederation of the Future

By V. R. SAVIĆ

Former Head of the Press Bureau in the Serbian Foreign Office; Author of
South Eastern Europe

WAR has always strongly impressed the imagination of man. It has inspired poets, seers and thinkers. But of all inspirations by the war, the most appealing to me are those that are a negation of the war,—thus, in the final inspiration in the Mahabharata, the great Indian war poem, when the old King Dritirastra in a vision saw all the warriors that fell on the fatal battlefield of Kukureshtra rising from the Ganges, friends and foes reconciled, all resplendent in youth and glory.

Technically we are still at war and all men of good-will are thinking how to get out of war, how to make peace, not a temporary one, but a lasting peace based upon solid foundation.

Two great aggressive empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, have passed away and upon their ruins, new states have sprung up, full of life, with new interests and a new outlook. The Balkans, that is what the politicians used to call the Balkans, have disappeared also. Only Bulgaria will remain a purely Balkan state. All other Balkan nations will have their future interests mainly outside the confines of the Balkan peninsula. Greece will extend to Asia Minor and look for the penetration of those vast territories which for some time were the dependencies of Hellenic civilization and later on were the stronghold of Byzantium. Serbia and Montenegro have ceased as independent states and have merged themselves into a larger national commonwealth of Jugoslavia, now officially called the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. With its territories on the left banks of the Rivers Save and Danube, that kingdom has extended beyond the Balkan peninsula, and, with its Alpine provinces, it belongs now to central Europe. Rumania also has altogether ceased to be a Balkan state, having annexed Bessarabia and Transylvania. Constantinople and the Straits surely will pass under an international control, and Albania will be tutored by a power or a league of powers from outside the Balkans. Moreover, the former

Balkan states, Rumania and Serbia, having nothing more to fear from Austria-Hungary, will turn to the north where instead of enemies they will find friends and natural allies in Czecho-Slovakia and Magyaria, the Magyar national state. Both these states, like Rumania and Serbia, must be creations of the Peace Conference at Versailles.

Since men or nations cannot be treated independently from their environments, it is necessary to draw attention to one strong feature of those countries. The fact should be emphasized that the Balkan peninsula, unlike the two other great European peninsulas, the Apenine and the Pyrenean, is not a geographical entity separated from the rest of the continent by a high and well marked chain of mountains. The Balkans are geographically an integral part of central Europe. The greatest European river, the Danube, is a common life-artery for all those countries. All the Bosnian and Serbian valleys open to the north and central Europe. This geographical fact may serve as an additional explanation of the causes of the present war and as a suggestion of what ought to be a sound policy of the new states of that part of Europe.

At the present moment the dominating desire of all those peoples is the achievement of complete national independence. The nations of southeastern Europe are longing for freedom, as freedom has been so long denied to them. Without the satisfaction of that demand no step forward can be made in the reconstruction of that stormy corner of Europe. We assume here that that demand will be fully satisfied, as Czecho-Slovakia and Jugoslavia base their aspirations upon victory achieved as well as upon the fourteen points of President Wilson.

There are many reasons, historic, national and economic which prompt the Czecho-Slovaks, the Jugoslavs and the Rumanians to remain good allies in the future and work out a scheme for close coöperation. The Jugoslavs and the Rumanians have lived as neighbors for more than a thousand years, but their history has never chronicled a conflict between them. They had the same sources of civilization, the Greek Christianity; they had the same enemies, the Bulgars, Magyars and the Turks. They shared the same destiny, being for centuries under the Turkish yoke, and were suffering from Magyar oligarchy. Together they shook off

Turkish rule and together in a world conflict they have now achieved the freedom and the unity of their race. All their past and present points to their mutual understanding in the future, as their interests nowhere clash.

The same is true of the Czecho-Slovaks. They and the Jugoslavs are of the same Slavic origin. Their languages even today represent a strong bond of unity. The Slovak dialect of the Czech tongue is so near to the Serbo-Croatian language that there is a dispute among the scientists whether the Slovak idiom should be classified into the group of the Yugoslav or into that of the Western Slav languages, to which belong the Czech, the Polish and certain other idioms. They also have drawn upon the same sources of civilization. In the tenth century the Slav apostles, Cyril and Methodius, translated the Gospels from the Greek into the Yugoslav language as was spoken in Macedonia. They went preaching the Gospel and strengthening Christianity among the Bulgarians, Jugoslavs and Czecho-Slovaks. Therefore, they are equally venerated by each one of those peoples. By the invasion of the Magyars, in the ninth century, the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs became separated territorially. Nevertheless, the bond of friendship and cultural ties never ceased to exist between them.

The similarity of their history is so great that one is rather tempted to look at it as a history of one and the same nation, forcibly separated into two physical parts, but whose inner life by a miracle remained the same. The Magyars subjugated the Slovaks in the north as well as the Croats in the south, whereas Bohemia and Serbia, as the main parts of their respective nations continued their independence and attained a remarkable degree of prosperity and civilization in the Middle Ages. The Turkish invasion worked upon them very similarly. After a prolonged struggle, Serbia succumbed to the Turks. Bohemia, fearing Turkish menace, in order to avoid the fate of Serbia, allied herself with Austria. But the result proved the same. The bad faith of the German dynasty of Hapsburg was an evil equal to the sword of Janissaries. Bohemia lost her independence and during long centuries, like Serbia, sank into misery and oblivion.

But there was a fire smouldering beneath the ashes. In the nineteenth century, after the great commotion created by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the national life of

both the Yugoslavs and Czecho-Slovaks was revived in literature and at the same time the nucleus of the present Jugoslavia was created in an autonomous Serbia out of the Turkish Vilayet of Belgrade. Since that time they both have progressed apace and in the same lines. The Czechs helped every national movement among the Yugoslavs and the latter always sided with the Czechs in their common struggle against the Germans and the Magyars. When, in 1848, the Germans of Bohemia took part in the Pan-German Congress at Frankfort, the Czechs proclaimed the solidarity of the Slavs by summoning a Pan-Slav Congress at Prague where the centuries old friendship between the Czecho-Slavs and Yugoslavs was strongly manifested and fortified by new coöperation. When in 1866 Austria became Austria-Hungary, the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs met one and the same fate. To them were denied the rights of ancient, independent states. Both of them were cunningly divided in Austria and Hungary and their national resources were recklessly exploited for the promotion of schemes directly opposed to their national welfare. The last war was a culmination of long endured iniquities. Their masters exacted from them the heaviest sacrifices in order to make their chains stronger. Both of them, the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs, were compelled to fight German battles. They both resisted that plan admirably. There has been no written treaty of alliance between them, but it is difficult to find any other instance in history of a closer coöperation and a more perfect confidence between two nations. Their policy sprang up simultaneously, dictated by the masses of the people whose heart felt instantaneously the whole meaning of the last world struggle. President T. Masaryk once said to me at London:

My policy was clearly revealed to me by the action of the Czecho-Slovak soldiers who, without awaiting upon any concert of their leaders, surrendered to the Allies in Serbia and Russia and immediately formed their own regiments to fight the central Empires. The same was done by the Yugoslavs. We, their leaders, had nothing to do but to follow and explain that policy to the Allies.

The same was done at home. Their recognized leaders were imprisoned, sentenced and executed by brutal masters. But in spite of everything their resistance grew and the mysterious coöperation among their national masses became closer with every day as war dragged on. Their deputies in the Vienna Parliament

proceeded with common accord. They denounced boldly the policy of the Central Empires. They preached and organized open revolt, which brought about the collapse of Austria-Hungary from within as much as it was due to the pressure from without. The Peace Conference will do justice to their bravery, and the brotherhood of arms between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugoslavs will be consecrated by a solemn international action by which both will be admitted into the society of nations as free, independent members.

They were true allies in the past; they are now; and they will continue to be in the future. There are ties stronger than any written treaty. The fear of a new German invasion by armed or by economic ways will dictate to them an agreement for the defense of their political and economic freedom. As in politics, so in economics they are mutually interdependent. Czecho-Slovakia can hardly find a better market for her manufactured goods than Jugoslavia. The latter being an agricultural country will have in Czecho-Slovakia, the nearest customer for her raw products. The Czechs will be the first to be interested in the development of the great natural resources of Jugoslavia.

With some difference of details, the same can be said for the past and future relations between Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia. Through the latter, Rumania and Jugoslavia can reach most easily northern and western Europe. Through Rumania, both of the others can be brought in contact with the rich countries on the shores of the Black Sea. Jugoslavia offers to Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia her fine Adriatic ports and Salonica which opens for them the wealth of the Indies and the East. As there was nothing dividing them in the past, so there is everything pointing to their coöperation in the future.

But all three of them, Jugoslavia, Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia, will stumble over Magyaria. The Magyars are a deep wedge, and for centuries were a stumbling block for the coöperation of nations in that part of Europe. Like a whirlwind from Asia they overran Russia and the Carpathians and settled down on the fertile plains on the banks of the Danube and the Tissa. Being a military organized camp, like all Mongolian tribes, they conquered easily the rather meek Slavic tribes and pushed them north into the mountains and beyond large rivers in the south.

After a thousand years of their European home, the Magyars have kept very much of their fiery, ardent, self-assertive Asiatic character. Through centuries the initial principle of their life—lust for conquest and sheer denial of any rights to their opponents—has manifested itself repeatedly. They conquered the Slavs, but they could never subdue them entirely. Weak as aggressors, the Slavs are very strong in their passive resistance. In the mountains, in the marshy plains, they kept their character and their faith, and after every apparent defeat, they came back stronger.

The thousand years of their past history, culminating in the struggle just ended, should have brought home a great lesson to each of them. The Slavs ought to recognize frankly the fact that the Magyars cannot be dislodged from their position. The Magyars should give up the eternal game of dominating the Slavs. Let them meet on a basis of equality and confidence. Let them consider their future relations in the light of the great modern principle, that no nation can live in itself, for itself and by itself. The old principle of exclusion and competition is to be replaced by the new one of trust and coöperation.

When the crust of old prejudices falls from their eyes, they will see how much of their past has been an awful misunderstanding, how, instead of irreconcilable antagonists, they are the most natural allies. The Magyars will see how their exclusiveness and self-assertion brought only misery to themselves and to their Slav neighbors. The Magyars' denial of Slav freedom undermined the real basis of their own liberty. In order to subjugate Slavs, they became slaves themselves and the overseers of German slaves. They will remember that the brightest and greatest phase of Magyar history was the time of King Mathius Corvinus, a sincere friend and ally of the Slavs. Never since has Magyar national genius shone so brightly as when it was coöperating with its Slav neighbors.

The Germans who invented and spread the teaching about an imaginary Slav danger, whilst preparing the conquest of the world for themselves, poured the poison into the Magyar ears that they were a super-race destined to rule. Of course the Germans gave them only the empty shell and kept the meat for themselves. What has been the result? The Magyar's professions of liberty degenerated into a cynic oppression of non-Magyar races and an

uncontested rule of Magyar junkers over Magyar masses. The fertile plain of Alföld saw with every day an increase of emigration of the Magyar peasantry overburdened by a medieval economic system and political corruption of the crudest form. The Magyar "super-race" after a very short and brilliant period of national literature and art during the struggle for independence of 1848, produced nothing that could win an international recognition. Their art and literature became a pale reflex of the cheap products of German mind of the last fifty years. Their only international "success" was the regilding of their aristocratic coat-of-arms by marriage with eccentric dollar princesses. Whereas the Magyar spiritual life sank to stale mediocrities, the oppressed Slavs exerted themselves vigorously in art, science and literature. The Czecho-Slovaks gave to the world a Dvořák, a Smetana, a Vrhlicki, a Masaryk. The power of the Yugoslav genius was revealed by the beauty of their national poetry and of their music and won the most honorable place in science through Tesla and Pupin, and in the plastic art through Meštrović, now unanimously recognized as the leading sculptor of the world.

If those people of southeastern Europe were to follow the teachings of Berlin, of Vienna or of Budapest they would in the good old way dismember Hungary and boast that this Mongolian dragon has been smashed and disposed of once and for all. And I should not say that such tendencies do not exist. The Balkan nations have for so long a time been tutored by Vienna and Budapest, that they cannot easily rid themselves of the ways of their former masters. But it would not be the Balkanization of the central Europe, it would be Vienneizing or Budapestizing it.

Fifty years ago, Count Andrassy returned from the Congress of Berlin to Budapest where he was treated like a great conqueror and far-sighted statesman. In the Hungarian Parliament and the fashionable clubs of Budapest, before gentlemen with diamond studs in their white shirts, he said boastfully that he was able to obtain for Austria-Hungary, not only the occupation of Bosnia but also the military administration of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. "Thus gentlemen," Count Andrassy boasted, "the Slav hydra has been smashed, the union of Serbia and Montenegro has been prevented, and the Magyars control the road to Salonica."

Life sometimes reserves strange surprises and revenges. The

would-be victorious Magyars were every day losing ground on that very field that only counts in the long run, the field of spiritual and moral achievements. Whereas the subjugated Slavs with every year made a new conquest on the way of true freedom and greatness. Thus the whole teaching of their history is giving them a serious warning on the threshold of a new era that is to dawn on Europe as a price of so much bravery and suffering. The sooner they bury the hatchet of past feuds the better for themselves and humanity. In order to enter the new life of promises the Magyars must be cured of the ridiculous pretension of a super-race which happily never was the religion of Magyar masses. At the bottom of Magyaro-Slavs relations, in spite of German insinuations and fatal misunderstandings, there remained always a feeling of respect and admiration. The plastic, elusive, imaginative Slav soul was a match to the ardent, fiery, somehow sombre Magyar mind. Temperamentally, they complement each other and if fused in a happy partnership can produce great and lasting things. The Slavs believe in their mission, but that mission never was that which the Germans taught about the Pan-Slavism. The Slavs believe in reconciliation and not in opposition. Against the German ideal of violence and pride, they set up their ideal of love and Christian humility. It consists not in compelling other nations to accept their outlook on life, but in sympathy for other nations' ideals.

The Slavs and the Magyars can enter the new life with old prejudices, petty jealousies, mean bickerings and eternal friction; or they can make their common life vaster, more beautiful and nobler through sincere reconciliation and coöperation. The Slavs do recognize the value of the Magyars; they are a desirable partner, but they must not be pressed into that partnership, they must be attracted. We may hope that the Magyars are ready for the change of attitude. The junkerism which heaped only misery and reproaches upon the Magyars is now defeated. Some of the Magyars could already see upon the Slav banners, the slogan "for our and your liberty." The Magyar democracy must feel friendly towards such instinctively democratic people as the Slavs. The self-evidence of so many common interests between them will do the rest.

The Magyar government headed by Count Karolyi made a

vain and very belated plea that the geographical frontiers of Hungary should be preserved, that the Magyars were ready to grant the complete national autonomy to Serbs, Slovaks and Rumanians comprised in those boundaries. The Peace Conference cannot and should not respond to it. This plea and offer are a survival of the old pre-war Magyar ideology. The nationalities of Hungary already possess their autonomy of will, and intend to settle their political status according to their own interests and aspirations. The Magyars have nothing to grant them. The nations of southeastern Europe demand above everything freedom and unity. No economic, geographical or strategical considerations can stand in the way of that. The future coöperation of those nations can be attained only through freedom and in freedom. The Magyars must recognize and reconcile themselves to these facts if they desire to enjoy the advantages of a coöperation.

The most necessary and desirable factors for coöperation with the Magyars are at hand. Not one of those nations is powerful enough to menace the independence of another. Czecho-Slovakia with strong German minorities will number about twelve millions; Magyaria with strong German and other minorities about ten millions; Jugoslavia about twelve millions and Rumania about twelve millions. Not one of these countries is economically self-sufficient. But united in a loose political and a strong economic confederation, they will command natural resources greater than any other European country. Rumania possesses oil wells and salt mines, the richest in Europe. Jugoslavia has an abundance of coal, copper, iron, and together with Bohemia is one of the wealthiest mining countries of the world. Jugoslavia, as well as the Carpathian mountains, has an abundance of forests and their timber industries will come next to Russia. Rumanian, Magyar and Jugoslav plains are the richest granaries of Europe. The vineyards of Hungary and Jugoslavia are equal to the best French vineyards. Jugoslavia enjoys the finest climate for fruit growing and cattle raising; Hungary for horse breeding. Czecho-Slovakia already possesses many industries. The skill and organizing capacities of the Czechs stand among the first in Europe.

A Danubian confederation represented by such gifted nations

as Latins, Slavs and Magyars, could evolve a civilization whose brilliancy might easily surpass anything attained until now in Europe. Materially and geographically it could be envied by many other countries. In variety and beauty of its scenery, in the richness of its soil, in the extent of its frontiers for the increase of population, in the navigability of its rivers, in the safety, size and beauty of its seaports—that confederation would be better provided than any other European country. Its geographical position which, heretofore, presented many disadvantages, such as being on a high road connecting East and West and open to all invasions and conquests, should in the new era of peace be turned to greatest advantage.

The Danube in connecting all these countries offers not only the cheapest route for an internal exchange of goods, but opens to them the access to the rich countries around and beyond the Black Sea. The Adriatic ports give them the access to the civilized West. Moreover, nature has provided through the Balkans the nearest and easiest access to Salonica. That port, the largest and safest in the Mediterranean, is the key of the fabulous riches of the East. The *Ægean* Sea is connected now by a railway line with Prague, Budapest, Belgrade, Skoplje and Salonica, but could be reached also by a navigable water way which was under consideration before the last war. The Danube is navigable and so are many of its tributaries in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Jugoslavia. But its navigation presents some difficulties at the Iron Gates and at Sulina. Those difficulties can, however, be avoided and the way to Salonica considerably shortened by a canal to be built from Smederevo in Serbia using the courses of the Morava and the Vardar rivers. Now there is no watershed between the Morava and the Vardar. The waters from a plateau near Kumanovo in Serbia run indifferently to the Danube or to the Vardar which empties in the Gulf of Salonica. The water way from Brunn in Bohemia or from Budapest or from Belgrade to Smyrna or to the Suez Canal or to any port of the Mediterranean can be made shorter by 600 nautical miles than the existing way along the Danube and through the Straits. The Hungarian government before the war had under consideration a costly and difficult scheme to connect Fiume with the River Save by a canal. It would require costly boring of a mountain range which would be

superfluous if the project of a cheaper canal to Salonica were to be executed. That water way can be easily prolonged by a system of rivers and canals to the Baltic. Thus from Danzig, the Vistula is navigable all through Russian Poland. Further up, the Vistula can be canalized and connected with the River March in Czecho-Slovakia which empties in the Danube near Pressburg. From there the Danube carries us to Smederevo, then the Morava and the Vardar through Serbia will bring us to Salonica. This navigable water way all through the countries independent of Germany would offer to all Baltic countries a sure water way to Suez shorter by 2,000 miles than the route now existing all around Europe. This water way would only emphasize the political and economic importance of a Danubian confederation.

The readers can see that such a confederation is not a beautiful dream of dreamers, but a practical and a most advantageous solution of future problems in southeastern Europe. It must not and cannot be realized by force but by enlightenment and free will of all the peoples concerned. For the present moment the whole question hinges upon the attitude of the Magyars after the signing of the world peace. It can be put thus: Will they continue to be a wedge or will they become a link between the neighboring nations?

What will be the policy of those nations depends upon what will be their philosophy, since the policy of a nation is the practical application of its philosophy. The Danubian peoples, in fact all the nations of Europe, are in need of a new philosophy. They look to America for this. Is there something ironically tragic in this looking? Will, or can America seize this opportunity to become the teacher for the nations of a philosophy of reconciliation and contentment?

Russia—Present and Future

By R. M. STORY, PH.D.¹

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RUSSIA is reaping the whirlwind. For generations her autocrats and bureaucrats, her priests and teachers, her professional men and merchant princes have sowed the wind. Clothed with responsibilities, endowed with power, and faced with opportunities such as rarely fall to the lot of any leaders, they stupidly chose to dig a pit of selfishness. Blinded with their own conceits they overreached themselves, and plunged down headlong dragging their people with them. In all the hellish misery of the present hour in Russia, one hears from their lips no word of contrition and no plea for forgiveness. The Almighty may have mercy upon them, but in Russia they are already numbered among the damned.

CZARISM AND BOLSHEVISM

Bolshevism is the whirlwind; it is the offspring of czarism, but not more hideous either in principle or in method. Conceived in utter selfishness and in basest materialism it carries within its own bosom the seeds of its destruction. Like the parent tyranny from which it sprang, it is without conscience and without a god. "We are frankly anti-Christian," announced the head of the Bolshevik Bureau of Social Welfare to a representative of the Y. M. C. A.; to which the faith of a Christian replies, "Then you will fail."

Czarism has passed away; it was not truly Russian either in its spirit or in its working. It was founded on the sand; under the storm and flood of war it fell, and great has been the fall of it. Bolshevism, its child, also builds on the sands of class-rule, hatred, strife, jealousy and selfishness. It mocks international obligations and revels in intrigue. With audacious impertinence it seeks to override existing democracies and voices its claim to

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world dominion. One cannot imagine the consummation of its program, even in Russia. Any social structure which is to endure in Russia, must be founded upon the enduring rock of good in the character and the past experience of the Russian people.

THE RUSSIAN CHARACTER

One who has been through the agony of the past two years with Russians can realize how deep are the strata of love, forgiveness, patience and meekness; how universal the common sense and humor; how strong the mental fibre; how glowing the desire for knowledge; how wonderful the already developed capacity for coöperative effort; how rich the simple culture; how reverent and noble and genuine the religious life of this great people. No lust of conquest or imperial ambitions motivate them. The average Russian believes in the golden rule as a practical proposition. His fine idealism and rugged good sense will ultimately turn to confusion the counsel both of hypocritical bourgeoisie and demagogic bolshevist. It is in the faith that neither of these pretenders to authoritative speech voices the real mind and will of Russia, that one can view her present plight without despair or even trepidation, and look to her future with confidence and assurance.

One is not unmindful of the present woes and horrors which have overtaken this long-suffering people. Would that it were possible to blot from memory some of the unutterable infamies which have been perpetrated by both sides in this terrible civil war! Only too well known are the embittered ruthlessness and calculated terrors of the bolshevist program, both in its conception and in its execution. These men had good teachers. On the other hand are the arrogant, swaggering, imperialistic militarists, the record of whose deeds will make even the Prussian jealous when the scalpel of history bares it to the world. And what shall one say of those who follow in their wake, the soulless, vulturous creatures, who from their emigré havens outside of Russia have been calling upon the world to rescue their prey for them! Neither side in the Russian civil war has a monopoly of coup d'états, Chinese mercenaries and Machiavellian principles and methods. The great majority of the Russian people quite wisely prefer to endure stoically the pains of the present rather than cast in their

lot with either of the principal groups aspiring for power, for neither group knows what it is to respect public opinion, to have regard for ordered liberty, to love international morality, or to recognize the principles and practices of democracy. It is quite easy, entertaining and popular to paint the lurid and the outrageous. One may indulge in this pastime exclusively, may remain wholly faithful to the facts in every instance related, and with the mass of accumulated evidence may continue such portrayal almost indefinitely. Yet such a portrayal would not truly represent normal conditions in Russia today. As in the case of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, granted that every detail related could be substantiated, yet the aggregate impression conveyed is wrong. The dislocation in life, industry and transport is severe. The sufferings endured are often intense, but there is no such uninterrupted carnival of blood and crime, no such wallow of corruption, as the more picturesque reports would have one believe. There is less of disorder and suffering in bolshevik Russia, and less of stability in non-bolshevik Russia, than is generally indicated. Allowing for the effects of the war, the masses of the Russian people know little more of oppression today than they have known in generations past. Large sections of the country are comparatively quiet. The impairment of former conditions of life has not come quickly. The disruption of normal life began in 1914, and affairs have grown progressively worse from then till now. Individual and social adjustments have to some extent kept pace with misfortune and there has been no sudden or overwhelming collapse. The nearest approach to it followed the demobilization of the army. The only explanations for Russia's survival of that supreme test are found in prohibition, the average man's good sense, the faithfulness of the railway employees, and the wide distribution of the shock.

THE EFFECT OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

I entered Russia before the bolshevik revolution. The country had been three years at war. It had already been gutted as by fire. Vast areas had been swept over by the contending forces. Man-power, industry, financial stability and transport had been sacrificed to the terrible demands of the struggle with Germany. Twenty million men had been mobilized for the armies, and the

armies had suffered nine million casualties including prisoners. Agriculture, the principal industry, had suffered no less than manufacture. Roubles were selling for five cents in Vladivostok, and you can buy them no cheaper today. Bank credits were grossly over extended through war loans and speculative activities. The vice-president of the Zemsky Soiuz informed me in November, 1917, that the productive capacity of his organization—a fair example—in the Moscow district had fallen from 40 to 60 per cent during the preceding year. Trains were running from three days to a week late on the Trans-Siberian. The morale of the army was gone, and many competent observers, British, French, Belgian, and Czech soldiers, who had been fighting with the army, testify that there was little chance for the restoration of that morale after the disasters in the fall of 1916.

Russia was already prostrate when swept by the revolution. She was prostrate not only because of the corrupt and incapable leadership to which her destinies had been committed; not only because of her military defeats and economic insufficiency; but prostrate because her masses in their ignorance did not comprehend the significance of the conflict. If Russia was already prostrate in 1917, what has transpired since then may be viewed in the nature of a misdirected protest; a protest which aggravates rather than betters the misfortunes against which it is directed, but which can be greatly overestimated in its importance.

The person who fastens his attention upon the disasters of the war, or gives way to undue concern regarding bolshevism or attaches his hopes to the success of the Siberian, North Russian and other ostensible champions of constitutional government, will certainly fail in any just approximation of the future of Russia. These may all affect, but they will not determine, that future. There is so much bolshevism in anti-bolshevik Russia and so much anti-bolshevism in bolshevik Russia that the fate of the momentous issues at stake in Russia cannot possibly be decided by mere changes in battle lines or even by the rise and fall of temporary antagonists for power. The situation is far more baffling in its complexities; far more astounding in its contradictions; and far less susceptible of analysis or even intelligent observation than the majority of foreigners, who have been there, like to admit. The wise student of Russia's future will rather

seek to ascertain and study the great underlying currents of Russian life and thought. He will seek out the fundamental and substantial elements of former social organization and practice and the individual virtues that are universally recognized as significant in the lives and destinies of peoples who seek to be free.

THE FUTURE

The fundamental present facts which in my opinion have permanent bearing on Russia's future are:

1. Russia is rich in her natural resources, so wondrously rich that the average American literally has no conception of the tremendous possibilities of the great Slavic domain. Natural resources of this character are vital. Upon them national life may draw for its recuperation, if the will and the determination to recover are present. It is, therefore, to the characteristics of the Russian people and to their social institutions that one must address himself if he is to know whether Russia *will* recover.

2. The true Russian spirit is tolerant, democratic, spontaneous and unspoiled, if one may judge by the soldiers and the peasants. Wanting much in self-discipline and the spirit of compromise yet they knew not arrogance nor false pride, nor was there in them any servility; they were free men. One of them in the rapture of his freedom expressed it thus, "I have known what it is to be free. To have had one day of the revolution is better than all my previous existence."

3. The Russian temper is radical in its attitude toward political, social and economic problems. It is definitely intended that the old order shall not continue in the new nation which the people aspire to build. For example, in all of my travels in Russia, I did not meet with a single Russian who wished to see American social and economic civilization reproduced in his country. It is upon the vision of a better social order that the bolshevist régime has built up its power, but no one who knows the radicalism of the average Russian can for a moment believe that his conception of the better social order will permanently admit of the substitution of a new tyranny in place of the old.

Moreover, if Russia appears radical from our point of view, we should bear in mind that she may not be so radical from her own standpoint. Private property has never enjoyed the recog-

dition in Russia which it has in America and in western Europe. If in the working out of their social vision, the Russian people choose to modify still further the recognition which it has heretofore had, it will be but the confirmation of a tendency long since established.

4. Russia is rich in social experience as well as in natural resources, democratic in spirit and radical in temper. In his bitter struggle for a better world, the peasant has learned the value of coöperative enterprise. The coöperative buying, selling and banking organizations of Russia and Siberia are among the great institutions developed in former years. Except in a very limited sense, these great coöperatives have restricted themselves to buying and selling and banking, but it will be surprising indeed if the economic rehabilitation of Russia in manufacturing and mining does not come about through the application of the coöperative principles already well established. I see no other method of economic readjustment that is in keeping with the social views of the masses and the practical problems involved.

5. The Russian people are poor in education. Yet I have never been any other place where the intellectual hunger is as keen and insatiable as it is in Russia. To think that this desire for knowledge has been the object of much of the repression and oppression which the Russian people have undergone! One of the great and crying needs of Russia today, one which all substantial elements of the population seem unanimous in their desire to realize, is education. Sad as it is to witness the levelling down of the institutions of higher learning in Russia, it is but a part of the retribution which has swept in upon the privileged classes. The Universities of Moscow and Petrograd and similar institutions may have been demoted from their high calling, but they are being definitely related to the most immediate and pressing educational needs of the Russian people.

6. Russia has genuine unity, cultural, political, economic, and religious. After admitting the present potency of the separatist and disruptive forces which are at work, one must still face the great underlying unity of culture. A common medium of speech and a universal body of literature, song, art and custom continue. These create a desire for political unity. Many Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Siberians and even Poles have privately recognized

the ultimate necessity of a federal union of the component parts of what was formerly the Russian empire. A separatist movement in Siberia in 1918 received no substantial support. The economic interests of the various sections of the old empire are already knit together in a fashion so plain and substantial that the separatist tendencies which are present have before them an exceedingly difficult struggle if they are to prevail. The cultural, political and economic unity is reinforced by a spiritual unity which obtains throughout Great Russia, Ukraine and Siberia, and which has planted its roots deeply in the furthestmost corners of the old empire. It is a force—manifested chiefly in the Orthodox church—which is under a cloud today, but which is potent in its capacity for future influence upon the destinies of Russia. Finally there is geographical unity. As I travelled over Russia and Siberia, I was frequently reminded of the Honorable James Bryce's dictum in regard to our own Mississippi Valley—it was meant to be the home of one people. The geographical unity has been emphasized by a remarkable system of river, railway and canal transportation, which strengthens at every point the other elements of unity. I cannot believe that the forces of unity and integration have been more than temporarily suspended by the conditions which now obtain.

7. In its governmental institutions, one must bear in mind that Russia has had a minimum of political experience with democracy; that it is without trusted political leaders, without tried and proven popular institutions of government and without the stabilizing influence of political traditions.

It is not altogether clear to me that the village mir or the Zemstvos or the Duma, either municipal or national, are to endure. It is very doubtful if they command popular confidence and support. My own impressions are that they do not now do so. The soviet, on the other hand, has gathered around it the loyalty and enthusiasm of the revolutionary movement, and has the honor of having saved the social and economic character of the revolutionary movement. It has innumerable defects. But its constitution is still in the formative state and is undergoing rapid modifications. The great importance of the soviet lies in the fact that it is the only political institution in which the Russian people seem to have confidence. The average Russian peasant,

or the workingman, has little trust or interest even in a Constituent Assembly; he will tell you his fear that though he were in a majority he could not control it because of his political inexperience. In the soviet, on the other hand, he believes he can ultimately make his point and maintain it. He will admit that it may be perverted and often has been, but will deny that such perversion can be long or continuously maintained. In this confidence which the masses of the population have in the soviet and in its own capacity for rapid change and development lie the possibilities of its future. My impression is that it must be reckoned with in any consideration of the future of Russia.

In conclusion, let me suggest a few of the things which it seems to me we may confidently expect to come out of Russia's present struggle.

1. The rehabilitation of the Russian state on some federative basis, which will include the Balkan provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Siberia, but will almost certainly exclude Poland and Finland.

2. The application of state ownership and control to transportation, education, certain banking and financial functions, and welfare work.

3. A coöperative rural and industrial economy, based upon past experiences and prevailing ideals.

4. Considerable latitude for private initiative and corporate activity. The field for such developments, however, will be limited as compared with what today exists in the United States.

5. The definite abandonment of militaristic and imperialistic programs of the past and of the wild radicalism of the present; a wholehearted committal to international peace, to the intensive development of the native character, culture, institutions and resources.

6. There are yet many long years of civil war and strife ahead of Russia. It will not be surprising if revolution follows revolution, so wide spread is the unrest, so inadequate the leadership, and so poor are the facilities for effective expression of public opinion. Yet, despite this unhappy prospect, one who has been in Russia and has come to know her people can hardly doubt her future. If it is impossible to explain Russia, if it is beyond us even to understand and comprehend her, one can yet have faith in

her. And it is a remarkable fact that those of my associates who have known Russia longest trust her most.

For Americans who have such faith, there is open the privilege of an unselfish and sympathetic assistance to a people who need help and who welcome and appreciate it when rendered. There can be no sure method of helping Russia that is not founded on the law of love and mutual respect. The soul of the new Russia will spurn any other.

The Russian Tragedy

By W. C. HUNTINGTON

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PHYSICALLY, Russia covers over one-seventh of the surface of the earth, but in thought present-day Russia has come to cover the whole world. The Russian problem is fundamental and elemental, and its roots are deep struck and in all directions in our modern life.

The Russia of today is not interesting chiefly because of its art or quaint customs, its embroidery or church music, but because it is a seismograph of political and social movements, on whose dial in great sweeps of the needle can be observed indications of what are still only faint rumblings in other places. Again, Russia is a social laboratory in which vivisection is practiced with a vengeance. Russia is offering up a vicarious sacrifice for the benefit and instruction of us all, and we can hardly stand by coldly or without sympathy and see this sacrifice made.

It is very difficult for the American here at home to encompass the Russian problem. It is so huge and so new that more time is needed to get the full perspective. Russia has not been a popular subject in the past, and most students lack the absolutely essential background to consider the subject. Newspaper accounts have been fragmentary, which is by no means to say that all newspaper accounts, as is frequently stated, are untruthful. As an eyewitness, I can say that, in spite of error and exaggeration, the general tenor of these accounts, which picture the conditions in Russia as very bad, is correct.

Of the Americans who were in Russia before and during the revolutionary period, most were idealists and well-wishers of the country; few, however, had the necessary equipment to study a situation where political and social phenomena have taken place at such rapid speed; and there have been, therefore, many inaccurate observers and, worse still, false teachers. So much of the discussion about Russia is not about Russia at all, but about political and social fundamentals, which the Russian situation

has brought to light, between people who differ beyond the possibility of compromise in their political and social conceptions, and each of whom hopes to see in Russia the vindication of his view. The constructive purpose of this paper is to try to discover some logic in all the tangle of ideas and give you, if possible, foundation and materials for your own further study and thinking.

In doing this, I assume that I am writing as a student for students and as a liberal for liberals. By liberals I mean those who have an open mind, a profound consciousness of their social obligation and a sense of values too profound to permit them to cast lightly away the old until the new has been tested. With such an equipment one can attack the Russian problem. I cannot forbear to say, as one who cherishes an affection for Russia, that she needs friends, and especially American friends. She needs sentiment of the best kind, but she does not need sentimentalism. The appeal of Russia is of such dimensions that it approximates a religious experience. However, there are varieties of religious experience, and emotionalism is not the best variety. Many well intentioned people, or adventurous people, seem to feel that when they approach the Russian problem they abandon all their former standards. This is an absolute mistake. Russia is not an exception in human nature; rather the Russian people are the most profoundly and intensely human that I have ever seen.

Now Russia is a tragedy, and America and the Anglo-Saxon world a comedy. We play the game to win, but to be beaten before you start has been the perspective that has faced Russians for centuries. This vein runs through all their literature. As an instance, recently a conference class in English literature at the University of Toronto was discussing Matthew Arnold's definition of poetry, in which he said it must be pleasing (doubtless in form and style). A Russian girl student in that class rose excitedly and said, "That definition is untrue. Poetry is literature, literature depicts life, and life is not pleasing."

From the economist's viewpoint, Russia is a natural tragedy, because of three great factors: (a) Its isolation from the rest of Europe, (b) its vastness and unprotectedness against Asiatic raids, (c) its harsh climate. It is impossible to discuss the present and future of Russia without knowing something of the past.

The three factors of the natural tragedy enumerated above finally brought about the consummation of the autocracy three hundred years ago. The people accepted this autocracy because they preferred it to anarchy and famine. Presently to that autocracy was added serfdom—analogous to the slavery of our colored people of the South—which lasted until the year of 1861, the year of our own Civil war. By serfdom nine-tenths of the population were bound to the land on which they were born, to be bought and sold with it.

THE TWO GREAT CLASSES

The great result of all this was to divide the Russian people into two classes, an upper one-tenth and a submerged nine-tenths, with a chasm between. Again from the economist's point of view, education and, hence production, were so backward in Russia that there was simply not enough produced to maintain much more than one-tenth on the scale of living which we have come to demand as normal. The upper tenth was composed primarily of the city dwellers, nobility, bureaucrats, professional classes, industrials and merchants. These look toward Western Europe; they often speak several languages. I have known cases amongst the wealthy where the children spoke French better than Russian; they are versatile, attractive, but as a class unsound, because out of touch with the main body of their own people. I venture to say that, generally speaking, no class of people in a country is ever superior to or can separate itself from the accomplishment of the country as a whole without hurting itself; and the quasi-mediæval conditions in Russia, persisting because of the backwardness of the country, had an unfortunate effect on the upper classes. The lower nine-tenths was composed of peasants in the country and their relatives who had come into the city to work in the factories. They were living for the most part as did the peasants in Western Europe two hundred years ago, undernourished and 90 per cent illiterate.

The spectacle of the profound difference between the two great classes, of the backwardness which prevailed among the nine-tenths, and the tyranny which held the whole structure together, was the tragedy of Russia. This tragedy has produced the passive Christian virtues in which the Russians excel—pity, generosity,

tolerance, human kindness, as well as a feeling that many have of living in eternity, that, since this life is not worth very much, they must turn to the prospect of another. But the tragedy has also produced the fundamental Russian faults: inertia and lack of initiative and decision.

THE INTELLIGENTZIA

Autocracy, using the bureaucracy as an instrument of government and excluding even most of the upper one-tenth from participating in it, has not given the people an opportunity to train in democracy, and has helped to bring about radicalism, which is the dominant note in Russian political life and will remain so until the harsh economic situation is improved. From the tragedy sprang also the "intelligentzia"—a portion of the upper one-tenth, profoundly conscious of their social obligation and trying to bridge the gap between the upper one-tenth and the lower nine-tenths. The faults of this class are well known. Circumstances made of them theorists, because they were denied opportunity for constructive efforts and participation in political life. They also suffered from the mentality of protest, the mentality which grows so accustomed to fighting certain evils that it has no plans for the time when these evils shall have been removed. Nevertheless, the intelligentzia has contained some of the noblest souls and most heroic strugglers for liberty of all time.

THE RUSSIAN PEASANT

As an offshoot of radical thought in Russia, it was most natural that socialism should be imported from Western Europe and that the labor movement of Russia should be under the socialist flag. Of course, political activity in Russia is always more or less on the edges and goes quite over the heads of the great mass of the people, who are the least known and the hardest to encompass, that is, the great mass of the peasantry. It is impossible to get a clear expression of opinion on political questions from the amorphous mass, because of its inaccessibility, due to insufficient communication, and because of its illiteracy and the limitations of its life experience. The Russian peasant is fundamentally of sound white stock and is bound to have a tremendous development. The war has had a great effect on him, but still he is essentially a

shrewd man with a very narrow horizon. The Russian peasant is an elemental man, with a character fundamentally good and kind, but like all such men, he can be aroused to passion by preaching and agitating, and in that passion he can strike and be tremendously cruel; and he has been.

THE MARCH REVOLUTION

In June of 1916 I arrived in Russia. I saw the manufacturing capacity of the country—never very large—concentrated on war production. I saw transportation—never sufficient, even before it had an army of millions of men to supply—overloaded. There was corruption in high places; there had been disaster at the front. The burden of war, while it drew out so many noble sacrifices from all classes of people, was, nevertheless, breaking down Russia's insufficient economic apparatus and intensifying political and social disturbances. With ample supplies of food in the south of Russia, hunger came to Petrograd and to Moscow because the food was not transported. Finally, with the flower of the professional army gone, just this hunger produced riots in Petrograd and pulled the hair trigger on the loaded gun; and the revolution of March was on.

On January 14, 1917, all the ambassadors in Petrograd and their staffs were presented to the Emperor at the New Year's reception at the Tsarskoe Selo. Two months afterward that same Emperor had abdicated for himself and his son, the Grand Duke Mikhail had refused to take the throne without a mandate from the Constituent Assembly, and the line of the executive authority was broken for the first time in three hundred years. The struggle for democracy was on.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET

Then we ran through those memorable eight months, the eight months of effort at democracy, of conflict between the provisional government and the soviet. When the Romanov dynasty was cut off, the Duma, which was Russia's only parliament, formed a committee. This committee attempted to take affairs in hand and, in accord with the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, appointed the provisional government of Russia, of which Prince Lvov was the Premier and in which Alexander Kerensky, who later rose to fame, sat as Minister of Justice.

"Soviet" is merely the Russian word for "council," and the soviet was a labor organization, primarily formed in the cities and only afterwards extended to the peasants, for the reason that the latter are more inaccessible and not politically conscious, as has been explained above. The soviet is not an old institution in Russia, but had its birth in the revolution of 1905, when soviets of workmen were formed in all the chief cities. In the revolution of 1917 it also took in soldiers, a large part of whom were, of course, peasants, and finally it took in the peasants, who for a time had their own soviet. The soviet was socialistic, not bolshevistic, the Bolsheviks sitting in it as a small minority party, very active. The soviet organization did not aspire to govern, fearing to make a botch of government in such a crisis and discredit the cause of socialism. They sought to influence the provisional government, which was composed of *bourgeois*, i.e., not working people, with the exception of Kerensky, who was a member of the soviet. The leaders of the soviet were not rough workmen, but educated people, who had espoused the workmen's cause.

The chasm between the upper one-tenth and the lower nine-tenths immediately became evident between the provisional government and the soviet. This latter organization, in which there were so many restless spirits, desired to realize all manner of ideals instantly. There was no compromise, no team-work, because no one had ever been trained in democracy, and there was a very tremendous economic and military crisis which would have taxed the powers of any government to meet. Besides all this there was the constant work of the German spies, with which the country was filled, and of the bolshevist group using German money. This produced in eight months the downfall of the effort toward democracy in Russia.

BOLSHEVISM—ITS MEANING, METHODS, AND FAILURE

In November came the bolshevik coup d'état. *Bolshe* in Russian means "more"; *bolshevik* means a "maximalist," a man who stands for the maximum of a program, not the majority of the people, according to some misrepresentations. *Menshe* means "less," and the Mensheviks are the minimalists in the socialist movement. The Bolsheviks, whose chief spokesman is Lenin, have always taken the stand of the whole-hogger. In theory,

bolshevism is crude Marxian socialism by violence. Many of my Marxian friends deny this. The Berne Conference, by a large majority, repudiated bolshevism, but if you concede that they do in any degree strive toward socialist doctrines, then the great thing that distinguishes them from all other socialists is not their creed but their method, which is as old as the world. It is the method of "the end justifies the means," of personal opportunism, of absolute unscrupulousness. What they do is in the name, of course, of a great boon to be conferred on mankind. They are, like the Germans, wonderfully clever at using the basest side of human nature; they seem to know how to play on the meaner motives, such as cupidity. Lately the bolshevik propaganda organization in New York City, under the guise of commercial operations, has been offering American business men a bait of \$200,000,000 in gold. It was surprising the serious attention which this perfectly absurd, from a business point of view, organization received.

It is the philosophy of "the end justifies the means," the philosophy of class warfare and of the terror, with which democracy can never compromise. Our conflict with bolshevism is as fundamental as was our conflict with Germany. Karl Radek, writing in a bolshevik newspaper recently, made the issue plain, stating that now that the conflict between Wilson and the Kaiser was solved by the defeat of the latter, the struggle was on between Wilson and Lenin. The philosophy of "the end justifies the means" made it possible for the bolsheviks, although opposed to imperial Germany, to accept the tainted money of the Germans, and for the Germans to give the bolsheviks this money, although detesting them and their movement.

The theory of the Bolsheviks calls for the class war, and they remain in government by the exercise of the terror. The chief characteristic of this terror is not its physical side, which is merely Russian bestial nature let loose, but the fact that official proclamations prescribe it and justify it. In America the sanctity of the home is held very high, and stories of the nationalization of women in Russia have attracted disproportionate attention. Such nationalization seems to have taken place in a number of localities, but never upon the instructions of the central bolshevik government. What is more important to me is that Chicherin,

the bolshevik Commissary of Foreign Affairs, told one of my friends in Stockholm that the church and the home stood in the way of the progress of modern society and must be swept aside.

Terrible as the methods of the Bolsheviks have been, they might perhaps be condoned had they obtained for the proletariat, whose name they use so often, the benefits which they promised. They have not. Russia is today a desert place. The cities of Petrograd and Moscow are prison places. It is not that the streets flow daily with blood—executions take place at night or in quiet districts—but it is the deadly weight of oppression that weighs on everything, the total lack of production and of activity. Today the Russian proletariat are not behind this movement, because they are hungry and out of a job and have no freedom. The peasants are not behind it, because they have seen that taking the land by violence has made no just distribution and has brought them strife. There is class warfare even in the villages between rich and poor peasants—and the rich peasant would seem very poor to you. Bolshevism is immoral in theory and an utter failure in economic practice. The time is approaching rapidly when this group will pass, and America should aid every constructive Russian force which is contributing to this end. The reconstruction of Russia is particularly America's job; and there is no country which affords a greater field for the efforts of the spirit of service than Russia. No country draws on one so much. It is not sufficient to lend money or goods, but we shall have to lend ourselves, because there are too few brains per square mile. The Russian and the American character are very congenial.

The Menace of Bolshevism

By BARON ROSEN

Former Ambassador of Russia to the United States

IT is needless for me to expatiate on the horrors of the bolshevist régime in Russia. Since the publication of the official reports of American and British representatives in Russia, the absolute truthfulness of which cannot be questioned for a moment, no fair-minded person may entertain any doubt whatever as to the reality of these horrors. And now we have an explanation from the lips of Lenin himself of the aims and policies pursued by the bolshevist tyrants of Russia. An extremely interesting report of this interview with Lenin will be found in the files of the *New York Times* for April 23rd. The report concludes as follows:

Some of his remarks are sufficiently frank and illustrative of the sinister form of moral insanity, which distinguishes the bolshevist mind, to be a terrible warning to Western Europe.

I might mention that I happen to have in my possession a letter just received from a most distinguished English statesman, an old friend and colleague of mine, who writes:

We have learned enough to know what Bolshevism is and by what detestable methods its sanguinary sway is maintained. Nevertheless, there are persons, not a few, who refuse to believe in the truth of the abominable crimes which continue to be committed by the Bolsheviks, and extend some sympathy to them merely because they profess to be the "friends of the proletariat," being really "hostes humani generis." This is one of the things which make one feel as if the world had gone mad.

The Russian Information Bureau in New York published in the last issue of its paper *Struggling Russia* a most eloquent "Appeal to Humanity" from the pen of the famous writer Leonid Andreeff, who paints a picture of the appalling sufferings of the Russian people and especially of the unfortunate people still left alive in the doomed capital of what was once the empire of Russia, a picture such as would profoundly move the heart of even the most callous cynic. An introductory remark of the editor expresses the hope that the so-called "parlor bolsheviks" will read it and will understand "the crime they are committing in going about

and speaking of the régime of murder in Russia as a new and higher form of democracy."

The formidable problem of bolshevism cannot be light heartedly passed by with similar shallow definitions. If one goes to the bottom of things, bolshevism is but the outbreak in a particularly virulent form of that old, chronic and incurable disease, with which civilized mankind is and probably always will remain afflicted—the everlasting strife between those who "have" and those who "have not." Incurable, because there is not and there never can be a sufficiency of the good things of this world to go round and, therefore, their enjoyment will always be limited to a small minority, whereas the thirst for such enjoyment among the great majority will constantly grow, as the contrast between the luxury and the ease of the few and the want and the limitations of the many becomes ever greater and more glaring. Discontent with the narrow limitations of a life condemned to incessant toil, joyless monotony and anxious insecurity, such as always will be the lot of the great majority of mankind, envy of the more fortunate and consequent class hatred—these are the seeds of the disease. They were and they are present everywhere. All that was needed to make them bear fruit—and that fruit was bolshevism—was the short-sighted policy of the ruling classes of the leading nations of the world. The wasting of untold billions of the people's wealth on gigantic armaments and finally on a fratricidal war of mutual extermination, instead of devoting, say only a tenth part of the colossal treasure thus wasted to the bettering of the lot and the lightening of the burden of the toiling masses. Such was the policy that produced and always will produce bolshevism and anarchy.

It was the suicidal feud between the ruling classes of the leading nations that created the opportunity for bolshevism to raise its head. The problem of how to deal with it stares us in the face now—not Russia alone, nor Germany, but the whole civilized world. One thing is certain: the problem of bolshevism can be solved only by all civilized mankind acting in concert to put it down. The ruling classes of all nations are a minority, but they have a sacred duty to perform; not towards themselves, which would only be acting in self-defence, but towards their peoples. The triumph of bolshevism would mean the utter ruin not only

of the "classes" but of the "masses" as well. That is the lesson which the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia is teaching the world.

At present the problem of the immediate future of Russia is one of unexampled difficulty. Its solution is urgently required in the common interest of all civilized mankind, for if bolshevism be suffered to spread it may ultimately come to mean the doom of our race and civilization. The task of seeking such a solution should be approached in a spirit free from partisanship and from the passions of international hatred bred by the world war. In other words, what is primarily needed is the total elimination from the consideration of the Russian problem of the fatally perturbing element of the relationship between Russia and the Entente Powers on one side, and Russia and the Central Powers on the other. It stands to reason that this can be brought about only by the final conclusion, if not of a general peace, at least of peace between the Powers of the Entente and the Central Powers. No peace can evidently be general without the participation of Russia, nor can any league of nations be complete without including a nation numbering still some 120,000,000 to 130,000,000 souls and occupying almost a seventh part of the surface of the inhabitable globe. But then Russia as a political entity has temporarily ceased to exist and there is at present no political party, nor body of men who could be held to be entitled to enter upon international engagements in the name of Russia and the Russian nation—least of all that small group of demented fanatics with their following of murderous bandits who have usurped power by violence, who maintain their tyrannical power by a régime of terrorism such as the world has never yet seen, who have completely ruined and destroyed the social fabric of the state, and who have turned what was once the empire of Russia into a wilderness of primitive barbarism—a prison, a lunatic asylum and a slaughter house.

No one can tell as yet when and how the time will come when the world will again behold Russia reconstituted as a political entity and able to resume her place in the family of nations and her status as one of the great powers. For the present all our hopes seem to lie in the evolution out of the prevailing chaos of a military dictatorship such as must always be the outcome of a prolonged state of anarchy, if the teachings of history are to be

believed. Some indications of the possibility of such a development are already discernible. Admiral Kolchak, the head of the Siberian government, having secured the recognition of his authority by General Denikine and other commanders of loyal Russian troops, has begun to use in his public utterances the firm language of a dictator conscious of his power and determined to render his will supreme. The task awaiting him—the task of reëstablishing the reign of law and order and of reuniting the shattered nation—is one of colossal magnitude and unequalled difficulty. To cope with it successfully will require the strength of a Napoleon or a Peter the Great. In working it out he will sorely need the moral support and such material assistance as may be found possible to extend to him from all well-wishers of the Russian people and all those who desire that Russia should be enabled as soon as possible to resume the place belonging to her by birthright in the family of nations. This task once accomplished it will be for the Russian people themselves to decide under what form of government they will desire to live.

One hears sometimes expressed by well-meaning people the opinion that the "soviet government" after all represents the majority of the people of what was once the empire of Russia. This delusion is apparently a fruit of the curious fascination which the establishment of the autocracy of the proletariat exercises over the minds of people totally ignorant of the condition of abject wretchedness to which bolshevism and its organ, the "soviet government," have reduced a once great and prosperous nation. The fact, however, is that this so-called government is bitterly hated by the overwhelming majority of the Russian people, and not the least so by those unfortunates who, to save themselves and their wives and children from starvation, are forcibly compelled to give it their reluctant services.

Democracy and Bolshevism

By A. J. SACK

Director of the Russian Information Bureau in the United States

THE Russian problem became the central European problem, and the central world problem, not a year ago, not two years ago, not since the revolution of March, 1917. The Russian problem has been the central European and the central world problem for several decades.

Let us go back to the revolution in 1905, the first open revolt of the people against the Czar's rule. If you will recall the events of the revolution of 1905-1906, you will recall also that there were moments in this revolution when it seemed that victory would rest with the people. In October, 1905, the Czar had to grant a constitution. In April, 1906, when the first Duma presented the Czar with an address demanding liberal reforms, the structure of the old régime was tottering. Do you realize what happened to the entire world at the moment when the Russian people, the democracy of Russia, was defeated by the Czar's government in 1906?

If you will recall the German literature, the military writings and even the general press, before 1914, you will find that the plan openly discussed by the German press was, in case of war, to crush France first and then turn to the East to meet the Russian armies. The German logic was that since the Czar's government was so unpopular in Russia, the population would not answer the Czar's call for mobilization, and that very probably a declaration of war would throw all Russia into the flames of a revolution. Consequently the Germans would have time enough to rush to Paris, to defeat France, and then turn to the Eastern front and snap up Russia, all in revolutionary flames. It is probable that, had the revolution in 1905 been successful, then nine years later, in 1914, Russia as a nation would have been so strongly united, and the alliance of a democratic Russia with the democracies of France and England would have been so natural that the German militarists and imperialists would not even have thought of starting the European slaughter. That means that

in 1906, when the Russian revolution was defeated, at that very moment a death sentence was signed for the children of thirteen to fifteen who were then innocently playing in the streets of Europe and of America.

The fate, therefore, of Europe and almost of the entire world depended on the events of the first revolution in Russia. It is time to understand that during the last half century the cultural, the commercial, the technical and the financial bonds between civilized peoples have grown so strong that the nations of the world have, in reality, become one body and one soul, and when there is an infection in one part of the body the entire body is in danger. The establishment of a stable, democratic government in Russia is a necessity for the entire world, and therefore the world cannot afford to remain indifferent to the political developments in Russia.

The March revolution brought into existence Prince Lvov's and then Kerensky's Cabinet. Events in Russia during the past two years are in the main a death-grapple between the Socialists, who held the majority in the provisional government, and the Bolsheviks. There is a difference between socialism and bolshevism, and this difference must be thoroughly understood by every liberal-minded person. Socialism means governmental control over production and distribution; and the great teacher of scientific socialism, Karl Marx, was at the same time the great teacher of the law of evolution. All of us would like to jump from this modern life with its unpleasantness, direct to paradise. But a perfect state is possible—if possible at all—only after centuries of development, and the great teacher of scientific socialism, Karl Marx, understood this better than anyone else. Believing in socialism, believing that governmental control over production and distribution would open a new era in the life of society, Karl Marx taught that socialism is possible only after capitalistic development. The historic mission of capitalism, according to Karl Marx, is the development through private competition of the productive forces of society. Only after the productive forces are developed and wealth is concentrated practically in the hands of a few can the democratic state enter and substitute governmental control for the control of private interests. The Socialists of Russia, the Social-Democrats

and Socialists-Revolutionists as well, understood the prosaic law of evolution. The difference between the Socialists and the Bolsheviks is plain. While the Socialists of Russia, most of them, are responsible leaders, the Bolsheviks are demagogues. In the fall of 1917 the Bolsheviks came to power because they gave the suffering masses of the Russian people promises which they have never been able to fulfil. At the moment of the bolshevist revolt, in November, 1917, there was over 8,000,000 casualties in the Russian army, with about 3,000,000 dead and about 1,000,000 disabled for life. Only an industrially developed country is able to wage a modern war, and you cannot imagine what it meant for poorly developed Russia to wage war against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey during the three years. The Russian masses were anxious for peace. Not for a separate peace with the German imperialists but, if possible, for a general democratic peace. The responsible leaders, the provisional government, frankly stated to the masses of the Russian people that such a peace could not be obtained at that moment; that although bleeding and suffering, Russia must continue the war together with her Allies until German militarism was broken. Irresponsible bolshevist demagogues approached the masses with promises of immediate democratic peace, and more than this—of immediate realization of socialism in Russia. With the help of the German militaristic machinery they overthrew the provisional government and, after coming to power, brought to the people, instead of a general democratic peace, a shameful, separate peace with the German imperialists; instead of bread and happiness and immediate realization of socialism, a régime of starvation, destruction, murder in those parts of Russia where bolshevism rules.

The Bolsheviks are camouflaging their régime with the terms "socialism," and "democracy." In truth their régime is a caricature of these two great ideals. No one who knows the nature of socialism will ever consider the Bolsheviks as Socialists, and no one who knows the nature of democracy will consider the Bolsheviks as democrats. The Bolsheviks do not recognize the fundamental principle of democracy—the right of every member of society, men and women, to participate in the government. According to the so-called soviet constitution there are entire classes of the population which are excluded from the government.

And I wish to call attention to the fact that this soviet constitution, undemocratic as it is, is still better than the practical application of this constitution to Russian life. The Bolsheviks have excluded from the government not only entire classes of the Russian population, but they have excluded all the political parties which are opposed to their régime, the Liberals, the Constitutional-Democratic party, the Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks and the Socialists-Revolutionists.

To conclude this brief sketch of the characteristics of the bolshevist régime and its relation to the ideas of socialism and democracy, I shall quote now a document which, in my opinion, is one of the most important documents describing the conditions in Bolshevik Russia. It is the text of a telegram sent by the British High Commissioner, Mr. Bruce Lockhart, to the British Foreign Office on November 10, 1918, as published in the official *British White Book on Bolshevism*. Mr. Lockhart telegraphed:

The following points may interest Mr. Balfour:

1. The Bolsheviks have established a rule of force and oppression unequalled in the history of any autocracy.
2. Themselves the fiercest upholders of the right of free speech, they have suppressed, since coming into power, every newspaper which does not approve their policy. In this respect the socialist press has suffered most of all. Even the papers of the Internationalist Mensheviks, like Martov's, have been suppressed and closed down, and the unfortunate editors thrown into prison or forced to flee for their lives.
3. The right of holding public meetings has been abolished. The vote has been taken away from everyone except the workmen in the factories and the poorer servants, and even amongst the workmen those who dare to vote against the Bolsheviks are marked down by the bolshevist secret police as counter-revolutionaries, and are fortunate if their worst fate is to be thrown into prison, of which in Russia today it may truly be said, "many go in but few come out."
4. The worst crimes of the Bolsheviks have been against their socialist opponents. Of the countless executions which the Bolsheviks have carried out a large percentage has fallen on the heads of Socialists who had waged a life-long struggle against the old régime, but who are now denounced as counter-revolutionaries merely because they disapprove of the manner in which the Bolsheviks have discredited socialism.
5. The Bolsheviks have abolished even the most primitive forms of justice. Thousands of men and women have been shot without even the mockery of a trial, and thousands more are left to rot in the prisons under conditions to find a parallel to which one must turn to the darkest annals of Indian or Chinese history.

6. The Bolsheviks have restored the barbarous methods of torture. The examination of prisoners frequently takes place with a revolver at the unfortunate prisoner's head.

7. The Bolsheviks have established the odious practice of taking hostages. Still worse, they have struck at their political opponents through their women folk. When recently a long list of hostages was published in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks seized the wives of those men whom they could not find and threw them into prison until their husbands should give themselves up.

8. The Bolsheviks, who destroyed the Russian army, and who have always been the avowed opponents of militarism, have forcibly mobilized officers who do not share their political views, but whose technical knowledge is indispensable, and by the threat of immediate execution have forced them to fight against their fellow-countrymen in a civil war of unparalleled horror.

9. The avowed ambition of Lenin is to create civil warfare throughout Europe. Every speech of Lenin's is a denunciation of constitutional methods, and a glorification of the doctrine of physical force. With that object in view he is destroying systematically, both by execution and by deliberate starvation, every form of opposition to bolshevism. This system of "terror" is aimed chiefly at the Liberals and non-Bolshevist Socialists, whom Lenin regards as his most dangerous opponents.

10. In order to maintain their popularity with the workingmen and with their hired mercenaries, the Bolsheviks are paying their supporters enormous wages by means of an unchecked paper issue; until today money in Russia has naturally lost all value. Even according to their own figures, the Bolsheviks' expenditure exceeds the revenue by thousands of millions of roubles per annum.

Such is the picture of the bolshevist régime in Russia, and you can readily see that the Russian problem at this moment is probably not so much a political as a moral problem. The Russian people are going through impossible tortures as a consequence of Russia's participation in the war. Loyal to her allies, Russia stood at her post for three long years, sacrificing not less than 4,000,000 of her best sons. The strain of this [war] was too great for Russia and she collapsed, and the bolshevist régime is the result of the breakdown of her economic life. Russia is lying now in seas of blood and tears because she has sacrificed everything for the Allied cause. It is up to the Allies to help her.

To help Russia means to help the Russian people and not those who have established in Russia a new tyranny worse even than the old tyranny of the Czars. Russia's salvation lies in the establishment of a stable, democratic government through a Constituent Assembly freely chosen by the entire population on the basis of universal, direct, secret and equal suffrage. The Bol-

sheviki dispersed the first All-Russian Constituent Assembly in January, 1918, at the point of bayonets, but the idea of a Constituent Assembly, which was one of the main aspirations of the great revolution of March, 1917, is still alive, and the greatest Russian liberal, revolutionary and socialist leaders, led by such people as Catherine Breshkovsky and Nicholas Tchaikovsky, still support this idea. The American democracy cannot remain indifferent to the tragedy of the Russian people. The time has come, in my sincere opinion, when the American people must speak for the Russian democracy against those who have destroyed the new democratic institutions in Russia, who have dispersed the first All-Russian Constituent Assembly and who are doing everything in their power to prevent the convocation of another Constituent Assembly. Whatever may happen in Russia, democracy will finally win. Citizens of the United States, support the Democracy of Russia!

The Soviet Republic

BY SANTERI NUORTEVA

Secretary of the Bureau of the Representative in the United States of
the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic

YOU cannot solve the Russian problem by emotionalism. You cannot explain the situation there by passion. You cannot settle it by denunciation. You cannot understand Russia by saying that this man did so and so and another did so and so, and if these men had not done so or had not been there everything would be different. The Russian problem is not so simple as that, because it is a sociological problem.

I shall confine myself to pointing out just one outstanding economic fact in this sociological problem—namely, the land question. That has been the fundamental question in Russia for years and years. The peasants have made attempts to confiscate the land in Russia many, many times before the Soviet revolution. The peasants never had enough land. The Czar's government was too reactionary to present a solution of the land question even in such forms as have been accepted by so-called liberal capitalism in Western Europe. I refer to such solutions as, for example, were reached in the Irish land question, where the landlords were bought out and the Irish peasants were placed in a position where they somehow could buy on installment payments that little patch of land they got. The Czar's government was too reactionary to offer even such a solution. It stuck stubbornly to the old order for years and years. And when the day struck, when the peasants were in full physical control of the country, it was too late to offer such solutions. The peasants needed too much land and the finances of Russia were too disrupted to allow arrangements which would have been acceptable to capitalistic conceptions of society. If the land they took had been bought, it would have required tens of billions of roubles, financing of a kind which Russia was unable to do, even if she had wanted at that time. When the revolution came, the army which had been the chief weapon for keeping the peasants down, became the chief weapon in the hands of the peasants themselves.

And so the peasants just took the land. Whether you approve of it or not, it doesn't matter because you can't change it any more than you can change the course of the sun or the moon. It was, as diplomats say, a *fait accompli*, which could not be undone.

The Kerensky government fell because it had not courage enough to deal with this fact as an accomplished fact. Nor did it dare to stand for the consequences of this fact. Yet just naturally many other things resulted therefrom. If you annul the property rights on millions of acres of land, you thereby strike a death blow at the very foundations of capitalistic finance. Land is usually mortgaged. The value of papers in banks ultimately rests on land value. If you annul the mortgages, the banks are bankrupted. The bankruptcy of the banks will influence industrial and commercial life as a whole.

There were several theoretically possible courses to take to prevent such an outcome. One would have been to suppress the peasants. That could not be done because the peasants refused to allow themselves to be used to suppress themselves. Another proposition—one which is being carried out in Russia even now, although with very little success—was to get somebody else to suppress the peasants. Kolchak is trying to gather around him various armies of semi-savage nomadic tribes, such as Kalmyks, Bashkirs, etc., who have no interest in the land question, with a sprinkling of old régime officers. They are, however, not numerous enough to suppress that vast number of peasants. Then the Russian autocracy proposes another solution. They would like to have your boys come over there and suppress the Russian peasants. There has been some opposition among you to that proposition.

If there had been no Communist party in Russia at the time of the March revolution, one would have been created to cope with the issues presented by the nationalization of land. The Bolsheviks are in power because they had courage enough to stand by that issue and to pursue a policy which was necessary. The fact that they, as Socialists, were particularly interested in following such a program made them particularly fitted to take upon themselves the consequences of the nationalization of land. Those consequences were the nationalization of banks, industry and so on, as far as it has been necessary and advantageous.

It is said that Russia is chaotic. This is true to a certain extent, but where do you not have chaos in the world today? You have chaos elsewhere than in Russia. Is there more chaos in Soviet Russia than there is in the rest of the world? There are many conflicting reports upon it. I shall, however, call attention to the testimony of a man who cannot be accused of bias toward bolshevism, Mr. Allen White, who was selected by the President of the United States to be one of the representatives at the Princes Island Conference, which never took place. He writes in the *New York World* of April 27, 1919, that the Soviet government of Russia is the only stable government on the European Continent east of the Rhine. Mr. Fred Hunt, quite a conservative correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune*, who is now in Soviet Russia, wires to his paper that there is more order in Soviet Russia than he has seen for a long time anywhere in Europe. An exaggeration, some may say. Perhaps not. The average American public have certain notions about the Bolsheviki. They always mix anarchy and bolshevism all in one. Now the fact is that the Communist party, which is popularly called the Bolshevik party, is absolutely anti-anarchistic.

There is terror in Russia, it is said. Why, yes! But if you speak of the Russian Red Terror, which, according to official figures has taken by executions—or if you please, murders—about 3,000 lives during the past year, why don't you speak about other terror that exists in other places? In little Finland alone, where I come from, the anti-socialist forces, the so-called White Guard together with the Germans, after the civil war was over, deliberately executed 15,000 men and women, and deliberately starved 10,000 more to death within a period of a few months, and they admit it themselves. Kolchak boasts of the fact that, whenever he is able to get hold of a village or a town where the Bolsheviki have been in power, he executes "as bandits" all those who belonged to the Soviet government. His forces execute as murderers and looters all the prisoners they take.

If the Kolchaks ever will come into power in Russia, they will come into power over the bodies, not of three or four or five thousand, but over the bodies of five, six or seven hundred thousand men. You will have an orgy of bloodshed which you never have had in the world before. It will mean fighting in each and every

village in Russia; it will mean fighting in each and every house in Russia. Is it not clear that if the Kolchaks are to put down that organization of the workingmen which is established there, they will have bloodshed for years to come, and when that bloodshed is ended they will have, at all events, that which you have there today? If you countenance the terror, tenfold much more cruel and extensive, which is being perpetrated by the opponents of the Bolsheviks, is it not sheer hypocrisy to speak about the terror that is perpetrated by the Bolsheviks? Furthermore, out of the 3,000 persons executed in Soviet Russia during the past year, more than 50 per cent were executed for looting and for street robbery, for thievery, for dishonesty. The rest of them were executed because they were found red-handed with arms in their hands trying to overthrow the existing government in Russia and to murder their officials.

The Russian Soviet government is absolutely incapable of constructive action, we have been told. This is a question on which the American public is not in a position to pass judgment because they have been systematically prevented from getting news about the constructive work which is being done in Russia. A correspondent of an important news association, who by no means is a socialist, admitted to me himself that he left Russia not because the Bolsheviks drove him out, but because it was impossible for him to send dispatches, as some outside forces prevented him from sending them. He said that 95 per cent of all his telegrams were held up, and especially were such telegrams held up which said a single word about the constructive work that is being done in Russia. You get from Russia news purely of a negative character. Now if America were cut away from the rest of the world and somebody outside of America would take upon himself to distribute through the cables any silly, foolish thing which might have been done by some individual, or might not, and news of everything else were prevented from coming out, what do you think the people outside would believe?

We in Russia are very much in that position. If space allowed, I could present official statistics of the industrial departments of the Russian Soviet government, which would prove that in spite of tremendous obstacles the Russian industries are running and that their output has been steadily increasing since April, 1918.

The educational system in Russia has been reorganized on an extensive basis, unheard of in Russia before; tens of thousands of new schools have been established; and treasures of art and music, which never reached the people before, are now at the asking of anybody in Russia.

There is one thing I desire to avoid more than anything else—exaggeration. I do not wish to state that in Russia there are idealistic conditions. How could there be? But I ask if any country in the world—excepting perhaps the United States, which is economically self-sustaining—if any country were economically cut off from the rest of the world for seventeen months, as Russia has been, what would happen to its economic life? Russia always depended for imports on abroad. How can she be expected, after five years of war and revolution, to have ideal economic conditions with the world deliberately keeping away from her every screw, every nail, every little cog-wheel of a machine, every little thing which every civilized country may need?

I admit, and by admitting it I am expressing thoughts of our people in Russia, that the Soviet government can succeed only in as far as it is economically sound. We know that we can maintain our power and the structure of society which is in Russia today only in as far as we are able to deal with the realities of life. We are ready to take upon ourselves the responsibility of responsible relations with other countries. We know that we will not succeed unless we can prove that the system we represent in Russia, under given conditions, is economically the most efficient.

We have been accused of attempting to "bribe the American business men" by promising them \$200,000,000. It has been said that we are playing on the avidity of the American business man and that some of the American business men have fallen for our charms. Now, although I am a bolshevist, I shall not be so discourteous toward the American business man. I shall not accuse him of individual avidity. Yet I want to state that in spite of the vilification directed against us, and in spite of all warnings issued, there are more than 1,500 responsible manufacturers in the United States today who have in black and white expressed their desire to enter into trade relations with Soviet Russia at once without hesitation. I do not ascribe this to their avidity. I ascribe it to their common sense.

You cannot isolate the world in the way it has been isolated up to now. You may do so, perhaps, for a year or two, but isolation of this kind is a boomerang in the final account. It will hurt you as well as it will hurt us.

There is just one thing we are asking for: Trade relations and cessation of intervention.

It has been said that if the Allied troops were withdrawn from Russia there would be a general massacre of all those in favor of intervention. This story has been printed hundreds of times, but not one of the big American newspapers has ever printed the fact that the Russian government has repeatedly offered to give absolute amnesty to everyone who has participated in any struggle against it. The Russians are not out for scalps for the sake of scalps.

I don't ask you to love us. I don't ask you to do away with your prejudices against the theories we represent. Why should I? I will not attempt to tell you that we are in accord with your ideals. I would be a hypocrite if I did so. We represent there a different social order. But it is our business, not yours.

There is too much insincerity in the world diplomacy today. Mr. Lloyd George said, in his speech before the Commons, that he never heard about the peace proposition that Lenin had sent with Mr. Bullitt from Moscow to Paris. Yet a New York magazine says that Mr. Lloyd George had lunch with Mr. Bullitt the very day after Mr. Bullitt returned from Moscow. Now, Mr. Lloyd George was formally right. He never received an official presentation of that document. No one came to him, clad in the official garb of a diplomatic servant with the usual formula, "I hereby have the honor to present to your Excellency this and that." Yet he knew all about it. Is it not time to do away with that insincere hypocritical structure of diplomatic formalities that has been built up during hundreds of years? It may be in itself a funny thing, if you have enough sense of humor to sense it, but it becomes a criminal tragedy when such formalities stand in the way of sensible people getting together and talking common sense in order to stop murder and starvation.

The Intelligentsia and the People in the Russian Revolution

By MOISSAYE J. OLGIN, PH.D.

New York

A TRAGEDY lurked at the bottom of Russian life, a discord fraught with dangers for the future of the nation. All through Russian history, the "plain people" never understood the man of education and culture, and he hardly ever succeeded in fathoming the "dark" sea of the masses. Both lived side by side in the same country; both bore the suffocating burden of a monstrously overgrown autocracy; yet through storm and quiet, through lean and prosperous years, they remained different camps, almost different races: the *bárin* and the *naród*, the "gentleman" and the "black people."

THE INTELLIGENTZIA DURING CZARISM

It was due to the cunning precautions and scrupulous watchfulness of a "scientific" bureaucracy that no coalition between the intelligentsia and the people was possible through generations. It was a consistent policy in Czar-ridden Russia to keep the peasants and workingmen away from education and to keep the man of knowledge away from the masses of the people. Neither side was to blame, yet here they were, separated by insurmountable barriers of ideas, conceptions, modes of living, fundamental experiences of existence.

It was the intelligentsia who made supreme efforts to approach the people or at least to imbue them with progressive ideas. It was a group of thinkers and dreamers, army officers and civilians, who on December 14, 1825, started an open army revolt in the streets of St. Petersburg in the expectation of finding support among the people. It was a host of intellectuals, young men and women of the well-to-do class, who early in the 70's of the nineteenth century undertook a crusade "into the heart of the people," ready to sacrifice all privileges of birth and education, to live with the plain man and to share with him their ideas. It was again a well-organized circle of intellectuals who late in the 70's

and early in the 80's startled Russia with terroristic attempts on high Russian dignitaries, including the Czar, in a vain hope thus to remove autocratic pressure from the shoulders of the people. When a revival of revolutionary activities began in the 90's followed by the first signs of a broad mass-movement, we find the intelligentsia everywhere—in the factories, in the shops, in the villages, in schools—organizing, educating, enlightening, paving the way for a conscious systematic revolution of the people.

THE INTELLIGENTZIA IN 1905-1906

When the long-coveted mass-movement at last convulsed the huge body of Russia in the abortive revolution of 1905-1906, it became evident that the intelligentsia had no power to control the Russian masses. The peasants in the villages burned and looted the landlords' estates—contrary to all advices and appeals of the thinking radical leaders. The workingmen in the cities started the colossal strikes of 1905, with the crowning unprecedented general strike of October, which was contrary to the expectations and beyond the regulating influence of the intellectuals who formed the various socialist factions. The sea of the people was too vast and the moments of contact with the intellectual elements far too few and brief to allow for a broad sympathetic coöperation between the *narod* and the radical man of learning. The revolution of 1905-1906 had no leaders. In Petrograd, a soviet to conduct the affairs of the revolution was created by the imperative need for leadership recognized by the masses. However, it was of brief duration and died with the death of the revolution.

THE INTELLIGENTZIA'S DEVELOPMENT

The period following 1905-1906 demonstrated the basic difference in the attitude of the intelligentsia and the people toward the revolution. The masses needed revolutionary changes to remedy elemental *economic* evils; the intelligentsia expected the revolution to create *political* freedom. The masses could endure no longer the archaic land system and arbitrary power of autocracy; the intelligentsia could live and prosper, both materially and spiritually, even under autocratic pressure. The intelligentsia could easily adapt itself to the semi-parliamentary system,

that crude European varnish on the surface of a blunt unwavering tyranny, which prevailed in Russia with the establishment of the Imperial Duma. The process of adaptation on the part of the intelligentsia to the seemingly inevitable order of things was in reality very rapid. Even before the last shot of the "punitive expeditions" reëchoed in the Russian villages, the intelligentsia was already disappointed in revolutionary ideas. Even at a time when dozens of fighters for freedom were hanged daily before dawn, the majority of the former intellectual revolutionists were turning to new gods. The intelligentsia had failed to stand by the revolution to the very end. It had failed to assume leadership in the great mass-upheaval. Now it was reappraising all social and spiritual values. At this time certain characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia appeared in sharp relief. Highly idealistic, but inclined towards doctrinarism; readily inflamed, yet easily disillusioned; full of self-sacrificing aspirations, yet lacking in vigor and endurance; hating autocracy, yet ready to "settle down" for practical work under an autocratic régime; loving "the people" with an abstract love, yet principally interested in the intelligentsia group; believing in the people, yet convinced beyond any doubt that the intelligentsia was destined to lead. And the greatest of these is the last because one of the reasons for intellectual hatred of autocracy was that the intelligentsia was barred from leading the nation.

Both the spiritual and the material aspect of the intelligentsia underwent a marked transformation after the abortive revolution. Spiritually, the intelligentsia, tired of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, of an excessive interest in political formulae, turns towards mysticism and theosophy, becomes absorbed in the problems of sex, gropes for an assertion of man's inner self away from the clatter of political events. Materially, the intelligentsia becomes hungry for external comfort and success in life. Gone are the days when it was deemed unworthy of a "decent man" to lead a "bourgeois" existence. Almost legendary appear the times when men refused to finish their university studies, eager to work in a dark village under the Zemstvo auspices for a miserable salary, or in a revolutionary organization with the prospect of imprisonment and exile. Men became more "practical" after the strain of 1905-1906.

This coincided with new opportunities offered by the industrial development in the twentieth century. Russia was rapidly introducing modern capitalism. New banks needed clerks, accountants, branch representatives; new factories needed engineers and other specialists; new stock companies needed hosts of intellectual workers. A large part of the intelligentzia, formerly leading an ephemeral existence, became absorbed in commercial and industrial establishments, became a live factor in the new economic order. This in itself had a "sobering" effect on many. The idea of a revolution gave way to the hope for peaceful evolution.

MEANWHILE WHAT OF THE PEOPLE?

Quite different seems to have been the spiritual and material aspects down below, among the huge strata of the plain people. There was little comfort for the poor peasant in the fact that measures tending to his annihilation bore the stamp of approval of the Imperial Duma. It was slight relief to the workingman to know that ministers guilty of shooting down hundreds of strikers, received a vote of confidence in the Tauric Palace. The agrarian situation became even more ruinous for the needy peasants after Stolypin's agrarian reforms of November 9, 1906. The workingmen in the cities were practically outlawed by an unscrupulous bureaucracy wreaking vengeance upon its recent enemies. There was no calm, no peace, no feeling of security, no prospect of a settled existence for the masses. At the same time, people were hungrily learning. The revolution had shattered the stronghold of censorship. Hundreds of periodicals were circulated in town and village. Books found their way to the remotest hamlets. The younger generation was going to schools which were opened everywhere. Many a Zemstvo introduced even compulsory education for all children of school age. Political and social ideas were steadily pouring into the minds of the people, putting fire to the fuel of discontent. The Imperial Duma, powerless and humble as it was in the face of autocracy, had to tolerate a left wing that used the high tribunal for nation-wide propaganda. Thus, while the intelligentzia was accepting the situation as final in its main outlines; while few believed in a near revolution, and fewer were ready to become instrumental in revo-

lutionary movements; while the revolutionary organizations were steadily losing their intellectual members and only the most stubbornly optimistic remained faithful to the old banners; the masses of the people were accumulating the fury of hatred, the lava of repressed energy, the poison of corrosive disgust, which only wait for an opportunity to burst forth. The general political strikes of 1913 and 1914 in the capital and in other industrial centers, came as a surprise to intellectual Russia. The gulf between the man of culture and the plain people was deeper than ever.

THE INTELLIGENTZIA, THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE

The war did not bridge the gulf. The intelligentsia saw in the world conflict a struggle for democratic principles; the masses saw in it a sacrifice in blood and treasure for things they did not understand. The intelligentsia had a vision of a strong powerful nation emerging from a victorious peace; the masses had the immediate experience of millions dead and wounded, of millions of households losing their best working force. The intelligentsia rallied to the support of the existing government in the conduct of the war, convinced that to win the war was of infinitely more importance than to change the form of government; the masses, even those plain men who were able to think, were unable to understand the possibility of coöperation between progressive forces and the government of the Czar. The government in its turn exerted every effort to manifest the futility of such coöperation. Inefficiency, vicious recklessness, coupled with an increase of oppression, marked the conduct of the war by the old régime administration.

The revolution of March, 1917, came not as a result of conscious efforts on the part of the thinking elements, but as a spontaneous outburst of despair on the part of the masses. Before March, 1917, the intelligentsia did not expect and did not wish a revolution. What it demanded with full vigor was a cabinet appointed by the Czar from the majority of the Imperial Duma. When the masses went out into the streets of Petrograd clamoring for bread and peace, they were not led by intelligentsia organizations. When army units, for the first time in Russian history, refused to suppress the riots by force of arms, it came as a result of war-

weariness and general dissatisfaction among the masses, and not as a result of systematic propaganda. When councils (soviets) of workingmen, soldiers and peasants were formed in every province and district of Russia to represent the plain man, it was not the execution of a clearly conceived plan, but an outburst of spontaneous activity on the part of the *narod*. From the very first days of the revolution there were two centers of power in Russia, two bodies speaking with authority—the provisional government supported by the intelligentsia, and the soviet-organization supported by the masses.

FAILURE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The chasm between them was never spanned. The thinking of the masses was elementary and concrete. The peasants wanted the land. The provisional government, determined as it was to confiscate the land of the nobility and to introduce a radical agrarian reform, became entangled in theoretical controversies and practical difficulties. Months passed without marked progress. The provisional government was well meaning, yet it could not win the confidence of the masses who were hungry for immediate improvements. The workmen's and soldiers' soviets insisted upon a speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The provisional government, hampered by subtleties of electoral systems, was losing precious time and evoking unwarranted suspicions. The provisional government deemed all internal readjustments and improvements secondary to the main issue of the time—the continuation of military activities at the front. The front loomed in the eyes of the intelligentsia as the object of the most generous national sacrifices and as a duty of the Russian revolution to civilization. Here it entered into a sharp and irremediable conflict with the masses.

The intelligentsia failed to see that war-weariness was the very cause of the revolution. It failed to realize that the yearning for peace, both at the front and in the rear, was overwhelming. It failed to hear the cry of anguish coming from exhausted millions who had never seen the glory of an ideal in the war. It overlooked the cruel fact that, with the industries of the country rapidly collapsing, with transportation deteriorating, with the entire economic fabric weakening day after day, there was hardly any

possibility of maintaining millions at the front. The intelligentsia remained isolated from the masses. It had no way of meeting the implacable realities of a situation. It had assumed leadership without that closeness to the currents of popular sentiment which guarantees success. It lacked the ability of moulding public opinion and wisely directing mass-energy into carefully drawn channels. It had not put before the masses a great luminous ideal, potent to make them forget pain and cheerfully endure privation. The intelligentsia remained what it had been for generations: idealistic, impractical, prone to take its own experiences as the measure of life, convinced of its inborn quality to be the leader of man.

THE COMING OF THE PLAIN MAN

When that leadership slipped out of the hands of the intelligentsia, its consternation was not less acute than had been its joy over the March revolution. The intelligentsia saw the man of the bottom rising, and was appalled. The man was uncouth, blunt, unwieldy. He had no manners, and in his rush to quench his material and spiritual hunger he broke all laws of politeness. He lumbered straight ahead without respect for traditions, for rank, for titles. He had a strong iron-clad idea which he proceeded immediately to put into operation. Worse than that, he mocked at the intelligentsia with its doubts and scruples. The intelligentsia saw in him the rising Beast of the Apocalypse. The intelligentsia had loved "the people"; it had loved its love for the people. When the people came, with crude energy, with passions, with cruelty and with beauty, the intelligentsia became frightened. It is now sending out clarion calls to the rest of the world to save it from the Black People, even through bloodshed and famine if need be. This is one of the most profound tragedies of the Russian revolution.

History avenges itself. Russia is paying for the sins of autocracy. The revolution was deprived of the knowledge and technical skill accumulated within the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia was deprived of an opportunity for inspiring constructive work. Can the historic gulf be bridged? And if so, how soon? On the answers to these questions depends much in the future of free Russia.

Economic Force and the Russian Problem

BY THOMAS D. THACHER

Member of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia

ACCUSTOMED to think in terms of our own political experience, we Americans habitually regard all problems of government as easily solved by the application of American principles. We hailed the Russian revolution as a conquest of democracy, awaiting with almost childish faith the extension of all the blessings of our own system to the great people of Russia. Because the Russian revolution, controlled—just as our own was—by economic and social forces acting and re-acting through local institutions, has followed courses defined by actual conditions of life and not by American idealism, we, of all people, seem the least capable of understanding. Judging the situation by traditional and constitutional standards and forgetting that our own government was produced by the operation of relentless economic forces, we can never understand. Governments cannot exist in theory or imagination. They are not founded upon the idealism of other lands. They spring from the very lives and aspirations of the men and women who compose them. They are brought into being by facts and forces which are not to be resisted by phrase or propaganda.

The fall of the Czar in 1917 was the natural result of unrelenting economic force. European Russia, with a balance of trade in excess of \$200,000,000 in her favor for the year 1912, after two years of war was unable to support her armies or to feed her people. As in France, so in Russia the economic factor was the primary and direct cause of revolution. All classes being united against the Czar, the mass of the Russian people soon made clear to their new leaders the demands which they intended that the revolution should meet: peace, land, industrial reform—primarily economic, every one of them.

In November, 1917, the bolsheviks gained power because these economic demands had in no measure been met, nor even answered. Economic disorganization had progressed. The problem of food supply had become worse, instead of better. In the

Moscow conference of August, 1917, Kerensky's minister of finance stated with all seriousness that the nation had been saved only by the superhuman and self-sacrificing efforts of the workers in the government print-shop. There was no objection to the form or principles of the Provisional Government. The revolution in November, as in March, was economic.

The primary obligation assumed by the bolsheviks was to make peace and to meet these fundamental economic demands. For a time at least their promises of peace and economic relief were accepted, although under their control economic disorganization and destruction have progressed rapidly and with horrible results. Nevertheless, their dominion over not less than 50,000,000 of people is still maintained, and there is little evidence that their power has diminished. But, as surely as the tide turns, Russia's relief from present suffering will come in the same way as that suffering came upon her—through the relentless operation of economic force acting upon the lives of men and women. Lloyd George, the premier of England, said in the House of Commons:

I do not despair of a solution in time. There are factors in the situation even now which are promising. Reliable information which we have received indicates that whilst the bolsheviks are apparently growing in strength, bolshevism itself is rapidly on the wane. It is breaking down under the relentless pressure of economic facts.

How may we facilitate the operation of these relentless economic forces?

By intervention and embargo the allied governments have isolated European Russia from trade, commerce and communication with the rest of the world. They have cut off the Siberian grain supply from Petrograd and Moscow and have prevented the importation of any of the things which Russia needs from the outside world. This has increased economic oppression, and one might reason that such treatment would hasten the destruction of bolshevik power. It has, however, had an exactly opposite effect. It has aroused whatever revolutionary or national feeling is left in Russian life to support leaders who, whatever else may be said, are sincere in their opposition to foreign domination. It has at the same time relieved these leaders of responsibility for starvation conditions, and has

shifted the burden of this responsibility to the Allies, who are blockading the ports of Russia and cutting off Siberian grain from Petrograd and Moscow. By intensifying starvation conditions, we have placed in the hands of the bolshevik leaders an instrument of the most grim and terrible power, the control of an inadequate food supply, the power of compelling men to serve in order to be fed.

Is it not, indeed, time that we undertook to say whether or not we are charging the bolshevik leaders with things for which we ourselves may be in some measure responsible? Certainly we cannot hope for any successful Allied policy in Russia until we are relieved of all such responsibility before the Russian people. It should therefore be our aim to place the responsibility for the present economic oppression in Russia upon the leaders primarily responsible for it. Bolshevism should be confronted by the economic necessities of life and compelled to assume before the Russian people the obligation of providing an economic system under which the people, as the result of their own labors, will be fed and clothed, and free to engage in the pursuit of their own happiness. Confronted with this responsibility bolshevism will fail, as Lloyd George says, "under the relentless pressure of economic facts." We should raise the blockade if only to place responsibility where it belongs.

But, it is asked, how can we help the Russian people so long as they are ruled by the bolsheviki? The question assumes that we can do nothing. The other night I listened to such an objection addressed by a senator of the United States to representatives of the great coöperative societies of Russia in answer to their earnest plea that the embargo be lifted, so that they, with their own money, might purchase and transport cargoes to Petrograd for the relief of the people of that city, and the regeneration of trade and commerce. The senator was answered without hesitation. These societies have been able to continue their business under bolshevik rule. They are willing to assume the responsibility and the risk of distribution, and, in bringing supplies from America, will make clear to whatever authorities may be in control in Russia that the first ship will be the last ship if distribution is interfered with or prevented. Under such circumstances no government will undertake to interfere.

It was upon this very principle that the American Red Cross dealt with the soviet authorities and obtained their active coöperation in the transport and distribution of Red Cross supplies. During December, 1917, the people of Roumania were facing a severe winter with no adequate supply of winter clothing. This situation if neglected threatened to affect the morale of the Roumanian army. Ukrainia was in civil war and in actual war with the central Russian government. Shipments to Roumania had to pass through the lines between those two contending forces. We organized a shipment of thirty-one cars filled with clothing and supplies for the Roumanian people and obtained the coöperation and protection of the soviet government by insisting that the train should go forward as a demonstration that American Red Cross supplies could be transported in Russia. The entire train proceeded without loss from Petrograd to Yassi in Roumania in no longer time than was required for the ordinary passenger train to make the journey.

When our supplies from America arrived at the northern ports we were told by everybody who showed any interest that to attempt to transport them would undoubtedly result in robbery, and might result in murder. They were food supplies passing through a country which was bereft of such things. We were able to transport without loss from Murmansk to Petrograd three full train-loads of supplies and about half a dozen cars from Archangel. The only protection we had was the protection of the soviet government and the name of the American Red Cross, and we at no time paid one single copeck for freight nor did we pay any bribe to any person anywhere. We took the position that we were in Russia to serve the Russian people: that we were not inclined to pay for that privilege; and that we were entitled to receive the assistance of every one without regard to politics. That position was not only recognized by every person along the line, but we received the most courteous and favorable consideration that could have been received in any land.

These supplies from the northern ports were taken to the city of Petrograd. They were stored in a warehouse in a district far on the outskirts of that city, in a neighborhood which included some of the poorest elements in the city population, made up of people who were enduring serious hardships because they were in

want of the very things that were in that warehouse. That warehouse was protected during several months by no more of a force than would be required to guard any similar warehouse in our cities. And there was nothing stolen.

Through the active aid and coöperation of the local soviets in Petrograd we distributed condensed milk in weekly quantities sufficient to feed 25,000 children. There were no substantial irregularities. The milk was not consumed by bolsheviks; it was distributed to children under the age of three.

On my way out of Russia I was compelled to remain for about three weeks in the northern port of Murmansk. I was there when the first company of British marines were landed. They were landed upon the invitation of the local soviet, acting upon instructions from Petrograd, to coöperate with the Red Guard in protecting the Murman railway against White Guard or German attack. After this company of marines were landed the British admiral fired a salute of seventeen guns to the Russian flag. The only flag in evidence was the red flag of the revolution. From that day until the day I left, the soviet authorities in Murmansk were in daily coöperation with the French and English military and naval authorities. There were 500 Czechoslovak troops awaiting transportation upon the ship upon which I returned to England. They were going to France to fight the Germans. Their progress was facilitated not only by the local soviet, but by the central soviet government. The local soviet authorities were coöperating with the Allies in the protection of supplies at Murmansk and at Kandalaxia.

These and many other instances during the early months of 1918 convinced us that through economic coöperation it was entirely possible to influence and control the use and disposition of Russian products, which otherwise would be used by Germany, and by restoring economic life to increase the power of Russian resistance to German domination.

As the first step in such a program the American ambassador recommended that American railway experts come to Petrograd to serve under the bolshevik authorities in the reorganization and operation of the Russian railways. This recommendation was made after the peace at Brest Litovsk, and when Colonel Robins returned to America he carried with him a plan for economic

coöperation prepared by Lenin for presentation to the American authorities. The economic pressure at that time was so great that it was quite obvious that with American brains, American credit and American goods a tremendous influence could have been brought to bear upon the entire internal situation. With such resources we could have done much to recreate economic life, and, in recreating it, could have controlled and influenced the entire situation.

So long as we use military or economic force against Soviet Russia we confirm the arguments of the bolshevik leaders based upon the theory of the class struggle. Compel these leaders to assume the responsibility of doing business with the rest of the world and the complete failure of their absurd economic theories will be demonstrated before their own people. Russia is an economic vacuum. This vacuum will be filled by America or by Germany. No process of economic reorganization in Russia can even be commenced by the Russian people without the products of our industry. The next crop cannot be harvested without agricultural machinery and binder twine. We are today not only withholding our active assistance, but by the embargo have actually prevented such shipments from America.

Until trade with Russia is restored to its normal courses there can be no restoration of the world's economic equilibrium, and until that equilibrium is restored we shall hear much of bolshevism. When it has been restored we shall be able to forget the whole nasty business as a horrid dream. You cannot deprive humanity of the surplus production of one-seventh of the earth's surface and expect normal conditions of life to be restored upon the signing of a peace treaty—no matter how many weary months or how many tedious words are used in its composition. Lloyd George says he would rather leave Russia bolshevist than see Britain bankrupt, and that remark may be applied to the world at large. What the world needs is to get back on the job, and that quickly. Restore normal trade conditions and theories of government will be compelled to meet the facts of life or get out of the road. The first and most vital step is to open up Soviet Russia.

Social Control In Russia Today

By COLONEL RAYMOND ROBINS

Member of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia

THE Russian Revolution was the first fundamental economic revolution in the history of the world and the forces that sprung from it will be challenging the world, particularly the western nations, for years to come.

I had rather an exceptional opportunity in Russia. For three months I worked with the Kerensky government, and knew the Minister President, and every member of his Cabinet—some of them quite directly and intimately—also several generals, Commander-in-chief Kornilov, and others in active service on the Russian front. After the bolshevik revolution I knew the various members of the Council of the Peoples Commissaries, the generals in command of soviet forces, and for something like six months I met with Lenin and Trotzsky on an average of three times a week. Furthermore, for five months of that time I was the unofficial representative of the American government, so that every communication between the soviet power and the American government, or vice versa, passed through my hands.

THE 7 PER CENT AND THE 93 PER CENT MINDS

I want to present in this paper certain ways of arriving at a better apprehension upon the Russian situation than seems to me to have been always reached. As volumes could be written on Russia I shall have to try simply to suggest certain lines of thought. First, you will find sincere and honest men, or men who have had the reputation of being sincere and honest, absolutely opposite in their statements and in their conclusions upon the Russian situation. Why does that happen? I undertake to say that the best reason for this—there are a number of other reasons—but the best reason is the conflict between what I please to call the indoor 7 per cent palace and tea-table, formal, diplomatic and military mind and the outdoor original, extraordinary situation, 93 per cent mind of Russia. In the old days of Russia 7 per cent had run the show, had been the masters of everything in sight, of

wealth and power and education and property and offices and honors. They were delightful and agreeable people; they were the only persons you needed to know. The formal, diplomatic and military groups found their associations there. After this 7 per cent had been kicked down the back stairs it was still the voice that spoke most generally to the formal, diplomatic, military and indoor mind of the Allied groups and representatives in Russia. I undertake to say that that mind is still persisting and trying to speak for Russia, and that a very considerable propaganda in the capitals of the world—as well as from Petrograd and Moscow—has sought to influence the opinion of the world adversely to the Russian revolution, to the 93 per cent, to the soviet government, to the Bolshevik party, and to the various forces and groups that grew out of that revolution. I undertake to say that some of those persons are entirely sincere and speak what they believe to be true, and some of them are entirely insincere and are definite propagandists because they want their privileges and powers returned to them. But I undertake to say that it is the difference between the indoor tea-table and palace mind, the 7 per cent mind, on the one hand, speaking into the ears of folks in the capitals of the world and Russia, and this outdoor, original 93 per cent fact mind that caused the conflict between the two. You can almost always tell whether the speaker addressing you has spent most of his time with the 7 per cent or the 93 per cent by the nature of the report that he makes on Russia. I wish to state frankly that I have spent most of my time with the 93 per cent.

THE ECONOMIC PARALYSIS

I want to mention another fundamental thing, the economic paralysis in Russia. It is so easy to write about superficial and incidental elements in a great revolution. I yield to no one in opposition, resentment, if you will, and eager effort to prevent murder or atrocities of any kind. I have had a fairly definite record of standing against mob violence where it costs something to stand against mob violence. But I do not surrender my intelligence to the view that seeks out of the inevitable disorder and wrong, and brutality and crime that grow out of a vast revolution, to reason back into an ordered and normal life, and then out of that ordered and normal life make judgment against a revolution-

ary situation. So far as I am familiar with the history of the human race, violence and crime and execution after illegal methods have not been absent from any revolution. Cromwell was a trifle violent in Ireland. There was a little violence used by Luther against the Anabaptists and the peasants. We remember that there was some violence in France. But I undertake to say that when the ultimate judgment is written down, it will be recorded that this vast people—180,000,000—who have suffered unnumbered oppressions through centuries, and who arose and in an hour after a long period of enforced ignorance, took the bit in their teeth and went wild and brutal and wrong, blinded with the unaccustomed light, will be recorded as having been the least vindictive and brutal in the history of the great revolutions of the human race.

Underneath the froth, underneath the inevitable incident of disorder and revolution, there was a great fact that has been lost out of sight by many commentators on Russia, namely, the economic paralysis that swept Russia from the beginning, with increasing force to the time when Russia went out of the war and even to the hour when I left the country. I was forced to consider this fact because I was assigned to food and refugees, and in the course of my daily work had to get some reason for this economic dearth at the front and in the great cities of European Russia. In a land that was fabulously rich, that was verily the granary of Europe, why should folks be hungry in Petrograd and in Moscow, and why should the army be ill-supplied at the front? The answer runs as follows: When the war broke out in 1914 the 7 per cent, as from time memorial, were in full possession of all the power, all the wealth, and offices and honor of the Russian people. 1 per cent of that 7 per cent had nearly 100 per cent of the big, economic, financial and industrial management in their hands—the direction of it, the executive administrative part—and that 1 per cent of the 7 per cent that had nearly 100 per cent of the economic, financial and industrial management of Russia when the war broke out, was nearly 100 per cent German, and it did not even claim to be Russian German—it was non-resident German in most instances. How did that come about?

The Russian bourgeoisie, the educated, the privileged man or woman, is one of the most delightful persons loose on this old

planet. Fifteen or twenty of them sitting and talking at a table are, I think, the most agreeable companions and have the widest range in conversation I ever had the privilege to mingle with, *but* they are not administrators. The economic and industrial organization mind is rare among the educated Russian group. They cared for the ballet; they cared for music; they cared for art and literature; they cared for the large expansive ideas, and being very rich—250,000 acres being an ordinary estate, and many times their estates ran into millions, with great wealth in mineral lands and forests, with great power and possessions—they hired the nearest competent, executive and industrial mind. That nearest mind in Russia, almost without exception, was a well trained German or Austrian, educated in Berlin or Vienna, taught the Russian language, told the physical story of Russia, and many times operating in Russia with a secret subsidy from Berlin for the definite purpose of the economic, financial, cultural penetration of Russia in the interest of the Central Powers. That had been going on for forty years, and in the last twenty years it had extensively and intensively developed. Hence when the war broke out the economic mind of Russia was German. That mind abandoned Russia, that mind went back to Berlin and to Vienna, expecting to return on the heels of a victorious army and own what it had previously managed. They wrought havoc as they went. They set fire to flowing oil wells and turned water on coal fields in the mines of the Donetz coal basin. Some of them submerged and became secret information agents of the German Foreign Office.

Within four days after the declaration of war in 1914 a partial economic paralysis began in the Russian economic system, and there was a vacuum at the top where the brain, the organizing mind of Russia had existed. That economic paralysis spread out over the Russian land, and artery after artery of normal economic life found itself being depleted and finally practically paralyzed. The Russian bourgeoisie answered admirably to the call of patriotism. Counts and countesses, princes and princesses, the wise and learned and beautiful went out in the service of their country to do what they could—very much like some of our privileged folk in America answered to the call of our country in its time of need—but they answered with insufficient experience

and without the organizing mind as a national genius. The result was that while now and again there were those who rendered splendid service—like that of Prince Lvov who organized the Zemstvo and Volasts and the Russian Red Cross with extraordinary skill—they never caught up with the economic paralysis. And, as just a flash to show that what I am stating is true, do you remember that the original revolution of March, 1917, was preceded by bread riots in Petrograd and Moscow and was really precipitated by the economic paralysis and misery in the great cities of Russia? Now as soon as the revolution came, all this aristocratic help that had come in to fill this vacuum that had been left by the retreating Germans, was suspect of the revolution. The bourgeoisie, the autocracy, all of the nobles there became suspect of the revolution. They were thrown out because they had come into the service under the autocracy.

THE DOCTRINE OF DEFEATISM

The economic paralysis, the vacuum at the top, extended under Kerensky's provisional government and on down to the bolshevik revolution. When you get actual history, facts which will ultimately be written down in spite of individuals or groups and prejudiced opinion, it will be found that this economic paralysis was at the base of the break-up of the Russian army, was at the base of the defeat of the whole national life of Russia, and was altogether the center, and, if you will, the hot-bed out of which defeatist doctrines and extreme bolshevik doctrines were developed. As a matter of fact, in the army and everywhere you found the effect of three years of suffering, of hunger, of cold, of discouragement and of failure, because the economic base of life had in a great measure failed for the vast masses of the Russian people. When you found in the barracks a cry for peace that was sweeping the army, you found that it was sweeping the army something like this:

"Comrades," said a man in the barracks where I was speaking to soldiers urging the Allied cause, "Comrades, we went to fight because the Czar forced us to go to fight. You can't blame us for beginning because the whip and sword were over us. Why did the Czar want us to fight? Because he wanted to put the Greek Cross over St. Sofia and to get the Dardanelles. Now, we have overthrown our Czar. Why should we keep on fighting? The Germans, comrades, in the trenches are fighting us because their Kaiser forces them to fight us, just

as our Czar forced us to fight them. Why should we keep on fighting? If we don't fight them they won't fight us. They are going to overcome the Kaiser pretty soon, and if we quit fighting them they will have the time for their revolution. Comrades, we have been cold and hungry for three years. Four millions of our brothers have died or are in prisons in foreign lands. Have you heard, comrades, that they are distributing the land back in our Province? If we don't go back we won't get ours."

There was the general doctrine of defeatism throughout the army of Russia and it rested back upon the three years of cold, hunger, and economic paralysis. I undertake to state that there is no possibility of understanding the Russian situation unless you get that economic situation; and I want to state also that it will point to wise action in relation to Russia at the present time.

Defeatism in Russia is not a German product. In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian generals and Russian members of the government under the Czar said that it took two regiments at home to keep one regiment fighting in Japan because of the revolutionary gospel of defeatism. The late war was a Czar's autocratic war and was cursed in the mind of revolutionary Russia by the fact that the Czar began Russia's part in the war. The war was his war, the war of the autocracy, and, therefore, the revolutionary group, who had fought the Czar and the autocracy and denounced the war as an imperialistic enterprise, when they took command of Russia after a successful revolution, found it very difficult to say that they were supporting the Allies and that the Allies' cause was just. I am simply stating the difficulty so that you may see the actual facts in Russia.

THE SOVIET STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CONTROL

If we are going to think intelligently about Russia, we want to separate the Bolshevik party and its formulas from the soviet structure of social control. There is in Russia a new binder in the national life of the people, so far as the vast mass of peasants and workers are concerned and that is the soviet structure of social control. I came upon it not because I wanted to, but because I had to. The soviet first met me in southern Russia where I was dealing with actual tasks of food and refugees, with my pocket full of Kerensky credentials. I found that those credentials did not amount to very much. I found that the people did not pay any attention to them—those who were supposed to be the repre-

sentatives of the provisional government—and they had no power to do what they said they would do. I began to find out where the power was. I found an old order that had been very powerful; I found the dead carcass, the lifeless remains of genuine power—the autocracy, whether you like it or not, had been a real thing. The Czar, as head of the Church, and head of the State, and head of the Secret Police, and head of the Black Hundred, and head of the Cossack Whip and Sword, had exercised genuine, mystical and forcible power that ran to the remotest villages of the Russian Empire with a real authority. When that power went down, as it did in March, 1917, it was a very narrow structure, a very highly centralized power, resting largely on mysticism and the brutal force of the Cossack Whip and Sword. When that had gone the whole thing crumbled utterly and the actual binder in Russian life passed; it was very much as if the whole nation was disintegrated and lying loose out-of-doors. The physical integrity, as well as the political and moral integrity of the empire had for the moment dissolved. The provisional government of Prince Lvov and the provisional government of Kerensky were superimposed, paper consent affairs on top of this disorganized mass that came from the break-up of the autocracy. Their roots never got down into the actual provincial and village life of Russia; they never had genuine power, except in Petrograd and Moscow and in some barracks where rifles were behind the provisional government. At the very hour when Kerensky was supposed to be exercising authority over Russia, there were local soviets in various places and they were beginning to be a real power in Russia. Those soviets were the genuine force. For instance, I say genuine because when the chairman of the local soviet said, "You can get a train," I got the train; and when he said I could get six wagons to take grain from the village to the station, I got six wagons! In other words, it was a genuine social binder. Now, what was this soviet? You hear those who say it was a mere workmen's revolutionary council in great cities, and those who speak of great cities alone, speak truly. That is true if you only look at the cities, but the moment you turn your eye on the villages you find an old, historic, democratic social control, known as the "village mir"—a sort of town meeting, broader and narrower than our town meetings—broader in personnel and nar-

rower in jurisdiction. The personnel consisted of men and women with interests in mir lands who sat on equal terms in the village mir; their jurisdiction was narrow because they were held to communal land questions, roads, to sanitation, and so on, and were very limited in power. The Czar and autocracy, afraid of the democratic character of the mirs, would not allow them to have delegate relationships and kept them within local environment. As soon as the autocracy was repudiated, as soon as that power of the 7 per cent was lifted by the revolution of March, '17, the mirs grew up into district, municipal, provincial soviets, over night as it were. Joining with the Workmen's Councils of the great cities they became the all-Russian National Soviet, a genuine new revolutionary binder that came out of the past. And this is the only genuine binder, in my judgment, that has existed in Russia since the autocracy went down. That is the structure of the revolutionary government of the mass of Russia. What party and what formulas invest that structure is adventitious. It might be, as it is today, the Bolshevik party. It might be the Menshevik party, or it might be any other party. The machinery there is just like our own city councils and our own state legislatures and our congresses here under our form of government. The party that invests it may be Republican, Democratic, or, if they get enough votes, Socialist. So you get the difference between the Bolshevik party and the actual social control of the soviet structure, which is a genuine thing in my judgment and the only revolutionary binder in Russia.

THE SPREAD OF BOLSHEVIK FORMULAS

Why was it possible for the Bolshevik party formulas to take such a sweep in Russia? Why did these formulas have the sweep that they actually did have and that they now have in Russia? People can lie about it as much as they like, but a nation does not risk its life for fourteen months without having some reason for it. There is a reason behind the Russian revolution, just as there is for Grape Nuts. There is always a reason everywhere. I prefer to understand the situation rather than to denounce it. For sixty years prior to 1914 there had been revolutionary propaganda, and during that time the structure of the Russian despotism had not changed an atom. During those two

generations the structure of every other state in the world had modified toward liberalism. Even China awoke after a sleep of centuries and modified the structure of her government. Cossack Whip and Sword had held Russia static for all this time and every liberal development had been suppressed ruthlessly. Every little educational society among peasants, like that of Tolstoi's, as soon as it was extended, was denounced as revolutionary and the leaders imprisoned or killed. Every little economic organization, such as the miners' organization in the coke and iron fields, was suppressed by military force, and the leaders put in prison. All gatherings and meetings for free speech, free press, and general discussion of social interests and government were denounced as revolutionary and the leaders imprisoned or killed. So for sixty years men said over and over again, in cellars and garrets, in forests and Siberian prisons, "When we get power we will pass this decree and that will settle this! When we get power we will pass that decree and that will settle that!" So there was a definite formula, mind you, in revolutionary Russia, and never having had a chance to try indoor formulas against outdoor facts, it could afford to believe in them. You know there never was a set of indoor formulas made in the history of the human race that you could take outdoors and work with actual life. The Russian revolutionary mind had an indoor formula which was generally distributed over the conscious mind of the masses of Russia. I have stated that 84 per cent of the people in Russia are peasants, 9 per cent are proletarians (people who work in the factories, mills, mines, etc.) and 7 per cent are the privileged class. Some one may ask if I believe that 84 per cent, consisting of the peasantry, really had these formulas in their minds? Now, this is what I mean to say: 9 per cent of the proletarians of the Russian people are nearly entirely conscious and revolutionary; 40 per cent of that 9 per cent retain their connection with villages. Twice a year they go back for planting time and harvest. They are the traveled persons from the village. They are the wise persons, the persons who have been out in the great world and when they come back the villagers gather around them and listen to their story. They always say that a good time is coming with the revolution, and they always repeat over the formulas they have heard in the great industrial cities. So throughout Russia in

the actual conscious peasant mind there was an agreement upon certain formulas of socialism. Why were those formulas socialistic? The Russian mind is a collectivist's mind and moves out on life on collectivist methods. The people move in villages, not as individuals like the Anglo-Saxons. They are collectivists—they move together. That accounts for the collectivist dogmas. Are they materialists? Not at all. They are mystics. They are intensely religious. Why then do they take up with a very definite and, if you will, brutal materialistic class formula? Let me illustrate by a story. I am walking through a portal—it is the portal of the most Holy Gate that opens through the wall into the Kremlin in the Holy City of Moscow. It is the most holy ground in Russia, and a red guard, with bayoneted gun, walks by my side. He takes off his cap. I am interested and curious. We move on and as we pass an Icon he stops and kisses it and makes the sign of the cross. Here is a member of the Guard who is ready to take orders from Lenin and Trotzsky tomorrow. I say to him, "Do you believe in God?" "*Da*," which is yes. "Do you believe in Christ?" "*Da*," which is yes. "Do you believe in the Church?" "*Net, net*" (no, no). "The Church has been the spy system of autocracy for two hundred years." And it is that fact, that the Greek Catholic Church had been the æsthetic and worshiping and musical center, if you will, of the 7 per cent and yet at the same time had been the spy system of autocracy upon the 93 per cent, which accounts for the 93 per cent's utterly ruthless dealings with that institution and its utter lack of power and authority over the 93 per cent in the hour of national strain. A class church is the most effective poison against the reality of the Christian doctrine that you can devise.

Many persons had adopted the formulas who did not believe in them. There is a propaganda mind, entirely familiar to intelligent people, common in public life and affairs, a propaganda mind that claims and promises more than it believes, in the hours of propaganda. Then in the hours of administrative tasks it seeks to relieve itself from the obligations of its past utterance. I suggest that the reason that that wonderful and historic character, Madame Breshkovsky, lost all power over her own workmen and peasants was because she had spent forty years in the villages and factories saying to the villagers, "It is wrong to pay rent to the

landlords. When the revolution comes you will get the land and pay no rent." She would say to the workmen, "Your labors have built all these factories. When the revolution comes you will get the factories." She would say to the mass meetings of peasants and workingmen, "You will run the government." She had helped to distribute Russian copies of *The Communist Manifesto* and translations of *Doskoptal*. She helped in every way to create a demand which, when the revolution came, she sought to withstand. She sought to withstand it in patriotic and noble service, and supported the Allies, and all that was generous and fine in her nature resisted this Frankenstein, in a sense, of her own building. "The old lady used to say to us that we would get the land and the factories, but the old lady is getting old now and we can't pay any attention to her," said the peasants and workmen of the soviets. And when Kerensky was overthrown she, who when I went into Russia was the most powerful personality in the land, was absolutely without anybody to do her deference, because having raised up this situation she was no longer ready to be its leader in the hour of its power. Let me give one more illustration. Twelve years ago while in New York I was invited, because I was a social worker and interested in social questions, to go down one evening to Greenwich Village, Washington Square. I went down there and as I entered the parlor there was a very delightful gentleman, just fresh from Harvard, dis-canting upon the perfect system of Carl Marx, and showing how scientific socialism was the whole answer to the enigma of human society. He was presenting class struggle ideal, the materialist's conception of society, the iron law of wages, and all that, and he had the whole formula in a perfect statement. There were lovely little girls there, charming persons, fresh from Bryn Mawr and Wellesley, holding their hands and listening in great rapture to this wonderful proclamation. I lived to see that gentleman sitting in a room in the Hotel Europe in Petrograd at an hour when he was charged with important public tasks in the strain of a great nation, in the strain of his own national life, in the strain of the world's fight for liberty, and then his formulas that he had spoken for in the ease and comfort of Washington Square came down the Nevsky in the form of bearded peasants and hard-handed workingmen with bayoneted guns saying, "That which

you taught, we intend to do. We will push out your Kerensky and we will push out all of this stuff of support of the Allies. A class war is the only war of any interest. The Allies' war is simply a competition of capitalism for the markets of the world. We know what we are doing. Rouse mit you." Now the only thing I was troubled about was that this same gentleman, in the hour when his child came forth said, "That ain't socialism. That's thieves and murderers and German agents." Yet it was not a thing in the world but the revolutionary peasants and workingmen in Russia coming out with the program of that propaganda and trying to do logically and courageously what they believed they had a right to do. The fact that it was wrong is an entirely different matter. Our own conscious judgment is the only thing that determines right or wrong for us in this human world.

THE QUESTION OF GERMAN INFLUENCE

Were there German agents and German money and propaganda in the Bolshevik revolution? Why, of course, there were. No intelligent person has denied it. There were German agents in the Bolshevik government, but that has been true of every government in Russia for twenty years. There were German agents in the autocracy, and they had more influence there than in the soviet government. Von Stuermer, a Germanophile, was made Premier under the autocracy by the German interest at the Russian court, and anybody who knows Russian history knows that to be true. In the Kerensky government a minister of his Cabinet was removed because he was believed to be a German agent, and in the soviet government there were German agents, and there was German money in that revolution. I had in my possession for about sixty days, part of the Okhrana records, the old secret police records—those that were not burned in the old Department of Justice in Petrograd, and all the records (not any of them had been burned) from the center of the Okhrana in Moscow. I was translating them in relation to German agent propaganda in Russia. What appeared from the record, and I think will be ultimately historically maintained, was that the Germans for at least twenty years, and probably longer than that, had kept two propaganda groups in Russia and supplied them well with money, to represent the German interest and report back to Berlin, neither group having anything to do with the other in Russia.

I dealt with the revolutionary group in the main, because that was the group I wanted to be informed upon. For instance, a general strike was called in Petrograd and Moscow just before mobilization began in 1914. It was suppressed by the Cossack Whip and Sword, but it was not suppressed until the secret police got documents and testimony that proved that better than a million marks had been spent through perfectly honest revolutionary persons for the purpose of precipitating that strike in the interest of Germany before mobilization in 1914. As soon as mobilization began they commenced to work with the group that operated through the court and the autocracy, and that group had, in December, 1916, bought Rasputin—they did not have to buy the Czarina. And the two together sought to sweep the weak Czar into a separate peace with the Kaiser. Later it was thought that the best thing to do was to allow the two groups apparently to go to it and let the best man win. The revolutionary group said, "We will bring revolution." The autocratic group said, "We will bring a separate peace"—and both were allowed to go to it. The revolutionary movement won and the Czar was overthrown. As soon as that took place, again the German agents in Russia began, one group with the Right and one with the Left, one helping the Bolsheviki and saying, "Why don't you have a real revolution? Why do you fool away your time with Kerensky?" And then saying to the Grand Dukes and privileged class through the other group, "You don't want a Kerensky revolution. What you want is law and order after the fashion of the German power." So they were working both ways, and that condition had existed in the Russian situation for many years. Were the bolshevik leaders German agents? My judgment is that Lenin and Trotzsky were convinced international socialist revolutionists, and were honest and as free from a direct relation with German militarists' propaganda as I am. I regard their formulas as economically impossible and morally wrong, but I know no reason through that fact why I should slander or libel courageous men who fought and risked their lives for their formulas every hour for fourteen months. In dealing with them at numbers of points at no time in six months did either of them ever break his word. At no time did they say they would do a thing and not do it. They were able to deliver effective power at

every point. We sent a train of supplies to Jassy in Roumania from Russia under bolshevik rifles and frank, that could by no circumstances serve the German general staff. We developed actual points of contact and of advantage for the Allies. They never claimed at any time to be the friends of the established capitalist governments, but always to be their enemy and to be engaged, if you will, in the world revolution of the proletariat. I never heard of any hypocritical pretenses of friendship as regards ultimate political purposes. But Lenin and Trotzsky, being competent politicians, whatever else they are, saw the economic paralysis, and knew that economic support could come alone from one of two quarters—either the Central Powers or America. They wanted it to come from America because they thought that getting it there they would have a chance to fight against German militarist autocracy, which threatened them as well as the rest of the world. In my judgment, the fact of their world propaganda was one thing and the fact of its immediate impact upon Germany, Bulgaria and Austria was an entirely different thing; and in an hour of war you had to deal with the facts that were at hand.

ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

I wish to state that the soviet power sought economic coöperation with America. Under instructions from the ambassador of the United States, I dealt with them for two months, holding out to them that, if they would not make a separate peace and if they would refuse ratification of that peace when it was forced on them by the bayonet, America would give economic and military support to the soviet power. I was so instructed in initialed instructions from the American ambassador. I am very glad that I have those initialed instructions, because memories sometimes fail a bit. During all that time there was a definite and understood proposition before the soviet government. That proposition was accepted by the soviet government in a written statement of questions on the fifth of March, 1918, after that government had offered to put our officers on the frontier to prevent raw materials going to the Central Powers and we had refused, out of ignorance of the situation, in my judgment, after they had offered to give us the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the railroads of Russia. This offer was not only for their own benefit so that we could dis-

tribute food, but also for our benefit so that we could remove munitions and supplies from the western frontier, where, if the Brest-Litovsk Conference failed, the Germans were sure to get them. We had eight weeks in which to work, and then when the conference failed and the Germans advanced on all fronts, the Germans took hundreds of tons of munitions and supplies—twelve inch guns that had never been shot which we could have removed, and with which they killed the Allied soldiers in the March drive and in the June drive on the western front. That was part of the confusion, and the reason of the confusion was always this: When the Allied interests would admit that it was wise to do this work—evacuating supplies—even if the soviet leaders were German agents, were thieves and murderers, they would finally say, "But, Robins, if we coöperate with them to do this work don't you know in three weeks this government will be overthrown and we will be discredited with the new government? Don't you know what is coming down from Finland and coming up from the Ukraine and coming out of Siberia?" All of that came from the tea-table palace talk of the 7 per cent class. How many times has the soviet government been overthrown in the last fourteen months? Just as often as the indoor mind of Russia has cared to peddle its latest tale. It is a great outdoor situation at every turn of the road. This particular proposition was presented to the American government and to the British government. It was endorsed by the British High Commissioner, Mr. Bruce-Lockhart. It was endorsed by the American ambassador, David R. Francis. It was endorsed practically by each one of the important Allied interests—English and American—in Russia at that time. The American government and the English government never responded. I went down to the fourth All-Russian Soviet, representing the American ambassador, to wait for word from America, and the conference was delayed two days at my urgency—Lenin being ready to take action (Trotzsky was really sulking in Petrograd in those days) and, in the final hour, after two days of debate, at a half hour before mid-night I am sitting on the steps of the platform, Lenin in a chair at the back of the platform motions to me. He says, "What have you heard from your government?" I say, "I have heard nothing." I ask him what Lockhart has heard from his government? He replies, "I

have heard nothing." Lenin says, "They will not support the revolutionary soviet and the peasants and workmen even against the Kaiser and they cannot fight alone because of the economic condition and military condition in Russia, so I will advocate peace." He then stepped forward and spoke for that shameful peace, and it was adopted.

There is a great historic setting here that cannot be dealt with in a paper of this length. I have outlined certain things that I believe ultimate historic truth will vindicate, and may I add this—if I am on the wrong side of the truth of the Russian situation, so much the worse for me. The ultimate truth of the Russian situation is finally going to be told. It is too significant a challenge in the history of the human race not to be thoroughly understood, and instead of disposing of it as the work of German agents, thieves and murderers, it will have to be disposed of on the basis of the sincere and courageous men who have risked their lives every hour for fourteen months, and who, after they had gotten \$200,000,000 in gold in the State Banks, instead of going when the going was good, preferred to stay and risk their lives. It is absurd to esteem and to estimate this tremendous performance as though it were entirely a German agent affair. Ultimately we will get the larger historic truth.

In conclusion, I would like to submit the following recommendations in relation to the Russian situation:

First: Lift embargo at once on all Russian fronts.

Second: Enter into direct negotiations for an armistice on all fronts where Allied or Czech forces are engaged.

Third: Insist in armistice negotiations upon general political amnesty to be declared and guaranteed by both sides; Allied forces to be retained in Russia solely for the purpose of enforcing such guarantees and to be used after signing of armistice in reorganizing and operating Russian railways primarily for transport of food supplies throughout Russia.

Fourth: Send relief through American Red Cross to Petrograd and Moscow immediately upon signing of armistice.

Fifth: Send Commission of Inquiry, with industrial and trade experts, to Moscow to ascertain and report on present situation in Soviet Russia and best means of bringing social peace, economic reorganization and relief to all the people of Russia.

And may I say that there is in Russia the largest unused market for secondary production that there is in the world—the largest market for the absorption of manufactured product that there is lying outdoors and with the largest raw materials to pay for those products of any nation in the world. There is a vacuum in the economic order in Russia that has come out of the war. A hundred years of commercial penetration by the Central Powers could be beaten now and we could be the most favored of any economic and industrial nation in Russia if we would use intelligence and brains instead of allowing ourselves to be fanned into stupid passion about the atrocities and all the shameless talk about the nationalization of women that never has been anything but cheap, miserable lies of propaganda, from the beginning to the end, and was recently withdrawn, even by Harold Williams, who believes much that is evil against bolshevism and whose wife is Madam Tyrkova, a noble Russian woman.

What about bolshevism in America? There is a general challenge of the institutions of the western world and of the Christian conscience in the materialist force control of the Russian mass. It is understandable in Russia—it comes out of a past historic story, out of brutal autocracy, out of ignorance and out of terrible economic misery. It has no place in American institutions and absolutely will not grow anywhere in America after discussion and fair understanding. But if we refuse to discuss it fairly, refuse to understand it, and denounce it for what it is not, creating a false sympathy and a false feeling of resentment, for which there is absolutely no foundation whatever in the actual facts—it may grow in America. If we suppress free speech and suppress the free press and do not allow the liberal foundations of this Republic to endure, and which are guaranteed in our Constitution, then we will create bolshevists in great groups, who will be bolshevists out of passion and resentment against what they feel is injustice and wrong. If you allow such a development of lawless passion to become general as took place in some cities on May Day where men ruthlessly beat others because they wore a red tie or because they said they were socialists—then we will have bolshevism in America. That sort of situation is the very matter of bolshevism in this country or any other. We are dealing with a genuinely serious theme that needs to be understood and needs to be

dealt with for what it really is and not for what it is not. And may I say to you that wherever any group of men or women seek to overthrow this government by force or violence, or wherever they seek to deprive persons of the rights of persons or property by violence or force, they should be suppressed by an unfaltering and overwhelming exercise of the force of the public law, and they will be so suppressed. There is no city in America that will not support a definite use of force within the law against persons who seek to violate the public law. But simply to think that the bayonet and bludgeon can answer ideas—that is an old failure in the history of the human race. Behind the mass movement in Russia is the misery of countless generations, is the hunger for a better human life. With a false economy and a false method, in my judgment, behind American unrest in certain places there is a definite economic wrong and a desire for a better human life—and I refer to some non-Union coal mines that I knew pretty well a little while ago. They are not so bad now as they were in the old days. I refer to the twelve-hour day and the seven-day week steel mills. I refer, too, to the sweat shops in the West Side of my own city and the East Side of New York. I refer to the rotten police courts where justice is a sham and a pretense in many of our great cities and where the poor, the least of these, invited to our shores are meeting America at America's worst, and are beginning to believe the worst about America as a whole. It is a very small portion of America that needs remedying, but that portion needs it terribly. American intelligence and resource, the Christian conscience and the democratic state are adequate to meet and answer everyone of the just needs of American life within the Constitution and the law. The only answer to the desire for a better human life is, in the last analysis, *a better human life*. There is none other answer, and the world is engaged in realizing that answer, and all forces of reaction, all who look hungrily to the old order, are doomed to disappointment in the great movement of the world's life. The German order met ideas with force in a very finely disciplined fashion. Bismarck started out against the Social Democratic protest against militarism with blood and iron, and when he started there were less than 300,000 voting Social Democrats in Germany and when he finished there were 3,000,000 voting Social Democrats in Germany.

The Czar started against ideas with bayonets in the finest organization of mere blind force that the world has ever known. He had the mystical power of the Black Hundred. He had the Okhrana, the secret police, to dog the foot-steps of every suspect. He had the Cossack Whip and Sword. He had the power to banish to Siberia a hundred over night without trial, and the answer to that power, and the answer to that method is Nikolai Lenin in the high court of the Czars in the Kremlin and Moscow, and Leon Trotzsky in the winter palace of the Czars in Petrograd. The question is, will America be as intelligent as England in dealing with the forces of unrest, holding firmly to law and order and yet daring the adventure of free discussion, on which this Republic was founded? We then shall answer with the serving church and the serving state and the serving industrial order that brings the better human life to more men, women and children than is brought elsewhere in all the world—and on that sure foundation we can stand and meet the clamor of alien systems and bid the distant generations hail.

Foreword

By RT. HON. JAMES BRYCE

IT is eminently fitting that the great problem of how permanent peace is to be created and maintained in the world should be fully discussed by the American Academy of Political and Social Science. It has been occupying many of the best minds in England, and even more of such minds in the United States; and there is a strong hope here that when the amended draft of the Peace Covenant now being prepared by the Conference in Paris comes to be published it will be in a form that will deserve and receive the approval of the American people. With that approval, however, the work of the friends of peace will not have ended. Details will have to be filled in. Rules of procedure will have to be adopted. In both these departments the public opinion of those who have studied the subject in both our countries may be and ought to be of high value. When mandates are given to and accepted by any powers under the provisions of the covenant, the same public opinion must continue to watch the manner in which such mandates are carried out, and the way in which the supervision to be given by the league is exercised. The experiment is novel, and it is difficult.

We must also remember that the frontiers of the new states that are being set up, or extended in area in eastern and southeastern Europe, and in the Near East, have not yet been drawn. It is of the utmost consequence that in drawing these frontiers the principles of nationality and self-determination of peoples shall be faithfully observed, for if they be overridden to gratify the wishes of any ambitious power, the seeds of future discords and war may be sown. Here also there are matters on which public opinion ought to be watchful and well informed above all. It is for the friends of peace in all countries to strive for the creation of the spirit, in all the nations that enter the league, which will inspire and guide those in whose hands the direction of its policy will lie, helping them in their great task by sympathy and by keeping alive the enlightened public opinion which will aid them in their task. Earnestly do we hope that the American people, who have led the way in the pursuit of this high ideal, will not only enter the league but will give it that constant and wise support, without which it cannot succeed.

The Economic Organization of Peace

By HON. SAMUEL J. GRAHAM

Assistant Attorney General of the United States

IT is not my purpose to discuss the covenant of the League of Nations, or the proposed treaty of peace. The people of this country demand an insurance policy against war on the lives of their men and their property, and the only policy that is offered to them is the covenant of the League of Nations. For this reason they are for it, and I believe that it will be confirmed and established as far as the government of the United States is concerned. I wish rather to direct your attention to some phases of the organization of peace which are basic—certain requisites which are fundamental, even after you have a league of nations in operation.

Each of us must learn something in this world as we go along, if the world is to progress. Abraham Lincoln, with his uncommon sanity, once said: "I haven't much opinion of a man who isn't wiser today than he was yesterday." Some persons always advance into the future with their eyes turned back, looking for a precedent, and are accustomed to predict, whenever a new thing is proposed for the advancement of civilization, that if it is tried the world will wake up and find its throat cut. The world, however, wakes up, rubs its eyes, stretches itself and goes about its business. Civilization is the result of human experience and is perfected by human experience. Each generation has a certain residuum of clarified experience from which it can draw for the future. But in looking back and examining that experience, while lessons are to be drawn from it, men must read those lessons in the light of present conditions. All forms of government—whether they be monarchies, despotisms or democracies—are but forms of human housekeeping, and these forms vary from time to time as conditions in the world change. Conditions are constantly changing. The world is always in a flux. There is no trick of perpetual motion in government any more than in mechanics. We have only to take our own Constitution as an example. It has been changed many times—changed by amend-

ments that had they been proposed in the Constitutional Convention would not have received one vote, and would have shocked and amazed George Washington and his associates; such, for instance, as giving the negro the ballot and prohibition. But conditions have changed, and all recognize today that in the course of the development of society, government and civilization these are things that are here to stay and should be.

In the organization of peace any proposed plan for a league of nations is not supposed or intended to be static and unchangeable. After a reasonably satisfactory form is secured and agreed upon, and the breath of life breathed into it, it will change, as all human institutions change. Nothing is easier and more commonplace than criticism, nothing more fruitless and confusing than hypothetical cases based upon imaginary facts. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, if submitted for approval today and subjected to tests of hypothetical cases propounded by present-day lawyers and statesmen, could be made difficult of defense and shrouded with an atmosphere of confusion in the minds of many. Had the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence been subjected to the same unfair tests the debate might have continued so indefinitely that it would never have been adopted. Debate on hypothetical cases is an endless affair, and will continue without a satisfactory conclusion as long as a mind can be found to produce imaginary facts. The need of the hour is to get some form which will reasonably meet the demands and aspirations of the people—as was done in the case of our Constitution—not a form that is going to meet the views of everybody in every particular; for that is not possible.

Alexander Hamilton, when confronted in the Constitutional Convention, with the question of whether he should sign and support the form of the Constitution which had been agreed upon, said in substance that it was far from what he wanted, as the members of the Convention well knew, but that he believed it was the best that could be gotten at that time, and he would defer to the judgment of his associates, being satisfied that it was a matter of choice between the establishment of that form of government and anarchy. Benjamin Franklin took a somewhat similar position, although the Constitution was nearer to his views than Hamilton's. This is the view we should take of the

plan of a league of nations proposed by the Peace Conference, and which the people of the country, I believe, have made up their minds to take.

I wish to discuss the organization of peace as it is affected by national rather than international conditions; and to point out certain essential elements in the organization of peace which must be considered after the League of Nations has begun to function. Much the larger part of government is human. The biggest, the most certain and all-encompassing thing in the world is Man, and all that is going on in this world, in the final analysis, is but man's effort to make a living. All history, whether of economics or government or society, is but the story of this effort. All government and all social institutions are but methods which man has devised to make a living. It is the human element in government that is the important element and that must always be kept in mind if any plan of government is to be successful. The Declaration of Independence was a capital transaction in human affairs. It was done "in the course of human events," as it stated. In the first words of the first paragraph of the enunciation of the fundamentals of government is the following declaration of basic human principles:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

It dealt not with interests, with states, with caste, with wealth—it dealt with the human stuff that to the fullest extent makes up government. To understand government it is necessary to appreciate fully this human element in government, and its significance and vital relation to any form of government. Man must have his living. All government must rest on the consent of the governed. When that is withdrawn the form of government falls. Empires have risen and fallen upon the same spot. The sun still shines, the fields still produce, the same soil is there, the same waters flow on, the same raw materials remain, and yet on those very spots forms of government have come and gone. In the tenth century Bulgaria controlled the whole of the Balkan peninsula. In the fourteenth century little Serbia controlled the whole of that penin-

sula from the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth. In the seventeenth century Poland was a great nation, repelled the advance of the Turks and was thanked by Europe; yet in one century Poland was no more. In each of these cases the government had fallen into contempt, or had lost the confidence of the governed, thereby causing the withdrawal of their consent. In such cases a disposition is created not to defend and support the government, but to allow it to fall to pieces, or even to destroy it, thereby rendering it too weak internally either to hold together or resist external attack. To retain the consent of the governed the government must create and establish such reasonable living conditions for the average man as it was designed to secure. It must provide conditions where the average man can live with a fair degree of satisfaction; contentment and freedom, otherwise he will withdraw his consent. The decay and disappearance of empires has been due to political causes—to the failure of the form of government to give to man that kind of living which he demands and must have. His demands for a better kind of living have broadened with the spread of intelligence in the world. Today he is demanding and will have what he knows he has the power to get—a kind of living in keeping with the advanced conscience and intelligence of the world.

Whether representative government can, or will, meet this demand is the big and all-important question of today for us and for the world, since upon it depends the organization of a permanent peace in the world.

The importance of this human element in government, as related to the internal affairs of the different nations rather than their external relations with each other, must be noted. No nation today can prevent its domestic affairs from being affected by the internal conditions and disorders of other nations. The rapid spread of intelligence, the facility and swiftness of communication and the easy and general use of propaganda have created this situation. The domestic affairs of China react upon us. The lava of discontent, as seen in Europe today, will overflow any dyke or any wall of nationality that can be erected. The only safeguard is to have such a large measure of contentment and freedom at home as will be able to resist and throw off this poison of discontent from the outside. To have this you must provide that the individual man shall be reasonably contented

and satisfied, shall have an opportunity to strive and feel that he owns himself before God and his fellow-men. One of the things that man must have, if he is going to be contented, is food, a reasonable amount of food for himself and his family. If he is deprived of food, and hunger is allowed to take possession of him, he at once loses that social morality which makes him respect the rights of others and in doing so respect himself. If he reaches the extreme of hunger he reverts to the state of a savage and an animal, and will kill his friend and eat him. This is Nature's primal law of self-preservation. Therefore, in order to have stable government, conditions must be provided under which the average man can live and be reasonably satisfied and free to strive and work out his own life.

The autocratic power of kings and caste has been swept away in the world. The peoples of the world are asking whether the powers that be are the powers that ought to be. Formerly men knew only their wants, their desires and their fears; today they know their opportunities and their power. Give the average man what is practicable and possible and he is apt to be satisfied; fail to give him what is practicable and possible and he will follow any agitator who promises him the impracticable and impossible.

In a paper of this length I cannot go into the details of how and by what means government is to give contentment, freedom and opportunity to the average man. However, it is certain that he must be allowed a reasonable share of the proceeds of industry so that he may have a fair amount of food and raiment for himself and his family, and some opportunity for recreation and thought. Above all, the government must go into the business of providing for the health of its citizens. If a man has not health he has not anything. He cannot be contented and he cannot strive. He cannot enjoy his surroundings. He has a right to look to his government to provide healthy, sanitary conditions under which he and his family can live, and to protect him and them, against contagious diseases and impure water; otherwise he becomes discontented, and a prey to the teachings that lead him from the paths of order and law. As previously stated, representative government is on trial the world over today, and the problem it must solve is how to provide contentment and freedom for the average man. Unless these are provided there can be no permanent organization of peace.

Wanted—A Foreign Trade Policy

By JOHN HAYS HAMMOND, LL.D.

Washington, D. C.

AMERICA faces a new era in her national development; her future holds immeasurable potentialities. At no time in the life of the nation has the outlook been brighter. Peace is at hand. Prosperity and happiness, on a plane far greater than the world has ever before known, may be hers if she will but grasp and develop them. The degree of our future success will be measured by the degree of our vision and judgment. These blessings are not laid before us to take or leave in a casual manner. They are dependent upon the faithful fulfilment of well-defined duties. The complexities of the problems before us are great, but they are not insoluble. Let us view the situation from the standpoint of facts and experience, rather than through the spectacles of those fascinating optimists who assume that prospects and possession are synonymous. If we follow these gentlemen we may forget that while America stands inert and undecided every other great nation is preparing the quickest and surest method of snatching the advantage from her.

The world war has come to an end, but war for world dominion has been started on the ashes of the old system. Let us bear this in mind and let us remember that a well-defined national policy is as essential to success in the contest for national supremacy as a wise military policy was in the war that is happily ended. Failure to prepare for the new contest will be little less reprehensible than was our failure to prepare for the world war. The problems that are presented to us have no counterpart in Europe, Asia, Africa or South America. We cannot follow the example of any other nation. If we would succeed, we must lead. Our economic position is as distinct fundamentally as is our country's position geographically. The war has given us an unprecedented handicap over every other nation in the world. Our foreign commerce has jumped by leaps and bounds until we have almost monopolized the world trade in many lines. It came to us through the temporary weakness of our competitors, and not through our own

efforts alone. It is unreasonable to assume that we shall hold all of the markets we now control.

Irrespective of the renewed efforts of our competitors, now released from the inexorable demands of war, we may command all the foreign markets that we require and are capable of developing along healthy lines, if we will but capitalize our inherent potentials by wise fostering and conservation. No matter what efforts our competitors may make we can meet them and beat them if we will but protect our incomparable home market while developing on sound principles foreign markets which present natural and permanent outlets for our surplus products.

I shall proceed upon what I deem to be an axiom. Our ideal foreign policy is one that would give America the greatest degree of commercial independence and compel the greatest dependence from the rest of the world. In other words, as a great producing nation we should develop our foreign trade as an incident to a well-defined policy of strengthening our home markets, by stabilizing our financial mechanism, conserving our natural resources and raising our labor to the highest possible state. These are the fundamentals of a permanently successful policy—one that will give us an unassailable commercial position.

In order to realize fully our tremendous potential power, as well as the dangers which are ahead of us, it is necessary to review the economic history of this country during the last fifteen years.

America is the only country in the world which possesses, and at the same time has developed to the point of availability, the greater part of the raw materials essential to her industries. This is the cornerstone of our great industrial structure; the basis of our economic independence. It must be protected. There must be no internationalism in our economic policy! According to the director of the United States Geological Survey, our country contributed to the world's total in 1913 more than 64 per cent of petroleum; 55 per cent of copper; 43 per cent of phosphate; 42 per cent of sulphur; 38 per cent of coal; 37 per cent of zinc; 35 per cent of iron; 34 per cent of lead; 30 per cent of silver; 19 per cent of gold and 20 per cent of salt. We have timber in abundance and an adequate supply of agricultural products to make us in a great measure independent. With respect to nickel, platinum, tin and a few other minerals, there is not much likeli-

hood of our country being self-supporting. We are deficient in potash and certain other minerals essential to our industries, but many of them can be supplied by a policy fostering their development. Such a policy may, in some instances, be well justified apart from economic considerations in view of the possible recurrence of conditions similar to those that existed during the war.

In the ten-year period, beginning in 1904, the export value of American goods was \$18,692,400,442, against an import value of \$13,826,293,032, showing a surplus in our favor of \$4,866,107,410, or approximately \$500,000,000 per annum. But from this favorable trade balance, between \$400,000,000 and \$500,000,000 must be deducted yearly on account of the so-called "invisible exports," the interest and dividends paid by us on \$5,000,000,000 of loans and securities held by European investors; money spent by Americans abroad, remittances made by immigrants and payment by American manufacturers and merchants for freight shipped in foreign bottoms.

During this period we were compelled either to provide a favorable trade balance to the extent of approximately \$500,000,000 a year to off-set the invisible exports, or to sell additional American securities to foreign investors. Payment in gold would have soon depleted our gold reserve. The financial condition of this country at the outbreak of the war was serious, owing to the fact that under the present tariff the value of the imports actually exceeded that of the exports. Fortunately, the effect of the war was to create what was tantamount to a protective tariff by reason of the incident restriction of exports to this country from the belligerent nations, thus averting a great national calamity, financial and industrial.

It is estimated that, prior to the war, upwards of 90 per cent of the products of our national industries were absorbed by our own market, and amounted to more than twice the total export trade of the world. It is not generally known that New York City alone had, before the war, a yearly output of two and one-quarter billions of dollars of manufactures, approximately equal to the entire export trade of either Great Britain or Germany and nearly three times the value of the total imports into South America from all sources. From these considerations, the con-

clusion would seem irresistible that the keynote of our industrial policy should be to preserve unimpaired this incomparable home market. Shall we dissipate this tremendous market, or shall we maintain it by the protection that can be accomplished through tariff legislation wisely administered? This is inherently an economic—not a political—problem.

It is vital to the industrial peace, social contentment and prosperity of the nation that unemployment of labor be reduced to a minimum. This can be effected in a large measure by the restriction of immigration and by the development of foreign markets to insure uninterrupted operation of our industrial plants. The condition of the labor market in the near future is a subject upon which authorities disagree. Among the factors which will determine this condition are the future position of women in industry and the rate of immigration compared with that of emigration. Undoubtedly, there will be a large exodus of our wage earners to their native lands as soon as conditions admit of their departure, and, in all probability, many of these emigrants will not return to America. But, on the other hand, the higher wages and better living conditions here, coupled with the desire of leaving behind the scene of sad memories, will soon attract a large number to America and perhaps far more than would off-set the loss through emigration.

A law restricting immigration should be of short duration and subject to suspension by a body of officials to whom Congress would delegate the authority. The quality of our immigration from all countries would be improved if the work of debarring undesirables were carried out abroad before their departure, instead of after their arrival here. In other words, the Ellis Islands should be established at the points of emigration. The number admitted should be based upon the record of naturalization among the various races during the decade previous to the war. Preference should be given to those nationalities which have evinced a disposition to become naturalized American citizens. It would be far better to suffer a temporary shortage of labor than to have any considerable oversupply under normal industrial conditions. We can dictate the types and numbers of our future immigrants. Shall we accept hordes of undesirables, or shall we accept the best that apply and in the number required?

After the period of reconstruction in Europe, America cannot depend on European markets to absorb her surplus products. If England permanently adopts and extends the principle of the protective tariff—as she surely will—as a basis of preferential tariffs with her colonies and dependencies, America will be deprived of her most important foreign market. In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1914, nearly 40 per cent of our total exports were to the United Kingdom and Canada. This almost equaled the entire importations into South America from all nations. These comparative figures are instructive. Germany also will lose her best market, for in the year 1913 one-sixth of her entire exports—a large part of which were manufactures—went to England, in addition to her very considerable export trade with the colonies.

There is a tendency in this country to overestimate the disabilities under which the great commercial nations of the world will labor as a result of their war losses. Let us examine the facts. France unquestionably will require most of her strength and capital for some time to come to rebuild her devastated areas. Japan undoubtedly will attempt to make great strides in South and Central America, and in many lines we cannot hope to compete with her underpaid labor. Germany, driven from her old markets under the British flag will regain—and in fact already is attempting to regain—and enlarge her sphere in Latin America. We shall meet her at every turn. Her unscrupulous agents will be found in every market and their activities will bear fruit. While England has paid a tremendous price to carry on the war, it has not all been lost to her. As a result of the war, her industry has been modernized and she is now far better equipped than ever before to compete for world trade.

It is to the so-called “backward nations” of South America, Africa, Asia and to Russia that America must look for her future markets. These countries possess enormous natural resources, as yet undeveloped, and consequently of no present value. Their people lack purchasing-power, and because of the low standards of living there is but little demand for foreign goods. The exploitation of these countries would involve the expenditure of colossal sums of money. Where is the money to come from? Obviously European financial centers can no longer provide capital, and it is to the United States that they must look for financial assistance.

In developing new fields of industrial activity, we shall not only create markets for American products but for the exports of Europe as well. In that way we shall profit by enhancing the value of the European securities which we now hold. Our Allies cannot repay these loans in gold—that would be impossible, even if it were desirable—and to receive payment in their industrial products would seriously affect our own industries. Therefore they must repay us by securities we help them create.

Before the war, England, Germany and France were the great bankers of the world. Indeed, many of our own most important industries were financed by foreign capital. England's investments abroad were estimated, in 1914, at upwards of twenty billions of dollars from which she derived a yearly income of \$1,000,000,000. In Latin America alone England has invested five billions of dollars. Both England and Germany have encouraged the investment of the capital of their nationals abroad in order to control the trade resulting from the industries developed. The investment of capital in the development of a country is the "open sesame" to trade with that country.

In international investments, what the borrowing nation requires is cheap money; what the lending nation demands is good security. Under present conditions, good security is what the so-called "backward nations" find most difficult to furnish. It is not only that all business arrangements may at any time be disrupted by political disturbances, but where a dispute arises between the foreign investor and the local interests, the matter is decided by a biased local court or by executive decree, from either of which the only appeal in practice is to diplomatic intervention. Whichever way the case is finally decided, the course of procedure creates bad feeling on both sides. For this reason, I advocate the creation of a High Court of Equity to hear and determine cases solely in the category to which I have referred.

The authority of such a court would be enormous. Its decisions, published all over the world, would constitute a powerful deterrent to dishonest practice; and its influences would extend over the whole field of international business. For the plaintiff or defendant, as the case might be, would not be called upon to accept the decision of a foreign judge and jury whom he would suspect of bias against him. It is not suggested, of course, that

every dispute should be taken to the High Court of Equity and jurisdiction might be fixed by a minimum sum as the amount to be involved in the suit.

If we wish to induce the investment of American money abroad, our government must change its attitude towards American investors in foreign countries. Heretofore no attempt has been made to distinguish between legitimate undertaking by Americans, founded upon the purchase for cash of land, mining-rights, etc., and those schemes—fortunately few in number—which are based entirely upon concessions extorted without valuable consideration. The view has been that there is something base and sordid in any American business enterprise conducted in a foreign country. The fact is that the opposition to the legitimate investment of American capital abroad usually rests upon the complete ignorance of the circumstances.

Anyone who is familiar with the conditions in Latin America, in Africa, in the West Indies, for example, knows that whatever measure of prosperity and civilization exists among the natives has been developed by the activities of foreign capital in those regions. What may very properly be asked of a man who invests his capital in a so-called "backward country" is: "Are the inhabitants of this country better off or worse off because you have gone among them to do business?" And by the answer to this question any foreign enterprise should be approved or condemned. In modern times there are few instances in which native races have not secured great benefits both moral and material from the establishment among them of foreign enterprises.

The foreigner, acting for his own selfish interest, will do everything he can to maintain law and order and to avert internal warfare. He will build hospitals, import physicians and surgeons, improve the sanitary conditions, develop means of transportation and communication, and encourage local industry. In the actual conduct of his business, he will bring capital to the country, give employment to labor and elevate the standard of living. Through the taxation of his enterprises, the government of the country will increase its revenues and find it easier to borrow money for its own purposes. The foreign investor invariably pays a higher rate of wages than native employers, and his business always stimulates the development of whatever resources the country pos-

sesses. An excellent and typical instance of this is what occurs when American capitalists build a smelter in Mexico. The smelter will depend upon ore mined by native wage labor, but in the surrounding district there will be thousands of acres of metal-bearing ground owned in small patches by the natives. Before the smelter is built this ground is worth nothing whatever to its owners as none of them has the capital with which to erect buildings, to import machinery and to employ mining engineers and metallurgists. But the American smelter will buy at a fair price all the ore any of these men will bring to it, thus turning into money resources which have hitherto been valueless to their possessors. Less direct, but no less beneficial, is the stimulus given by the smelter to small local industries among the natives like farming and cattle-raising. What is true of the Mexican smelter built by foreign capital is true of the West Indian sugar factory, of the Malayan tin mine, of the African gold mine, of the Burmese rice mill, of the Sumatra tobacco plantation—the foreign investor makes his profit, but in doing so he increases the prosperity, the development and advancement of the country. In addition to this he confers a benefit upon his own country, for he establishes a trade connection which may be of great value both as to the import and export of commodities and provides freight for the railways and the merchant marine of his own nation.

It would be manifestly impossible to discuss all the phases of foreign trade policy in a paper of this scope. I have dwelt only on those which I deem to be of major importance. It seems almost unnecessary to remind even the most casual observer of the necessity for improving our financial facilities abroad and of strengthening our diplomatic and consular agencies.

I have emphasized the essentiality of fostering our incomparable home markets as the basis of all our prosperity and the natural foundation of a great foreign trade. If we are to build on such a foundation then our foreign trade policy should embrace:

1. A tariff based upon the recommendations of tariff experts to protect our home markets from the dumpings of Europe and Asia and also to secure reciprocal trade advantages with other countries.

2. Legislation supplementing the Webb-Pomerene law to promote efficiency in our home industries, by eliminating uneconomic and unessential features of the Sherman law.

3. The creation of an immigration board which shall regulate immigration to meet economic demands.

4. The development of a great American merchant marine, privately owned and privately operated, with such governmental assistance as is accorded the nationals of our maritime competitors.

5. The creation of a High Court of Equity which shall adjudicate commercial disputes between Americans and the nationals of countries in which they invest or seek to invest.

The Freedom of the Seas

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DURING the recent war no phrase has been so freely used and so imperfectly understood as "the freedom of the seas." Germany interpreted it as meaning the overthrow of British naval supremacy; Great Britain invoked it against the unrestricted use of the submarine by Germany; while the United States appealed to it for the protection of American commerce against illegal interference by both belligerents. Under these circumstances the public was unable to get any very clear conception of the meaning of the phrase. Unfortunately, the term has been glibly used by writers whose interest in international law was first aroused in August, 1914. It is important, therefore, in any consideration of the subject, to inquire what the meaning of the term was prior to the outbreak of the recent war.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

In arriving at an understanding of the term "freedom of the seas," it is necessary to define the term "seas." As used in this connection, it means "high seas." This latter term may have been adopted as descriptive of the apparent elevation of the surface of the sea when looked at from the shore. It is undoubtedly also connected with the meaning of "high" in the sense of "high" way. In the case of *United States v. Rogers*, decided by the Supreme Court in 1893, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said:

It is to be observed also that the term "high" in one of its significations is used to denote that which is common, open, and public. Thus every road or way or navigable river which is used freely by the public is a "high" way. So a large body of navigable water other than a river, which is of an extent beyond the measurement of one's unaided vision, and is open and unconfined, and not under the exclusive control of any one nation or people, but is the free highway of adjoining nations or people, must fall under the definition of "high seas" within the meaning of the statute.

Since the days of Bynkershoek (1702), it has been generally conceded that each nation has a right to exercise jurisdiction over

the seas surrounding its territory to the extent of three marine miles. Such jurisdiction is not absolutely exclusive, for the vessels of other nations have the right of innocent passage through this marine belt. At the time that Bynkershoek wrote his book, three miles was considered the greatest possible range of cannon, but the marine belt having become fixed by common consent, it has not been extended with the increased range of modern guns. The term "high seas," therefore, embraces all that part of the ocean beyond the three mile limit and not subject to the jurisdiction of any nation.

THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE

For the modern doctrine of the freedom of the seas, we are indebted to Hugo Grotius, whose book entitled *Mare Liberum* was published in 1609. The object of this treatise was to demonstrate the right of the Dutch to sail to the East Indies and engage in trade there against the exclusive pretensions of the Portuguese, which were based on the Papal Bull of 1493 drawing a line through the Atlantic and assigning Spain exclusive rights to the west and Portugal to the east. The argument of Grotius was both elaborate and lucid. He claimed, first, that the ocean was so vast that no nation could effectually appropriate it; and second, that the ocean was susceptible of unlimited use and ought, therefore, to remain perpetually in the same condition in which it was created by nature. He also claimed as an unimpeachable axiom of the law of nations that, "Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it." It thus appears that the demand of land-locked peoples for an outlet to the sea is nothing new.

The principles laid down by Grotius made a wide appeal, and soon became generally accepted, so that the freedom of the seas in time of peace (and this, it should be remembered, is what Grotius was contending for) has long been established and is not now seriously questioned. When, therefore, we speak of the freedom of the seas today, we do not mean the freedom of the seas in peace—about which there is no controversy—but the freedom of the seas in time of war.

By common consent belligerents have been permitted to exercise powers on the high seas in time of war which no nation is permitted to exercise in time of peace. The recognized rights

of belligerents are as follows: to capture enemy vessels on the high seas; to prevent neutrals from trading with the enemy in articles contraband of war; to stop all trade with duly blockaded ports or coasts of the enemy, and, in order to enforce the above rights, to visit and search neutral merchant vessels on the high seas. A long controversy was waged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries over the question of the right of a belligerent to remove enemy goods from a neutral ship. The Dutch advanced the doctrine of "free ships, free goods." This controversy, as well as several others relating to maritime warfare, was finally settled by the Declaration of Paris, issued by the powers of Europe at the close of the Crimean war in 1856. That declaration marked a great advance, but it did not by any means establish the freedom of the seas, for serious limitations on the rights of neutrals to trade with belligerents were confirmed by it. Its provisions were:

1. Privateering is and remains abolished;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE

The United States was invited to adhere to this declaration, but declined for reasons clearly set forth by Secretary Marcy. The United States had long stood for the principles contained in the second, third and fourth rules, but, as Mr. Marcy stated, it was not the policy of the United States to maintain a large navy, and we were, therefore, unwilling to agree that privateering should be abolished unless the powers of Europe would agree to exempt private property from capture in time of war. The powers of Europe were unwilling to accept this amendment and, consequently, the United States did not become a party to the declaration. At the beginning of the Spanish war, we agreed with the government of Spain not to engage in privateering, so that the question has since been regarded as settled.

The American conception of the freedom of the seas is closely associated with the efforts which we have made since our birth

as a nation to secure the exemption of private property from capture at sea, and to limit naval warfare to a conflict between armed vessels. In fact, during the negotiations of the treaty of 1783, Benjamin Franklin proposed to Richard Oswald an article containing the following provisions:

And all merchants or traders with their unarmed vessels employed in commerce, exchanging the products of different places, and thereby rendering the necessities, conveniences, and comforts of human life more easy to obtain and more general, shall be allowed to pass freely, unmolested. And neither of the powers parties to this treaty shall grant or issue any commission to any private armed vessels empowering them to take or destroy such trading ships or interrupt such commerce.

These proposals were not embodied in the treaty with England, but they do appear in almost the same words in article 23 of our treaty of 1785 with Prussia.

The United States has persistently advocated the exemption of private property from capture on the seas. President Monroe stated in his message of December 2, 1823, that instructions had been given to United States ministers abroad to propose to the governments to which they were accredited "the abolition of private war on the sea." President Pierce in his message of December 4, 1854, said:

Should the leading powers of Europe concur in proposing as a rule of international law to exempt private property on the ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that broad ground.

In the war of 1866, Austria, Italy and Prussia agreed to the principle of immunity of private property at sea for the period of that war. Five years later, the principle was embodied in a treaty between the United States and Italy in the following terms:

The high contracting parties agree that in the unfortunate event of a war between them the private property of their respective citizens and subjects, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels or by the military forces of either party, it being understood that this exemption shall not extend to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of either party.

In 1904 the Congress of the United States adopted the following resolution:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of the Congress of the United States that it is desirable, in the interest of uniformity of action by the maritime states of the world in time of war that the President endeavor to bring about an understanding among the principal maritime powers with a view of incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerents.

The American delegates at the first Hague Conference in 1899, at the second Hague Conference in 1907, and at the London Naval Conference of 1908-1909, acting under instructions from their government, urged upon the assembled powers the adoption of the American doctrine of the immunity of private property on the seas. In these various proposals the United States did not, of course, include contraband of war or goods bound for a blockaded port.

The American doctrine has always seemed to me to be a debatable question. It has always been based on the assumption that private property on land is exempt from capture and destruction. This assumption is false. We need only refer in this connection to Sherman's march through Georgia and to the present war. An invading army under modern conditions, like an army of ants, eats up everything in its path, and consumes what it does not wantonly destroy. Private property on land enjoys only a theoretical immunity.

On the other hand, the seizure of private property on the seas does not work the same hardship on non-combatants as the confiscation of property on land. Modern ships and cargoes are usually owned by wealthy corporations and the insurance is widely distributed. The loss of such ships and cargoes is, therefore, a national loss, and it is one of the most effective means of exerting pressure on an enemy and forcing him to come to terms. However this may be, when an American talks about the freedom of the seas, he is usually understood to mean the exemption of private property from capture in time of war. President Wilson undoubtedly has had this in mind in his various statements in regard to the freedom of the seas, though in linking the matter up with the League of Nations he probably has meant this and something more. In the second of his fourteen points occurs the following stipulation: "Absolute freedom of navigation upon

the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

The period of the Civil war marked a radical departure from the historic attitude of the United States on almost all questions of maritime warfare. Prior to that time we had been concerned mainly with the defense of neutral rights, but during the Civil war the United States pushed belligerent rights to the utmost limits. The contraband list was extended; the doctrine of continuous voyage was given a new application; a commercial blockade of the entire Confederate coast was established which in the last year of the war became the most rigid "starvation blockade" in history; and the British practice of seizing a vessel bound for a blockaded port the moment it left its home waters was adopted.

In applying the doctrine of continuous voyage the United States made a most radical departure from the recognized rules of international law in seizing cargoes bound for neutral ports adjacent to the Confederacy on the ground that they were to be reshipped to Confederate ports. The doctrine as previously developed by the English Admiralty courts applied only to cases where the ship was to continue the voyage to a belligerent port. The sole rule for determining the destination of the cargo prior to the American Civil war was that the destination of the cargo followed the destination of the ship. The American doctrine separated vessel and cargo, and held that a vessel might have a neutral destination while the cargo might have a belligerent destination. The case of the *Springbok* decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1866 affords perhaps the best illustration of the extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage. This vessel sailed from London in 1862 for Nassau in the Bahamas. She was captured before reaching that port and brought into New York, where she was libeled as a prize. The district court condemned both the vessel and the cargo. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decree as to the cargo but released the vessel. The court thus held that the ultimate destination of the cargo rather than the destination of the ship determined the liability of the cargo to condemnation. This decision was in conflict with the established rule of law that neutral property under a neutral flag, while on its way to a neu-

tral port, was not liable to capture or confiscation. Several other cases involving the same principle were decided by the Supreme Court at the same time.

THE ENGLISH INTERPRETATION

This decision of the Supreme Court was very severely criticised by English and Continental writers, though, strange to say, the British government made no demand for reparation. Great Britain, however, continued for some time to hold to the old rule, and in the Manual of Naval Prize Law, issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in 1888, we find the subject fully covered in the following paragraphs:

71. The ostensible destination of the vessel is sometimes a neutral port, while she is in reality intended, after touching and even landing and colorably delivering over her cargo there, to proceed with the same cargo to an enemy port. In such a case the voyage is held to be "continuous," and the destination is held to be hostile throughout.

72. The destination of the vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the goods on board. If, therefore, the destination of the vessel be hostile, then the destination of the goods on board should be considered hostile also, notwithstanding it may appear from the papers or otherwise that the goods themselves are not intended for the hostile port, but are intended either to be forwarded beyond it to an ulterior neutral destination, or to be deposited in an intermediate neutral port.

73. On the other hand, if the destination of the vessel be neutral, then the destination of the goods on board should be considered neutral, notwithstanding it may appear from the papers or otherwise that the goods themselves have an ulterior hostile destination, to be attained by transshipment, overland conveyance, or otherwise.

A few years later, however, when Great Britain became engaged in the South African war, she undertook to apply the American doctrine. The Boer republics had no seaports. The principal port of entry for goods bound for the Transvaal was Lorenzo Marquez on Delagoa Bay, in Portuguese territory. Supplies for the South African belligerents were sent to this port and transhipped by rail to the Boer republics. In December, 1899, and January, 1900, three German vessels were seized by British war vessels on the ground of carrying contraband to the South African republics. The vessels seized were the *Herzog*, the *General* and the *Bundesrath*. The German government at once protested, and the British government found some diffi-

culty in reconciling its action with the provisions quoted above from the Manual of Naval Prize Law. As, however, the German ships were found not to have any contraband aboard, they were released with the payment of compensation for the delay, and the incident was closed.

The London Naval Conference of 1908-1909 undertook to settle this controversy by a compromise, as the following articles will show:

Art. 30. Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails either transshipment or transport over land.

Art. 33. Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown that it is destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy state, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the articles cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress.

Art. 35. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and is not to be discharged at an intervening neutral port.

Art. 36. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, if the territory of the enemy has no seaboard, conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown that it has the destination referred to in Article 33.

A liberal construction of these articles, taken in connection with an extension of the contraband list, will be found to justify most of the steps taken by England in her "blockade of Germany." In separating the goods from the ship the United States Supreme Court undermined an established rule that was simply and easily applied and opened the way for endless contention and ingenious argument. In the recent war Great Britain carried the doctrine of ultimate destination to its logical limits and, furthermore, ignored the distinction which the London Naval Conference had drawn between absolute and conditional contraband. In answer to the protest of the United States she quoted the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases of 1866. Some writers, it is true, claim that the United States did not extend the doctrine to conditional contraband. This is true, but then it is also true that the court did not have to, for in the Civil war cases the entire Confederate coast was blockaded and, therefore, non-contraband was liable to seizure.

WHAT IS CONTRABAND?

One of the greatest difficulties in applying any of the rules of maritime warfare is the impossibility of drawing a sharp distinction between contraband and non-contraband. Modern warfare has become so complex that there are very few articles which are not susceptible of military use. It is also difficult to draw any sharp distinction between manufactured munitions of war and the raw materials of which they are made. A modern industrial nation like Germany can manufacture all the military supplies she needs provided she can obtain the raw materials. In fact, during the greater part of the recent war Germany was better equipped for manufacturing munitions than any of her enemies or than any of the neutral countries, and she would not have objected to the cutting off of the manufactured products provided she could have been supplied with the materials she needed.

We have reached a point where we must either abolish all right of blockade, all right to seize contraband, and limit naval operations to armed conflicts between men-of-war, or else we must surrender all neutral rights of trade in time of war and permit a power which has a naval force strong enough to do it, to stop absolutely all trade with the enemy.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

The latter alternative is precisely what is provided for in the covenant of the League of Nations in any war between the members of the league and a recalcitrant state. Article 16 provides:

Should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking (state) and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking (state) and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not.

In case the council of the league fails to make a recommendation for the settlement of the dispute submitted to it, the parties to the dispute will presumably be permitted to fight it out, and the constitution of the league makes no provision as to what rules

shall apply to the conflict. In the absence of any such provision, it is presumed that the present rules of maritime warfare would apply. But the constitution of the league undoubtedly implies some new revision or codification of the rules of international law. If war is to be permitted between members of the league, it should be restricted as much as possible, and if third parties are to be kept out, existing rules governing maritime warfare will have to be thoroughly revised. In this connection it is well to recall again the second one of the fourteen points: "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

If this idea is carried out in a war between the league and a recalcitrant member, there will be no neutrals, and the covenant-breaking state will be absolutely isolated and interdicted. On the other hand, in a war between individual members of the league, over a dispute which the council has been unable to settle, the neutral members of the league should be permitted to continue uninterrupted their commercial relations with the belligerents, and there would then be freedom of the seas in war as well as in peace.

The Need of Social Reorganization in America

By OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

Editor of *The Nation*

WHEN one has just beheld on the other side of the ocean elemental human forces unleashed; the very deeps of society breaking up; the pillars of civilization rocking on their bases; whole classes of the citizenship of nations lunging forward to take upon themselves the burdens of governing; when one has gazed upon a spectacle the like of which no other generation has beheld in more than a century, one comes back humble, indeed, and more than ever convinced of the fallibility of any single human judgment.

How can anybody just from Germany, France and England who has looked beneath the surface undertake to discourse upon the "organization of peace"? When I arrived in Paris from Berlin, an American statesman asked me, "How can I, Mr. Villard, think of the League of Nations, when civilization is all but collapsing before our eyes and may yet go down?" I not only agreed with him; I found he agreed with me that the war which was to make the world safe for democracy had thus far only made the world less safe for democracy than it had been since democracies were attempted.

But the darkness of the skies abroad, of which people in America are so amazingly unaware, is no reason for failing to take note of the portents and to make every possible effort to ward off the storm. Here at home reorganization is the great need of the hour. All the more so if one believes as I do that the terrible unrest abroad and the steady drift towards communism will inevitably make itself felt here if prompt steps are not taken to allay the prevailing discontent. It has been the fashion in certain quarters to dilate upon the wonderful effect of the war in making the whole nation one. This is a delusion. Never were the workers as unhappy. Never were there larger classes of our citizenship filled with bitterness and a feeling of being wronged. May Day has borne testimony to that. It is very easy to say when one hears that four millions of foreign born Americans are planning

to return to Europe that it is "good riddance of bad rubbish." But aside from the economic loss of these people, there is nearly a tenth of our citizenship—down-trodden, ill-treated, disfranchised and disadvantaged—that cannot emigrate even though it would and these are beginning to seethe with unrest and anger. I refer, of course, to the colored people, now estimated at ten millions, deemed good enough to fight for democracy, but not good enough to experience it or to live as part of one. Meek, patient and long suffering, these Americans are among the first who should be thought of in any plan of organization for peace. If we continue to drift without a program for the advancement of these people to real democracy, we may be sure that they will espouse socialism, or communism, or bolshevism, or anything else which will promise them the equality they are denied.

But my plea is not especially for them or any other class today. I heard Secretary Daniels remark truly in Paris that a hundred years had elapsed since August 1, 1914, and I took the liberty of amending this by saying that a hundred years had passed since the armistice. There are pressing such new and difficult problems abroad that the first step toward organization for peace in this country ought to be the creation of an absolutely unbiased, really representative society or bureau to study what is happening abroad and to report thereon in some way to compel the attention of the public, the newspapers and the Congress to what is going on. Let us take this new-old device of the soviet form of government. To suggest that it may perhaps have merit is to subject oneself to the charge of being a bolshevist—a word which has just taken the place of "pro-German" as an epithet in our national vocabulary. Yet the other day one of our own American officials at Paris solemnly assured the newspaper men that if the soviet type of government were made really representative he saw no reason why it should not be as democratic as any government, if not more so. It was only to the men who were running the present unfair and undemocratic soviet government in Russia that our government objected, he declared.

Obviously, if this is the case it is time for people everywhere in America to take the soviet seriously and to investigate it dispassionately. Personally I feel sure that the soviet has come to stay in Europe until it has been thoroughly tried out. While I

was in Germany all political parties agreed that the new German constitution now being drafted in Weimar shall contain within it the soviet as the unit of local self-government and that it shall stop short only of the respective parliaments of the several states and of the federal state. I heard everywhere the belief that this soviet procedure would be the best device for the reorganization of industry. Everyone admitted that that extraordinary demobilization of the German army—when it came back beaten, hungry, bitter at its officers and convinced that it had been lied to and tricked—could not have been put through without bloodshed or disorder of any kind if it had not been done by the soldiers' and workmen's councils which were everywhere formed. I met in Berlin the active head of the German Anti-Bolshevist Society, Dr. Stadler, and found him a firm believer in the permanence of the soviet in industry and local government, although he is fighting bolshevism day and night. Dr. Stadler, like everyone else whom I met in Paris, London, Berlin and Bern, agreed that Lenin was quite the ablest statesman in Europe today.

Now, plainly if this German, who saw the forming of Lenin's government when a prisoner in Russia, and a leading American official in Paris express opinions like these it is time for Americans to look into the soviet in a scientific spirit. It would certainly not do for us to let the wicked Germans get the advantage of us by picking up something good in government and getting the jump on the rest of the world. Perhaps we can let them go ahead and be our experiment station and discover whether there is anything worth while in it or not. But meanwhile we must surely have some body or group watching the experiment and passing upon it and warning us in time if we are losing a good thing.

There is something attractive in group representation, which is what the soviet is. I was once in a modest way a college teacher and I cannot say that the idea of college professors as a group having a voice in government is altogether unattractive. I have a feeling, moreover, that our great capitalists might like a governmental device by which their representatives could sit in governmental bodies with the right to be heard open and above board without recourse either to boodle funds or paid lobbyists or underhand means of protecting their rights. Please do not misunderstand. I am not convinced that we have anything what-

ever to gain from the soviet. I am only a journalist who is trying to be open-minded about it and to record the facts of its progress or decay, but I am almost ashamed to admit that I am a journalist, because there has been so much lying in the press about Russia and everything that has gone on there.

It is not only as to Russia that we need information. There is revolution going on in England today, peaceable revolution, thank fortune, carried on in the good old Anglo-Saxon way without bloodshed; yet still revolution. I found no Englishman in Paris who would deny that it was revolution, or assert that it was not going any further. Indeed, in the English Labor Party's program, in the recent decision in the case of the coal miners, in the almost certain nationalization of the mines, in all these we find clear indications of the tremendous change coming over the industrial life of England. Change which will be hastened and not delayed by the distressing financial situation in which she finds herself, and out of which she can hardly extricate herself without severest sacrifices unless she deliberately adopts a policy of disarmament and ceases to maintain a large navy and large armies to rule over her dependent peoples by force. Whatever policies she adopts, she is going to be leading the world in so many ways in her social changes that America must be following her with profoundest interest and care. It hurts our feelings to hear people say abroad that we are at least forty years behind the times in America. But this they are saying, and since our daily press cannot be relied upon to give us complete and accurate news of what is happening, we must find other ways of reorganizing for peace by following events abroad with zealous care.

This is all the more necessary if what has been said so often during this war is true—that we have abandoned our isolation and are now to be a part, through an alliance with France and our partnership in the League of Nations, of all the happenings abroad; that, absolutely forgetting the advice of Washington, we are to have entangling alliances. We have recently seen how embarrassing it is to be in a war without knowing about the secret agreements of our allies. Plainly, if we are to play the old diplomatic game, we should not do it blindfolded. Let us find a way to get all the light we can.

But most essential of all, if we are going to organize for peace

on any sound basis, is the need for a liberal and a tolerant spirit in dealing with the problems before us and with those of our fellow-citizens who are so unkind as to have other views than ours as to how our America and the world should be reorganized. It is not surprising that war-worn Europe should be in the frame of mind in which it is now the custom to throw a hand-grenade at the fellow one does not like. But we have escaped the real stress and strain of war so that it is rather trying to read of the recent May Day happenings throughout the country. We must surely all unite to preach the doctrine that it is utterly wrong to try to upset or alter this government by force, however inconsistent this may seem with our recent actions. It is a mighty poor American and a stupid, dull reformer who lets himself believe that the way to get a better country is to organize it by bullets or the cowardly infernal machine. That way lies madness, as Bavaria has just shown.

But if we try to suppress with rigid hand those who would urge a different form of society; if self-constituted mobs of uniformed men are to become censors of what the dissatisfied may or may not say; if we deny the right of free speech, and free thought to the dissenters; then we are padlocking the safety valve. If we are going to meet them with bitterness and anger, with threats of deportation and prison, then shall we merely intensify the nation-wide unrest which the war has done so much to increase. To let loose an idea upon the world is often a terrible thing, but still more terrible is the effort to combat ideas by force and by incarceration. The only way that we can organize for peace is by setting ourselves rigidly to inquiring what is wrong with us and what we can do to better the situation. Let us have a national commission of inquiry—not of political back-numbers and lawyers and elder statesmen and still elder labor leaders—but let us have upon it the spirit of youth and progress, with even a non-partisan leaguer and a socialist or two. They usually do not bite when in private company and though they have not converted many of us Americans to their views they sometimes have interesting and useful ideas to impart.

When the red flag waves over the public buildings of two-thirds of Europe; when there are twenty-two straight-out socialist republics being organized in Germany alone, it is surely time to examine

into this strange doctrine which numbers its followers by the hundred millions between Siberia and Paris. Americans ought surely not to disregard the fact that the conservatives in Germany and Russia today are now the majority socialists who at the outbreak of the war were the extreme radicals. We must likewise not overlook the truth that our two great political parties are today the most conservative parties in the western world, and that they are even further to the right than the professed British Tories. There is, therefore, no political alternative for those whose desires are unexpressed than to go to the Socialists. If we undertake to organize wisely for peace we shall lend all possible aid to a liberal party which shall take middle ground, else shall we see the cleft and the bitter feeling of the hour grow. In England the Labor Party points the way. Perhaps our own new-born Labor Party, if it does not confine itself merely to those who hold union cards, can supply the crying need.

Whether it does or does not, one thing is certain, the movement to the left in America is coming. No one can study conditions abroad and rest assured that America can remain apart from the imponderable world currents and keep unchanged the old America so many of us liked so well, loved so profoundly. Shall we guide it and direct it into wise channels by ascertaining and removing the causes of social and economic discontent, or shall we combat it by force and repression and lynching—and thereby compel it to nihilism and to what people consider bolshevism? That is the fundamental question to be answered before there can be any wise organizing for peace.

The Amended Covenant of the League of Nations

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THE "Amended Covenant of the League of Nations" having been adopted by the Paris Conference, the question is now before the American people whether it shall be adopted or rejected by them. Most of the objections, based upon mere form, have now been removed. It is still contended, however, that if the United States should join the league it would thereby become subject to the control of the organs of the league and would find its freedom of action restricted in a manner unfavorable to its best interests. It is even argued that our national safety and independence would be endangered. These objections have been advanced by men whose opinion is entitled to weight and they deserve serious and thoughtful consideration.

It is necessary to consider the exact nature of the proposals which the league covenant makes in order to ascertain how far they are likely to improve international relations and to what extent the objections advanced may be just. The league covenant contains so many separate articles framed in technical language that it is confusing to consider it article by article; it will be much simpler to consider the proposals, stated rather as objects of the covenant. Having regard to the restraint or compulsion imposed upon the members of the league, the basis of the objections now urged, the proposals of the covenant may be divided into two classes: First, those whereby a nation binds itself to do or not do certain specified things, either absolutely or under certain contingencies; second, those whereby a nation agrees to be bound by the action of an institution set up by the league.

Those provisions of the covenant merely offering opportunity to league members to take voluntary action along certain lines, but without compulsion or relating to matters to be hereafter dealt with by the league, are not discussed, as not open to the objections now under consideration.

I. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON LEAGUE MEMBERS BY THE
BINDING FORCE OF THE COVENANT

a. *Enforced Examination of International Disputes and Delay
before Commencing Hostilities*

Many of the terms of the covenant relate to one great purpose—to compel nations before commencing war against each other to submit the cause at issue to the examination of an international court or council, as the case may be, and to delay hostilities at least three months after the decision has been rendered.

This obligation, imposed upon all members of the league by the binding force of the treaty, is entirely apart from any duty to obey the decree of a court or the recommendation of a council—a matter to be separately considered. The requirement of an examination of the dispute and the enforcement of a delay which altogether would not be less than nine months after the public statement of the case to court or council would be almost certain to prevent war in most cases. The examination of facts clears away misunderstandings, discloses the falsity of claims made without foundation, and lays bare the hypocrisy of states masking aggressive aims under pretended grievances. Even more important is the necessary delay after the case has been stated to the world. The delay gives time for the passions to cool, for the cost to be counted and for that element of the community opposed to the war to make its influence felt. Time always makes for peace; it is the great pacificator, as well as the great healer. It has been said, and truly, that if but a few days had been given for discussion, after the opening scenes of the late war, it probably would have been averted altogether. It is as near a certainty as human intelligence can foresee, that, if the provisions of the covenant on this point are enforced as written in the treaty, the probability of war will be much diminished.

This is admitted by the opponents of the league, but objections have been heard to the method of enforcement. It is recognized that in order that the treaty may be of binding effect, all members of the league must agree to enforce it. It is objected, however, that the treaty would bind the United States to send its armies abroad, even if the cause they were summoned to support was not a just one; that the United States would be obliged to fight but could not decide for itself upon which side.

If a nation should violate this covenant and attempt to use violence in the furtherance of its own ends, without submitting its cause to court or council, as provided by the treaty, there could be but one side. The use of violence under these circumstances would not only be a gross violation of a solemn obligation—it would be a disturbance of the peace of the world, which the United States, as well as all other nations, would be bound to condemn and oppose. But although a term in the treaty obligating the United States to send troops for such a purpose might well be defended, there is no such obligation in the treaty. The stipulations regarding this matter are contained in Article XVI. The members of the league agree, in the event of such violation, immediately to subject the offending state

to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not.

This is the extent of the absolute undertaking of any member of the league. It agrees to treat the offending state as an outlaw, so far as commercial or social intercourse with it is concerned; it does not agree to take up arms against it. The article, however, proceeds:

It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league.

This is no more than a provision for a recommendation by the council. The members of the league do not agree to furnish the armed forces recommended or any armed forces for the purpose of subduing the offending state. It is probable that such forces would be furnished by the United States, but Congress would have to decide in favor of it before it could be done; and, if not done, it would be no violation of the treaty. It is therefore apparent that the supposed obligation to furnish troops regardless of the character of the controversy does not in fact exist.

There is nothing new in the character of restraint voluntarily submitted to by the United States under these terms of the covenant. It is our settled practice to make treaties with other nations, agreeing to submit disputes to examination and decision

and to allow a specified time to elapse before hostilities are begun. To enter into a general treaty of that character with substantially all the other nations of the earth would be no departure from this practice, but a continuance of it. In so doing, the United States should be willing to assume its full share of the burden of enforcing the treaty. However, the obligation to do so under the terms of this covenant, goes no further than to require the exercise of what is commonly called economic pressure, and calls only for the use of troops or ships of war as a result of the recommendation—not the command—of the council, and only in case the properly constituted authorities of the United States so decide.

b. *Limitation of Armaments*

Another obligation which the members of the league enter into by the terms of the treaty relates to the limitation of armaments. It is recognized that the burden of maintaining great armies and navies, which has rested so heavily upon Europe, is not only an unnecessary and gross imposition upon the people, but that "the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety."

The members of the league agree to disclose to each other the condition of their industries which are capable of being adapted to war-like purposes, and the scale of their armaments. They agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programs. There is no restriction upon the members of the league as to the size of their armaments until after they have themselves agreed to the restriction. The council is to determine what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable for each nation. This determination, however, is not binding upon any state unless and until the state accepts it by its own free act. Thereafter, not on account of any action of the council, but by the express terms of the treaty, the state agrees not to overstep the limits which it has itself accepted.

These provisions are so reasonable and lend themselves so plainly to the preservation of peace, that no opponent of the league has come forward to object to them.

c. *Publicity of Treaties*

Another provision by which the members of the league are bound is that they will make their treaties with one another

public; and that no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding unless registered in the manner provided by the league, so as to become public property.

This provision cannot fail to have a beneficial effect upon the relations existing between states. Secret treaties have been at the bottom of many wars. And while secret agreements cannot, perhaps, be prevented by this term of the covenant, the very fact that they are declared to be not binding will deprive them of much of their injurious effect upon international politics.

d. *Guaranty of Territorial Integrity and Political Independence*

Article X of the covenant, which has raised so much controversy, provides that the members of the league

undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all states, members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of any such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled.

Several serious objections have been advanced against this article. Perhaps the most serious is that a positive obligation by the United States to protect the territorial integrity of a member of the league against external aggression obligates the United States to defend by force of arms any such aggression against that state. This, it is said, would have the effect of compelling the United States to send troops abroad in obedience to the treaty on all such occasions and whether it believed the cause of the attacking state to be just or unjust.

It has been suggested in reply that the effect of this clause of the treaty is no more than to reënforce the provision of Article XVI—that members of the league will oppose by economic pressure, and, if they so decide, by armed force, a state which has refused to submit its case to court or council. This is not quite accurate, however, as a case might arise in which a state had submitted the dispute to court or council, had given the requisite delay, and still insisted upon proceeding with a war which would violate the political independence or territorial integrity of a member of the league. It might do this under circumstances which would not be a violation of the covenant (as where there was no unanimous recommendation of the council) and, there-

fore, the members of the league would not be bound to oppose it under Article XVI. They might, however, be called in under Article X to defend the state attacked because its territorial integrity or political independence was threatened.

It has also been objected that the apparent effect of Article X would be to maintain permanently the political organization of the world in the way it is fixed at the conclusion of this war, which is an impossibility. Nations live and die like human beings; they have their beginnings, their periods of greatest prosperity, and their periods of decline. In all human probability nations will rise and fall in the future as they have in the past. This necessarily means that political control of territory will change, and in some cases political entities will cease to exist.

It is apparent on examination that Article X rises like a lone peak above the other provisions of this covenant. It is in effect an absolute prohibition of war for territory or for the destruction of a political entity. It would be only a short step beyond this to forbid war altogether for any purpose, and require all states to use legal methods in acquiring objects which they may have in view. That this principle will sometime be established is a certainty. It is, however, a serious question whether it can precede the establishment of an international court and the acceptance of the principles of international law as governing relations between states. Before a prohibition of war for these or any specified objects can be made effective, there must be in actual operation another and better means of adjusting international differences. You cannot prohibit change by law. You can require change to take place only in accordance with certain rules or principles, but these principles must be recognized as applying in such cases and competent tribunals must be in existence ready to enforce them before all other means of change can be effectively forbidden. When an international court has become well established and has demonstrated its ability to decide international questions judicially—and not merely by way of compromise—and when the principles of international law are better settled and are recognized as really having the force of law, a prohibition of war will be more likely to be effective. Until that time such a prohibition as is contained in this guarantee of territorial integrity and po-

litical independence of the members of the league must be considered somewhat as a temporary provision intended to preserve existing conditions for a limited time only. It was no doubt in recognition of these facts and mainly on account of Article X that the provision was inserted enabling a state to withdraw from its obligations upon giving two years' notice.

It would clearly be appropriate as a part of the treaty of peace for the signatories to guarantee the boundaries fixed by the treaty for at least a temporary period; such guarantees to be enforced by the states in the best position to do so. It might have been better if Article X had been inserted in the treaty of peace, but in view of the possibility of amendment and the opportunity to withdraw on two years' notice, its inclusion in the covenant is not sufficient ground for rejecting it. The treaty of peace and the covenant will be adhered to by the same nations in the first instance, and after all, it is not a vital objection that this guarantee is included in the one rather than in the other.

Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the covenant contemplates the establishment of an international court and that the assembly will be competent to deal with questions of international law. It is, therefore, not too much to hope that when the new system is placed in operation, prompt steps may be taken to establish an international court and to develop international law, so that within the course of a few years machinery will exist capable of dealing with disputes between nations involving questions of territorial integrity or political independence. Thereafter the inclusion of Article X as a permanent obligation in the covenant for a league of nations will be no longer objectionable.

II. COMPULSION OR RESTRAINT OF LEAGUE MEMBERS THROUGH THE ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

a. *Decisions of an International Court*

Although it goes beyond existing practice in some particulars, the covenant is far behind in the matter of the judicial settlement of international disputes. This matter has been especially pointed out by Senator Root. The United States has so frequently submitted questions of great importance to the decision of international tribunals, that it has become our usual practice. We have not only submitted questions of minor importance, but

many which were distinctly of major importance, involving questions of the class commonly described as those which concern the honor, the vital interests or the independence of states. Among such may be mentioned the Geneva Arbitration over the Alabama claims, the numerous boundary disputes between the United States and Great Britain—especially in connection with the Canadian boundary—and the Fisheries Cases. The United States now has many treaties with other nations providing for the submission of questions arising between them to judicial examination and decision.

Not only the United States, but other nations have made great progress in the same direction. At the first Hague Conference the principal nations of the world agreed upon the establishment of a permanent international court of arbitration, which has done useful service. At the second Hague Conference, held in 1907, substantially all the civilized powers of the world agreed upon the constitution of an international court, designated the International Court of Arbitral Justice, and the only reason it was not then established was because an agreement could not be reached as to the method of appointing judges. Subsequently progress was made toward the establishment of an international prize court, although it never actually came into operation.

This shows the trend of modern thought toward the inevitable conclusion that questions arising between independent nations should be decided according to principles of right and justice rather than by violence. Experience has demonstrated that there is no insuperable bar to the judicial decision of such questions, even though involving what has been termed the honor and the vital interests of the contending powers.

With this history it was to have been supposed that the covenant establishing a league of nations would have provided specifically for the establishment of an international court (which had already been agreed upon in form by all the nations of the world) and would further have provided means whereby nations would be required to submit disputes—if not all, certainly all those of a justiciable character—to such court for decision. The provisions of the covenant, however, in this regard are very disappointing. No court is provided for. Article XIV states that the council shall formulate plans for the establishment of such a

court, but that is by no means so advanced a step as was taken by the second Hague Conference twelve years ago. It is further provided that:

The high contracting parties agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between them, which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole matter to arbitration.

This provision, however, when analyzed, is seen to amount to very little. The only questions which the league members agree to submit to arbitration are those "which they recognize to be suitable" for such submission. The covenant is somewhat strengthened by the declaration in the amended article to the effect that certain classes of cases are "generally suitable for submission to arbitration." This amendment, however, while it may serve as a suggestion to league members who have disputes with one another, is distinctly not binding. If it does not desire to submit a question to arbitration, it is apparent on the face of the article that a nation can avoid doing so by refusing to recognize it to be "suitable." The article is of no binding force whatever. The covenant would be greatly strengthened and would offer much better hope for its future successful operation if it provided for the establishment of a court to which questions of a judicial nature should of necessity be submitted.

A method should also be provided whereby the judicial character of the question of dispute may be ascertained either by the court or some other appropriate body. Thus it would not be left to the decision of the states concerned, who, if they do not wish to arbitrate, can always decide that the question is not one of a justiciable character.

Although there is no specific provision on the subject, it is a matter of gratification that the language of the covenant is sufficiently broad to enable the council or assembly to undertake the important duty of codifying, harmonizing and determining the principles of international law to be applied by the court when established. Both these bodies are to meet at regular intervals and both have jurisdiction over "any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world." This jurisdiction is clearly broad enough so that either body could assume the important and necessary duty of considering ques-

tions of the character mentioned affecting the firm establishment and growth of international law.

Although the framers of the covenant did not see their way clear to provide for the immediate establishment of an international court, it is to be hoped and is confidently expected that after the conclusion of peace one of the first duties to be undertaken by the council will be the establishment of such court along the lines of the recommendation made at the second Hague Conference.

While the provisions of the covenant in this regard are not as complete as they might be, they offer great hope for the future, and it is clear that they impose no restraint upon the freedom of action of the United States. Therefore, any objection based upon this supposition is without foundation.

b. *Recommendations of the Council or Assembly*

The covenant, although not really requiring the submission of any question to judicial decision or arbitration, does undertake to require the submission to the council or to the assembly of all questions not submitted to arbitration. The question, therefore, arises how far and under what circumstances will a nation be bound by the recommendation made by the council or assembly? There is no compulsion or restraint of any kind unless the decision is unanimous, excluding the parties to the dispute. If the recommendation is so made, the only compulsion which then rests upon the parties involved in the dispute is by virtue of their agreement that neither will go to war with the other, if it has complied with the recommendation. It is further provided that if either party refuses to comply "the council shall propose measures necessary to give effect to the recommendation." This last is obviously a mere statement that further proposals may be made by the council; there is no agreement by the parties to obey the recommendation and no agreement by the other league members that they will require them to do so. If there is no unanimous report, the only restraint upon the parties to the dispute is to await the proper time before beginning hostilities, if they are determined to use force.

It is this article, which has aroused so much discussion and so much opposition upon the supposition that it threatens serious

interference with questions of domestic policy or with foreign policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine. As to domestic policies the matter is dealt with by the amended article, which provides:

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party the council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

In case, therefore, a domestic question is involved in a dispute, such as, for example, the policy of a state regarding immigration, it will not be considered by the council if it finds the question to be one solely within the domestic jurisdiction of either party. This decision must be unanimous to be effective, but if not unanimous, and the council proceeded to consider the case, the member of the council who found that the question was of a domestic character, would undoubtedly refuse to agree to the recommendation as being beyond the jurisdiction of the council. It seems clear that if a question is one which can fairly be said to be of a domestic character, and if one member of the council finds that it is of such character, there will be no unanimous recommendation, and therefore no compulsion regarding that matter. It is therefore evident that there is no danger of domestic questions being interfered with under the terms of the amended covenant.

A clause is also included in the amended treaty which is intended to exclude cases involving the Monroe Doctrine from consideration by the council. This is in the form of a separate article, which reads as follows:

Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

If it be admitted that the covenant endangers the Monroe Doctrine, it must be confessed that the provisions of Article XXI do not clearly remove the danger. If it be assumed that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine is not affected by anything contained in the covenant, it does not necessarily follow that the doctrine would be recognized and enforced in all cases. For example, if Germany should undertake to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere by purchase and the United States should object, a dispute would exist, to which the United States,

Germany and the owner of the territory about to be acquired, would be parties. The United States would base its objections on the ground that the acquisition of the territory would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a menace to its safety. The provision of Article XXI is not a clear statement that in such a case the validity of the Monroe Doctrine would be recognized and applied and a decision given against the acquisition of territory by Germany. The declaration that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine is not affected by the covenant is not quite the same thing as declaring it to be valid and enforceable; nor is the mere mention of it by name a sufficient determination as to its meaning. The decision might be that the Monroe Doctrine could not be considered to apply in the case in hand and that the general principles applicable to such cases would not permit a just objection by the United States on the ground that its safety was imperiled. The amendment proposed by Senator Root, whereby the acquisition of territory in the Western Hemisphere by European powers would be specifically prohibited, has the merit of greater clarity.

Laying aside the provisions of Article XXI, however, what danger is there of interference with the Monroe Doctrine? Under what circumstances can it reasonably be said that there is probability of a decision which would have the effect of interfering with or nullifying the Monroe Doctrine? A decision of the council, to be of any binding effect, must be unanimous, excluding the parties to the controversy. As the case can always be taken to the assembly, there must be in addition to a unanimous vote of the members of the council, a majority vote of the other members of the assembly. It is, of course, possible that all the members of the council and a majority of the assembly would agree to a recommendation which would have the effect of nullifying the Monroe Doctrine, notwithstanding the declaration of Article XXI that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine is not to be affected by the covenant. The probability of such a decision, however, is so remote that under all the circumstances it may reasonably be said to be negligible.

It has been argued, however, by some opponents of the league that no questions of general policy or involving the vital interests of the United States (and this would include questions affecting

the Monroe Doctrine) should in any event be submitted to the council for examination. No precise effort has been made to define the class of cases meant, but it is broadly claimed that the United States should reserve to itself the right to determine all important questions of this kind and that it should not permit them even to be discussed by an international council. Strangely enough this argument has been advanced by persons who at the same time assert that they are in favor of a league of nations that would assist in preserving the peace of the world. It is apparent almost without discussion that a contract to submit questions to a court or council for examination, but reserving the right to refuse to submit an undefined class of cases involving the vital interests or important policies of the nations signing the contract would be of no binding force whatever. In the not-remote past general treaties of arbitration concluded between states generally reserved therefrom questions affecting the vital interests, independence or honor of the contracting parties. Such a treaty is of no binding force, as experience has shown. If a state does not wish to arbitrate it may escape the obligation of the contract by asserting that the question affects its honor, its vital interests or its independence. It would be quite useless to make any covenant at all if the states were to reserve from the consideration of the court or the council an undefined class of cases to be determined by themselves.

Admitting that there is a possibility that the council or assembly will in important cases affecting the vital interests of the United States make decisions unfavorable to the United States, the question is whether the United States should, under these circumstances, become a party to this covenant. On the one hand are to be considered the great advantages resulting from the institution of legal relations between states, with consequent greater security to the United States as well as to the other nations of the world. There are also to be considered the many advantages naturally flowing from this condition; greater freedom of commerce, the lessening of the burden of taxation incident to the maintenance of military establishments, and other matters of the same character. But even more important than these is the fact that the new order would go far toward removing the probability of war and establishing international relations on a basis of right.

As against these great advantages what is the danger to the United States? Only this—that there might be an interference with some policy or with some desired object, which, however, could only take place by a concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. That we should have a dispute with another nation which we could not settle by negotiation.

2. That after we had refused arbitration the case had been submitted to and examined by the council and by the assembly, and a report made, concurred in by all members of the council and a majority of the assembly, recommending a course of action unfavorable to the contention of the United States.

3. That this recommendation was satisfactory to our opponent in the dispute and that it complied with it.

4. That in order to maintain its policy, it would be necessary for the United States to take up arms against its opponent, which would be a violation of the covenant, and, therefore, the United States would find itself unable to do so because of its contract.

If the facts were such that the United States could still maintain its position without taking up arms, it would be under no obligation to obey the recommendation and there would be no interference with its rights—unless the other nations should, after consultation, decide to take steps to enforce the recommendation. This, by the very terms of the covenant, would require a further consideration and a further agreement, as there is no obligation in the covenant to do it.

The terms of the treaty in this regard have been thus analyzed to show how exceedingly remote is the probability that there would be any interference with any reasonable policy of the United States. It is improbable that any question would come up that we could not settle by negotiation, or if we could not settle, and refused to arbitrate, that a unanimous recommendation of the council would be made against us; or if by maintaining our position we could defeat the recommendation of the council, that measures would be undertaken to coerce us, especially in the absence of agreement to take this course.

But admitting that all these unlikely conditions might come to pass, should not the United States be willing to trust, to this extent at least, to the reasonableness and fair-mindedness of the

representatives of the other nations of the world? It should be recollected that they will propose to put themselves in the same position as ourselves. They have many more policies likely to clash with the interests of other powers, than we have. They have interests to guard which are as sacred as our own. If they are willing, for the sake of greater security in the world and for the advancement of civilization, to agree to take the risk of the judgment of their fellows, under the circumstances indicated, we should be willing to do the same.

The idea of a league of nations is not new. We who live in Pennsylvania take a special pride in the fact that William Penn proposed a very similar association of nations in the pamphlet which he published in 1693. But a league embodied in a treaty seriously proposed to be signed by the principal powers of the world is new and a marvelous stride forward in the progress of civilization. Such a proposal always has its protagonists and its antagonists, and the present is no exception. There are those who hail it as a great event—which it is—and who are disposed to accept it without examination. There are those who oppose it as a most dangerous innovation, find nothing good in it, magnify the errors of draftsmanship and possible dangers, and even affect to believe that American independence is threatened. This is not the way to discuss a proposal of this kind. It should be examined carefully, but not hypercritically; sympathetically, but not with the determination to see nothing wrong in it. In a word, common sense should be used in the discussion over the League of Nations as well as over the more common affairs of life.

So examined, what do we find? For the first time in the history of the world the principal nations have put in the form of a document a proposal that they should combine together in the effort to preserve better order in the future and to avoid a repetition of the awful experience through which the world has just passed. Considering the number and character of the nations which have expressed a willingness so to combine, this of itself is an event of the first magnitude. No super-state is proposed, but a mere agreement among sovereign states in the interest of a better world for all of them. There is no proposal to take away their liberty of action, but to protect them in the natural and inherent right they now have to live their own lives and work out their national

destinies without the constant menace and threat of attack which many of them have endured so long. The principal method proposed to accomplish this end, which all must approve, is a restraint upon all nations, forbidding them to fight until they have submitted their cause to examination and delay. No one can question the wisdom of this provision. No one can doubt the duty of the United States to join in it and be bound by it. It would be no restraint upon the United States, because we would always do this in any case, or we would belie our history. No one can doubt that the enforcement of examination and delay would greatly tend to prevent war. It might not always succeed, but the probabilities are that it would. It is highly improbable that any interference with the just policies of the United States would result. There are some defects in the covenant, but there is no great danger in it. When carefully analyzed, the dangers which loom so large when proclaimed from the public platform, either disappear altogether or become negligible in character. Even admitting their presence, they are not to be considered, as against the beneficent effect which the adoption of this covenant would have in lightening the burden of armaments and freeing the world from the scourge of war.

If this covenant as amended is accepted by the other powers negotiating at Paris, it is unthinkable that it should be rejected by the United States. The United States, throughout its entire history, has sought to be, and has been in a very real sense, the leader in the cause of peaceable international settlements. Not only has it shown a willingness to submit its cases to examination and decision, but it has urged this course upon others. The occasions upon which presidents and secretaries of state and other officers, and the Congress of the United States and the legislatures of the various states have urged upon the world the acceptance of the principle of arbitration of international disputes could scarcely be enumerated in this paper. If the country which has made such great profession in this great cause should refuse to follow where the military powers of Europe lead, it would be the darkest spot on her history.

But there is no danger that this will be the result. Even the most severe critics of the League of Nations are now prefacing their remarks by the statement that they are in favor of a

league, and their prophecies of evil if this covenant is adopted, are becoming less and less insistent. The covenant in deference to the objections has been amended according to the best judgment of the men who are at Paris earnestly endeavoring to bring about a just and permanent peace, and the United States will not refuse its approval.

America, the Nations and the League

By HON. THOMAS R. MARSHALL

Vice-President of the United States

ONE of the marvels to me has been the absolute inerrancy with which so many men in America were able immediately upon the receipt of the first draft for the proposed League of Nations to announce authoritatively what it would and would not do to the republic.

Having spent three and thirty of the best years of my life in the practice of the law, during which constitutional cases not infrequently arose, I ascertained that a century and a quarter after its adoption by the several states, the American Constitution presented many propositions about which strong arguments could be made on both sides. For six years, as presiding officer of the United States Senate, I have heard this same Constitution lauded and magnified, attacked and defended. Propositions prove to be clearly constitutional and equally unconstitutional until, in the larger, swifter movements of these epoch-making times, I have almost reached the conclusion that what one believes is constitutional and what one disbelieves is unconstitutional.

Without having made a public utterance upon this proposed league, I went to the Salt River Valley of Arizona where, far removed from the shouting and the tumult of the captains, I might bring to bear upon the subject such reason, patriotism and conscience as I possessed.

With those who are opposed to any league of nations, no difference what the terms of its covenant may be, I have no controversy nor do I care to charge them with impure and unpatriotic motives. Much that they say about the ancient glory of the republic appeals to me, both historically and racially. If among the hundred millions of people who now dwell under the supposedly protective folds of the American flag, there be aside from the Indian such a person, racially speaking, as an American citizen, then I am he. On both sides of my house, there does not course in our veins a single drop of blood which was not coursing in the veins of some

man or some woman here in this western continent when Bunker Hill became the highest peak in political geography.

If mere selfishness were to guide my conduct, I would be one of the first to raise the cry, "America for Americans." I am one of the bare half-million of like lineage now living in this land. My blood having fought its way out of English domination under George III could never contemplate skulking back as a prodigal son under George V. And regardless of that sense of loyalty and that personal devotion which I bear to my chief, I would be a last-ditch man in the maintenance of American institutions if I thought or could be convinced that the proposed League of Nations was to make of America a mere appanage of the British Crown. I am, however, convinced that there is a vast deal of difference between going back a prodigal son and going back, as I believe, not as a weakling but as a controlling partner in a great movement looking toward the peace of the world. To say that because I have whipped a man I will never have anything to do with him save to whip him again is primitive. Men learn to forgive—nations should. To say that I will deal only with an ambitious man when he does what I want done is to announce anew the Germanic political philosophy.

I have been pointed to the advice of the Father of the Republic to beware of all entangling alliances with European nations. At first blush it seems to be conclusive of the subject, but the more I consider it the less potency it seems to have in present day affairs. It will not do to construe language other than in the light of the circumstances under which it was uttered. Somewhere in the numerous "Lives" of George Washington, I have read that a gentleman would ride nothing save a good saddle horse. This advice does not seem to have had any effect upon the manufacture, sale and use of motor cars. It must not be forgotten that when Washington uttered his advice the status for peace or war of each nation of Europe was fixed by a small and ruling class. If I were convinced from my reading that the politics of Europe now were the product of the policy of politicians and not of peoples, I should be willing blindly to follow his advice. It is quite easy to assert what a man whose lips are closed in death would say, yet I venture to state that Washington was so great a lover of peace and of democracy that if, without violation of our Consti-

tution, he could today advise an alliance with the democratic peoples of the old world to preserve peace he would do so.

In the revised draft, the Monroe Doctrine has been taken care of. Agitation concerning it was a "tempest in a teapot." There were two conclusions drawn from the Monroe Doctrine, one of which was good for the American people and the other of which was bad. The conclusion that it was the doctrine of self-defense against the aggression of European nations on the western shore was good, but the doctrine conferring upon us a lordship or guardianship of our sister republics to the south was distinctly bad. It wounded the pride of these republics and instead of drawing them toward America it furnished reason for them to listen to the insidious wiles of European diplomacy. When all men pledge their honor to maintaining the integrity of the American republics, it is hardly needful for the United States to assume for itself the discharge of that duty.

This is not a question of what you and I wish were the case; it is a question of what is, and what we are going to do about it. Theoretically, I would quarantine against yellow-fever, but if I found the epidemic raging in America I would not rely upon the quarantine—I would treat the disease.

Stripped of explanatory verbiage and clarified as to non-legal phrases, the objects of the proposed league are to prevent war, promote peace, reduce armaments, control the sale of munitions, abrogate secret treaties, preserve territorial integrity from external aggression, and to help weak and struggling peoples toward the maintenance of democracies.

To attain these objects all disputes which the parties recognize as suitable and which are unsettled by diplomacy shall be settled by arbitration and in time by a permanent court of international justice; nor shall the parties go to war over any other dispute until after arbitration or recommendation upon the subject.

Enforcement of decrees is to be had by severing financial, commercial and personal relations with the offending state and by recommendation as to actual physical force to be employed.

In the event of disputes, non-member states are to be invited to obey the rules of the league. If the dispute is between a member state and a non-member state, a refusal by the non-member state to obey the rules of the league constitutes an act of war, but as

between non-member states subjects them to such action as the council shall deem necessary to avoid war.

Armament is to be fixed and not increased without permission, and private manufacture of munitions and their sale is to be controlled.

Provision is made for the recording of all treaties before they become effective and the league's power is pledged to the preservation of territorial integrity from external aggression.

I omit the mandatory clause because it is clearly optional and not compulsory, and the labor clause as being simply advisory.

This is in substance the original draft. One serious objection which I had to the original draft has been entirely removed in the revised draft by the inclusion of the right of a state to withdraw. This I think was necessary in accordance with the make-up of human nature. The seventeenth century could not fix the political status of the eighteenth, nor can the twentieth century definitely fix the political status of the twenty-first. The addition was advisable, not on account of objection to the terms of the league, but by reason of the inadvisability and impossibility of one generation speaking definitely as to what the next must do.

No one has yet shown me that there is a single word or sentence in the proposed league that is in derogation of our Constitution or that infringes upon the rights of the Congress of the United States. If there were a definite clause that bound the Congress and the United States to guaranty by force of arms the territorial integrity of any people it might be a valid objection. This objection, however, coming from those who with bland countenances voted to disregard our guarantee of the territorial rights of Columbia in the Panama Canal, does not convince me that the objectors are more patriotic than political in their zeal.

Among all the memorabilia of the war the most remarkable is the letter written by Von Bethmann-Hollweg in 1913. In the course of the letter he makes in substance this somewhat startling statement: "Force has never been able to maintain what force has won." Babylon, Nineveh, Troy, Rome, Berlin—all are covered with the ashes of destiny and defeat. More and more it becomes apparent that thought rules the world and that words and ideas are the only things that live forever. For the maintenance of stable government, it is needful that some men who

advocate violence should be punished, because they are seeking only to impress their ideas by force. We should never forget that we cannot execute an idea nor imprison a thought.

Lover of the old-fashioned neutrality of the American people, I have sought to take a bird's-eye view of my country's history. Some men will be mean enough to say that it is a small bird and a small eye—nevertheless, 'tis mine.

Neutrality cannot be maintained successfully by a lack of resort to physical force. My next-door neighbor and his wife may spend their days and nights in family quarrels. So long as they are nothing to me and to my wife, so long as we do not seek to know the origin of their dispute nor to endeavor to ascertain the right and wrong of it, just so long we are neutral. But if she happens to be my cousin or he happens to be my wife's cousin, or without any relationship whatever we begin to inquire into the origin and right of the controversy, we are no longer neutral. We have developed a neighborhood quarrel.

Now it so happens that a majority of those who are vehemently attacking the proposed league of peace are the authors of that course of conduct which took the American people from their isolated position and set them down in the politics of the world. When we accumulated Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines, our quarantine clause ceased to work. Eliminating also the half million of so-called original Americans, we have opened our gates to every kindred, tribe and tongue on earth. I make no complaint. I have no protest as to their being here, but we were in the European war long before the declaration. We would not listen to our President to keep still about it. We were pro-ally or pro-German in less than a year.

It was inevitable that we should get into the war, for the very soul of America is an intense passion for peace and an intense hatred for wrong. Large numbers of those who are now opposing the League of Nations are the intellectual descendants of those men who characterized the Constitution of the United States as "a covenant with death" and "a league with hell," and who advised to let the erring sisters go in peace. But the soul of America would not let them go in peace.

Disguised as the issue was, it was not loss of territory which caused the destruction of slavery. The Spanish-American war

was not over the sinking of the *Maine*; it was in the cause of human liberty in Cuba. Ostensibly we went to war with Germany for the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other outrages of the sea; in reality, the soul of America had demanded that the world be made safe for democracy.

League or no league, no grave crisis can arise anywhere around the world that this people will not seek to know the facts and to form an opinion upon them, and when their opinion is formed and expressed, the neutrality of the American people is gone. Had the American people had a cohesive thought upon this late war before it began, it is questionable whether it ever would have arisen; and if it had, it speedily would have ended.

I hope the United States will remain on the side of the Allies. I hope our people will always be trained to the idea of justice—not force—as the ruling power of the world. I hope they will ally themselves in some honorable way with like governments around the world so that everyone in America will cease to regret the loss of the German cause and that those who formerly believed in the German theory will begin to train their children in the principles of democracy. If we step back to our isolation we shall have two factions teaching contending theories of government in the country. I prefer to have only one faction and that faction teaching the cause of democracy and justice.

Just one more reason and I have done. I am for this League of Nations in the hope that, having made the world safe for democracy, we can now address ourselves to the task of making democracy safe for the world. He who seeks the peace of the world must compromise between his opinion and public opinion. He must remember Goethe's saying that no government is as bad as no government at all.

This startling thing called bolshevism is as great a menace to democracy as was the German military system. I do not accuse all men who advocate it as being bad men, but I do say they are mistaken men. All my life I have fought the efforts of business to run the machinery of government. I shall certainly raise my protest against the machinery of government being used for the doing of such business as a class of citizens may think ought to be done—all other business to be taboo or destroyed.

Bolshevism may come the world over, but it will be like the

influenza—it may kill its millions, but sooner or later it will pass away. I beg the good men who believe in it to stop and consider. They might ordain that among the feathered tribe of the world only blackbirds should survive and they might exterminate all others, but in some far-off distant year their descendants on a bright October morning would hear the shrill cry of the quail or upon balmy nights listen to the throaty notes of the nightingale. If they are themselves fathers of children they need only look at their own families to realize that, much as they may believe in the political equality of mankind, they cannot produce a social, economic, intellectual and moral quality that will endure. The laws of evolution and the evolutions of God will in due season overrule. To meet this menace the less change there is in constituted authority the better for the world.

Briefly in conclusion, upon the subject of world predomination—if my view coincides with the facts of history—then ideas and aims, not arms or armament, shall rule the world. Take the history of your own, proud people. Read all its glorious past, and answer me—not as partisan, not alone as patriot, geographically speaking, but as a lover of humanity—do you doubt that if our aims continue to be as they have been that the American flag will drape the throne of the nations? That we shall rule the world with a rod of love and in our right hand carry gentle peace to silence envious tongues?

In Defense of the League of Nations

BY HON. GILBERT M. HITCHCOCK

Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate

IT is a remarkable fact that during all the progress of civilization and the development of national life, the world has heretofore been organized for war. Every nation in the world has devoted a large share of its revenue and levied a large part of its taxes, not for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the people, not for the purpose of advancing their education, not for the purpose of developing the resources of the country, not for the purpose of improving the standard of living, but for the horrible purpose of making war on other countries, and in many cases seeking their conquest. Now, for the first time in the history of the world a serious effort is being made to do away with the old organization and in its place to establish an organization of the world for peace. For the first time also in the history of the world, the thought of every nation is directed to one issue; the thought of all countries is focused upon one great struggle. In times past one nation has had one great issue that it has busied itself with, and another a different one, but now fourteen nations at least have united on one purpose and have been actively engaged in negotiating with each other in Paris for the purpose of devising a means by which the world hereafter shall be insured international justice and world-wide peace. To me it is a glorious spectacle; to me it seems as though we, born in one age of the world, are to pass into another epoch and die in a better age. It seems to me that a new era has come to the world, just as much as when Christianity came, just as much as when the dark ages were swept away, just as much as when chivalry came into Europe to refine and advance the development of the people. We, who have lived in the past, have lived in an age of war. If this great enterprise now going on in Paris, under the leadership of the United States, succeeds, we are to pass into a new era of the world, which histories will record as a new era—the climax of civilization. It is an inspiring thought, and one which may well absorb the attention of the civilized world.

Probably less progress has been made in the last five hundred

years in the direction of improving government than has been made in almost any of the other activities of the world. The world has advanced less in the devices of a national government, and certainly in the devices of international government. Take for example the advances in surgery, during our own day, that have revolutionized the science. Not long ago, surgical operations were performed without anesthetics. Formerly surgery was almost butchery; now it has become a great science.

The fastest method of transportation was once the horse, but transportation has been developed so that it has now become a lightning-like proceeding. First steam and then electricity, steam boats and railroad trains, automobiles and flying machines—an enormous advance, a perfect revolution in the methods of transportation. In the United States we have seen performed veritable miracles in manufacture. We have seen machines developed which have done the work of a hundred men. We have seen machines installed in factories which have enabled the factory instead of doing the work of a hundred men to do the work of ten thousand men. When I went into the newspaper business type was set by hand. The idea of setting type by machinery seemed like the art of flying—just a foolish figment of the imagination. Now type in newspapers is set by machines. Newspapers in all their departments have been revolutionized. The newspaper, instead of being a concern with an editor and a few writers, circulated among a constituency of a few thousand, now goes out to its hundreds of thousands and in some cases to its millions of subscribers almost before the ink is dry. It is not very long ago since men plowed fields with crooked sticks, but now agriculture is almost all done by machinery, and the United States with over a hundred million people is able not only to raise all its own food, but a large share of the food of the world as well. Science has been made the hand-maiden of agriculture. It is not long ago when the fastest communication was mail by railroad train. Then communication came by the Morse system of telegraphy. Next the telephone came in and now wireless telegraphy and the wireless telephone.

In other words, man seems to have made tremendous advances in all of the activities of life involving individual enterprise, but when it comes to government, up to the time of the outbreak of

this war, nations were almost where they were centuries ago. Things have happened in this late war which would have shamed the savages of a thousand years ago. The question, therefore, arises whether we can now make a great advance in government. We made one great advance in government, when this Republic was founded. It has had a powerful influence all over the world. It has helped very largely to make the whole world democratic. The fight which our forefathers made for independence and for liberty, liberated England as well. The example which we set made the French Republic possible. Everywhere in the world today governments have come practically into the hands of the representatives of the people. Nevertheless, in our own country we have not altogether made government a success. City government in the United States today is almost a scandal. Taxation also is one of our great unsolved problems. The time has come when men may well turn their attention to reforming government.

But the great pending question is a reformation of the relations between governments. It is now proposed to organize the world for peace. I would not claim that this could have been done heretofore at any time in the history of the world. As long as there existed in the world great conquering empires controlled by autocrats the idea of a covenant between the nations to preserve peace was probably a vain hope. The world has been cursed with such empires, but when the war broke out in Europe practically only three of them remained. One was the Russian Empire, another the German Empire, and the third the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They were all controlled by autocrats practically having the power for war or peace. Conquest was their national aspiration. As long as they existed it was almost impossible to make a contract between the nations of the world to preserve peace. But those great empires have gone forever. What was once impossible has become possible and the democracies now controlling the world can just as easily make a covenant with each other to preserve the peace of the world, as people associated in any country can enter into such an arrangement. This can be done and it is done in the great document which has now been perfected in Paris. It is done without surrendering any part of the sovereignty of the United States or of any other nation that enters into it.

The League of Nations is not a government. It has no sovereign powers. It is a contract between sovereign powers in which they agree to do and not to do certain things under given circumstances. They promise each other when they enter into it that if a dispute arises between any members they will submit that dispute to arbitration, or if they do not submit it to arbitration they will submit it to an inquiry of the nine nations, composing the executive council, and during the period of arbitration or during the period of inquiry covering six months, they solemnly agree that they will not go to war and they further agree they will not go to war for at least three months after that time. So, no matter what the result of arbitration is, or what the result of inquiry is, the world is assured a cooling off period of nine months before there can be any possibility of war. That cooling off period will prevent nine tenths of the wars of the world. If the diplomats of Europe could have restrained Germany three days, this last war would not have occurred. If they could have restrained the German war-lords for three days Germany would have come to her senses and not gone into that war. The cooling off period of nine months gives the peace-loving sentiment of the countries opportunity to assert itself and come to the front. Nine-tenths of all the wars of the world have sprung, as this last war did, suddenly into operation. That cooling off period of nine months will practically wipe out nine-tenths of all wars. If, however, a nation violates that promise and goes to war within the nine months against another member, that act is an act of war against every member of the league and involves automatically that every other nation will at once dissolve commercial, financial and social relations with the offending nation and establish a boycott powerful enough to bring any nation to terms. There is not a nation in the world, except the United States, that could withstand a boycott of all the other nations. Germany was brought to time by a boycott of only a few nations, when she was still doing business with the neutral nations that adjoined her. Therefore, the penalty for breach being so severe, it is almost certain that the promise not to go to war for nine months will be kept and will do away with nine-tenths of the wars.

Another cause of war in the past has been the negotiating of secret treaties. The nations which enter this league agree that

they will do away with secret treaties, that hereafter all treaties shall be open. That gives another assurance of peace.

The private manufacture of arms and ammunition for profit is yet another cause of war. That is put under the supervision of the League of Nations and is to be strictly limited. What has caused all the revolutions in South America and Central America? Profiteering in arms in the United States. How have the wars in the Balkans been supported? Because Germany, France and Great Britain and other nations of Europe have permitted their private manufacturers to sell arms and ammunition to those half-developed countries to carry on their wars. So the League of Nations in its organization seeks to prohibit those acts which have produced the wars of the past.

The League of Nations is not a government—it is a contract between governments, and who shall say that this contract, these promises, which these governments make to each other are not to be kept? The day is past when a nation will hold a treaty or a promise to be a scrap of paper. This war was fought to demonstrate that a treaty is not a scrap of paper, but is the solemn word of a nation and must be lived up to. As long as the nations which enter this League of Nations live up to the treaty which they make and the covenants which they sign, there cannot be any war, because the promises are so drawn that if kept they will make war virtually impossible.

Some amendments have been suggested, as was obviously necessary, to clarify the document, but they were really, with one exception, involved in the very terms and discussion of the document when it was drawn. It is a treaty. Therefore, any nation can withdraw from it at any time upon a reasonable notice, but in order to make it specific this amendment was inserted—that the notice should be a two-year notice. It is a covenant between coöperating nations and can only operate when the nations unanimously agree. Therefore, no nation can be out-voted to its own detriment. We have been told that the United States was going into a combine in which it was likely to be out-voted by the other nations and perhaps ruined, but when we realize that all the great decisions of the league, all the great decisions of the executive council, must be by agreement that is unanimous, we see there is no chance for the United States or any other nation to be out-voted. The league

is built upon the theory of continuing good-will and common interest. It is built upon the theory that back of the men who represent the nations in the executive council are the people in all the nations. It is built upon the theory that the world has entered a new stage, and instead of being governed by force, it is going to be governed by public opinion.

Some of the criticisms of the league, in my opinion, have not been in good faith. It is not a partisan question. The great fight for it is led, and necessarily led, by the President of the United States. He has the backing of Congress. Congress, by a vote in both Houses, inserted in the Naval Appropriation Bill of 1917 an instruction to him at a proper time to call the various nations together in conference for the purpose of seeing whether or not it would not be possible to organize the world to provide international justice and peace. Again, it has the sanction of the country because the President, in the midst of the war in January, 1918, called the two Houses together in joint session and submitted to them his message, in which were included his fourteen points, and one of those points was the League of Nations; and the Senate and the House arose to their feet with applause when the President delivered that message, and the newspapers of the country, without regard to party, came forward and sounded their praises in most unqualified language. The great men of the country, the Republicans as well as Democrats, gave it their endorsement, and there was not a voice raised even in the Senate or the House against the League of Nations for eight months. When it went abroad it received the approval of our associate nations, and when Germany asked for an armistice she was told that the fourteen points constituted the frame-work of an armistice and of peace, and she accepted them. Great Britain and France and Italy and Japan gave those fourteen points their endorsement, and one of the fourteen points was the League of Nations. So, while the President of the United States is, as is necessary, leading the fight, it is the fight of America to secure a league of nations—not his personal fight alone. Great Republican leaders like William Howard Taft endorse the League of Nations. Our former President has brushed aside any possible political or partisan gain that he might get by embarrassing his successor. He waived his own preferences for his own particular plan of a league and

courageously endorsed the league that the President of the United States had secured, by joint agreement, with the unanimous consent of fourteen nations. He has helped the President with suggestions, just as any friend of this league has done in this great emergency, and he is wiser in his day and generation than those little partisan members of his party who sought to secure a political issue out of the league. They hunted for some political gain that they could make out of it. They have sought to drag this great issue down into the mire of politics in the hope of getting a political issue out of it. The American people, like the civilized people of high aspirations in the other nations of the world, have made up their minds at least to try this great experiment. They have made up their minds that when the representatives of the greatest nations of the world come together in Paris and unanimously agree to a device to do away with war, they want to give their approval to it. They know that they may have different ideas, but it is this league or none. It is now or never. This is the great opportunity. If this is rejected, it may be ten, thirty, fifty years or longer before another opportunity will come to the world. Let us get it when we can. Let us ratify it as the Federal Constitution was adopted. Thirteen states in convention agreed upon a constitution. Enemies fought it in every one of the states. They wanted to amend it—they wanted to change it. Why? Because it did not suit any certain state. It was a compromise, just as this great document is a compromise, but it was adopted in spite of opposition and became the greatest governmental structure of the world. Of course, they have proceeded to amend it. That was an agreement from which the states could not retire. This is a document from which any nation can retire on two years' notice, and if it is amended so as to dissatisfy any nation, the nation can retire on that account. We go into this as an American idea. We go into this as an American proposal. We go into this as the crowning efforts of the American Republic to better the world, and if it does succeed, it will be to the glory of the American Republic that the world has finally adopted a method of establishing international justice and peace.

Wanted: A League of Nations Likely to Promote Peace

By GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER, Esq.

Philadelphia

I AM in agreement with those who believe that the nations should set up an international council to promote conference and conciliation, to bring nations with divergent interests together around a council table under conditions which will tend to promote mutual confidence, remove misunderstanding and generate an atmosphere out of which peace may grow. I am heartily in favor of an international machinery of that sort. When in the course of the debates which must come in the Senate, and when we have before us the draft which was originally submitted to the Peace Conference by President Wilson and his fellow-commissioners, I venture the prediction that that document will be found to contemplate a council aimed at conference, at conciliation, at diplomatic approach, at publicity, at the abolition of secret treaties, at the multiplication of cooling off periods, and all the other things which are wholly good and admirable. I hazard the surmise that his original draft did not contain the provision which is central in the document that is under consideration by the country today, namely, the provision for a body which is not diplomatic, a council which is not a council of conciliation, but an international voting trust of nine nations dominated by five, in which there resides far-reaching political power. Such a voting trust of nine nations dominated by five, backed by force and holding political power in its hands, is far removed from the ideals which the President has proclaimed.

There is one provision in the Constitution of the United States which above all the others is the secret of its success. It is the provision that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as Congress may from time to time establish. Suppose that the Constitution of the United States had provided that the judicial power of the United States should be vested in the Cabinet of the President. What success would have attended our constitutional experiment?

We have a great responsibility. We have to do the thinking on this subject; because unless we are impressed with the necessity of thinking the less thoughtful people of the country are not going to allow the Senate of the United States the time to give unhurried consideration to this document. The time to amend it is before we go in and not afterwards. While the Constitution of the United States can be amended by the action of Congress and of a certain percentage of the state legislatures, this document cannot be amended save by a majority vote of the many nations of the world which are going to be parties to it.

Under ordinary conditions, when commissioners come back from an international conference, bringing the product of their conference with them, they take it to the White House and lay it upon the table of the Chief Executive and he subjects it to calm and judicial review. He calls the Senate to his aid and asks their advice and between them they amend the document until, in their judgment, it is safe for the interests of the American people. I have no disposition to criticize the President in any respect whatever; but I wish to point out a single important fact. When Mr. President went abroad and became a commissioner, he did a thing which it may be was right, it may be was wrong, it may be was wise, it may be was unwise. I am not concerned with that. But when the commissioner comes back bringing the treaty and the constitution with him, he comes back from the superheated atmosphere of conference, committed to the document which he brings, with the pardonable pride of joint-authorship; and when the commissioner brings that document to the table in the White House he finds the chair of the Executive empty. There is nobody there to examine this document judicially and calmly; and, unless the Senate of the United States is called upon to give unhurried consideration to this document, the United States will be committed to it in spite of the safeguards of the Constitution of the United States. No man should be so much in earnest in his quest of a constitution for the world as to be willing to jeopardize the constitutional operations of his own government.

This is the greatest thing that is going to come before any of us in our time. Let us take it up calmly as a matter of constitutional analysis and see where we stand. I use an analogy to

make plain the situation which is before the country today. If there were a case of great importance pending in one of the lower courts of the United States and the Chief Justice were to step down from the Supreme Bench and go into that subordinate tribunal, take the decision of the case out of the hands of the lower court, decide it himself, and hurry back to the Supreme Bench in time to hear the appeal from his own decision, you would feel that the judicial machinery of the United States was breaking down. And unless the President insists that the Senate of the United States shall have a calm and unhurried opportunity to consider this document, free from executive pressure or popular clamor, it will be precisely as if the Chief justice, having returned to the Bench in time to hear the appeal from his own decision, had refused to permit associate justices of the court to sit with him and participate in the deliberation. We cannot have a more serious constitutional situation confronting us. We are face to face with a civic responsibility which is just as great as any in the history of the United States.

My contention is that we have to amend this document before we adopt it, and we have to amend it in a number of vital particulars.

Among others, we have to amend it in respect to what I call the international voting trust which is stowed away in the body of this document in such fashion that nine nations, dominated by five, have the ultimate right of final decision, by a 7 to 2 vote, of every question—legal, political, quasi-legal and quasi-political—which can arise between any nations of the world and which one of the parties to the dispute does not choose to arbitrate. We are told that unanimity in that council is necessary to the giving of a final decision. But this is in plain violation of the express language of the document, which declares that decision shall be final when it is the unanimous decision of the nations represented in the council, excluding the parties to the controversy. Just as soon as you get rid of the principle of unanimity, and introduce the principle of majority and minority action, you transfer your device from the diplomatic conference region into the governmental area, and you set up a legislative machine which necessarily in deciding against the minority deprives the minority of its sovereign powers.

Moreover, it is provided that whenever either of the parties to an international dispute refers the dispute from the council to the assembly, the assembly's decision may be final. When it is unanimous? No. When it is unanimous but for the parties to the controversy? No. When it is unanimous but for the parties to the controversy as respects the nations represented in the council and then when it is backed by a *majority vote* in the assembly outside of the nations represented in the council. Take a practical illustration. A dispute arises between us and Great Britain. (Do not think for one minute that in using an illustration that concerns Great Britain I wish to appeal to what I regard as the ungrateful, unintelligent and perverse attitude of many of my fellow-citizens toward Great Britain; I am taking it merely as a definite, concrete case within the grasp of all of us.) If a dispute under this document arises respecting our protective policy, as to whether or not we are according equality of treatment to the commerce of all nations, what happens? It goes, if we do not arbitrate it, automatically to the council of nine. If one of the parties then refers it within fourteen days, it goes to the assembly. It is now before the assembly for decision. How is it going to be decided? You first poll the nine nations in the assembly who are represented in the council. You exclude the two parties to the dispute—Great Britain and the United States. If the seven vote one way on that proposition, you then poll the assembly. If a majority of the assembly votes with the seven members of the council, the disputants are bound by the decision. If the decision is adverse to the United States, we are bound. And I challenge a senator of the United States, or a chairman of a committee on foreign relations, or a vice-president, or a president, or anybody else, to answer the proposition that when you have set up in an international treaty a provision for the majority decision of international questions, you have set up a supergovernment. You have established a governmental body and you have bound the parties by covenant to abide by its decision. You may quibble about terms; but the substance of the thing is there. It jeopardizes the sovereignty of the United States. You poll the nine nations. Great Britain, were she not a party to the dispute, would have one vote, her Imperial vote in the council of nine; but, being a party, she does not vote. Seven

votes are cast in her favor. Subtract the nine from the forty-five nations in the assembly and you get thirty-six, of which a majority would be nineteen. Great Britain starts with five votes toward her nineteen, because her self-governing colonies have five votes apart from the Imperial vote. If the issue were one in which the fourteen South American countries were favorable to the British view of that controversy, Great Britain's vote and the South American vote in the assembly would bind the United States. We covenant that we will not go to war against the successful disputant who submits to the conditions of the decree. You have then an international steam-roller which is going to be an engine for the political determination of the affairs of the world. It is not the thing which President Wilson dreamed of, not the thing he preached, and not the thing for which he contended. It is the work of subtle diplomats of the old world. It is a clever piece of political machinery designed perpetually to control international affairs. I know a voting trust when I see it. I have drawn them in my time. It is as clever a reorganization voting trust as you ever saw.

But its advocates blandly say, "Yes, but we have the right to withdraw." The right to withdraw from what? You have got hold of the tail of the bear and you have a right to let go! If it is going to be a steam-roller we have reserved the right to get out of it and stand in the track. It is always safer for the United States to be in this thing than out of it.

They say the Monroe Doctrine is safe-guarded. I could show you, if the time at my disposal permitted, that the greatest mess is made of the Monroe Doctrine in the 21st Article of this covenant that has ever been made by any body that has dealt with this subject.

With regard to the amendments which have been proposed, the most friendly and constructive were those which were proposed by Senator Root. They dealt with the things that are essential to the promotion of peace; and the Conference has rejected every one of the Root amendments. Every one was rejected by the Peace Conference, with the result that the three stumbling blocks in the way of promoting peace are perpetuated in this document. What are they?

The nations have always refused to set up a High Court and

refer to it the questions of international law which must receive the consideration of a judicial tribunal if the world is to be ruled by law and right and not by might. Senator Root's amendment on that subject was rejected by the council.

The second thing which has always placed obstacles in the path of peace is the optional character of arbitration. Senator Root required by his amendment that the parties should be bound to submit to arbitration all justiciable questions—that is, the kind of questions that courts among us every day decide. And they rejected that. They prefer to send justiciable questions, the kind of questions the Supreme Court of the United States decides, to the international voting trust, which is an executive body, like the President's Cabinet.

The third obstacle in the way of peace has always been the refusal to limit armaments. Mr. Root pointed out that under this document there is no right on the part of the league to inspect the condition of munition manufacture in any nation and no right to verify the reports that the nation sends in; therefore he proposed an amendment that there should be a right to inspect the condition of munition manufacture and armament in each state and a right to verify the returns made by the state. And the Conference has turned that down.

The three things which have always stood in the path of peace up to this time are right there—writ large in the body of this document which we are asked to accept; and in the center of it is the voting trust proposition which gives political power to a small group of dominant nations not acting on principles of conciliation and conference, but just exactly as voting trustees act under similar circumstances.

With regard to Article 10, which is the blanket guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence of the nations of the world as against external aggression—that stands just precisely as it stood in the original draft. It is the provision by virtue of which, if we take our obligations seriously, the United States will be involved in every war in the future without an opportunity to determine on which side she will fight. I am not opposed to the United States giving all the guarantees that are needed to make the peace which shall be expressed in the Treaty of Peace firm, permanent and secure. I am in favor of having

the United States back, with men and money, every specific guarantee which is necessary to make the peace treaty effective, and the settlements under the treaty reasonably permanent. But I am absolutely unwilling to stand by and see the United States, without protest, sign its name to a guarantee which is blank respecting the obligation, leaving it to the future history of the world to fill in the body of that obligation. This thing must be amended. It must be amended carefully. It must be amended wisely. It must be amended radically. Unless we see to it that our representatives in the Senate have the unhurried and unpressed opportunity to do that thing, we shall be defaulters to our civic responsibility.

Peace and Democracy

By HON. SAMUEL W. McCALL

Formerly Governor of Massachusetts

WE have been side by side with the most civilized nations of the world in the most colossal struggle, in the most deadly war of all history, in a war that has been more expensive probably than all the previous wars that have ever taken place. It is clearly our duty to do all in our power to prevent any repetition of such a tragedy. That is the plain duty before us; and how are we going to perform it?

Are we to have a league of nations, a concert of nations, compacted together to wage war against war? I believe in a league of nations. It does not follow that I believe in any league of nations, but something of the sort we must have. I believe in debate. The Constitution of the United States was adopted after a long debate by the ablest men in America. It then went to the conventions in the thirteen states, where it was again debated. It was finally adopted, but it was adopted with very radical amendments, which are now a part of the document. That debate gave us a better Constitution. The formation of a league of nations is too vital a question to be settled without discussion. I think that the speech for instance made by Senator Philander Knox of Pennsylvania was the most illuminating speech that has been made upon the covenant, and if more such speeches can be made in the Senate I trust they will be made. If amendments are needed to improve the league they should be made. Undoubtedly the men in Paris have profoundly considered the covenant of the league, but they have not put it in the crucible of debate. There may be some question whether that part of the covenant relating to the Monroe Doctrine, in the form in which it now appears, should be sanctioned. The Monroe Doctrine does not mean simply the guarantee by the United States of the territorial boundaries of the other countries upon this hemisphere. That view overlooks entirely the essential political character of the doctrine. Mr. Olney contended that it contemplated a struggle between monarchical institutions and free government. President Monroe and John

Quincy Adams put it forth as necessary to our peace and safety that the governmental systems of Europe should not be extended upon this continent. If it is necessary to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine then an amendment should be adopted. But I doubt very much whether it is wise for us to guarantee the territorial boundaries of all the nations of the world, so that we may have a static world. Much of the advance in civilization has come from the shifting of the boundary lines of nations.

The paramount thing is that the covenant is aimed against war. We do not seem to comprehend just what war is. We are apt to regard it as a struggle in the abstract between nations, and we do not get beneath the surface. War, in effect, means the offering up of boys in what is called the cause of their country. In our Civil war, of 2,800,000 enlistments more than 2,100,000 were of boys of twenty-one years old and under. It was the same in ancient times. After a great war in Athens, Pericles said, "The youth perished from the city like the Spring from the year," and Plato said that war is a monster that lies in wait upon the rich meadow land of generous youth. So it has always been. Uncounted millions of boys have been offered up—and for what? In this war nearly 10,000,000 boys of the different nations of the world have gone to their destruction. Those young spirits were beating at the dawn of their careers eager to run their race and they were cut off in a war which they did not initiate. We want to put an end to the system that is likely every fifty years or a hundred years to require the offering up of 5,000,000 or 10,000,000 of the flower of the youth of the race. It is said that men are going to do what they always have done and that we must remain in servitude to the old system of war. But cannibalism has gone. Slavery has followed cannibalism, and it seems to be an indictment of the statesmanship as well as the humanity of the world if we shall permit this system involving the destruction of the young men of the world to continue. Therefore, the League of Nations as a whole is admirably devised.

There is somewhere in Paris or Versailles a painting of Louis XIV who was all his life engaged in war. He is covered with armor and is seated upon a war horse. The picture bears the title "Louis the XIV. Bringing Peace to Europe." Happily the head of the American nation is really attempting to bring peace,

not merely to Europe but to the world, and he is appearing in no such spectacular and hypocritical attitude. We want to adopt some sort of an organization in this present moment to preserve the peace of the world. The whole world is ripe for it. The philosophers of the world, and its poets for the last fifty years have been writing about it. There is a public spirit abroad that demands it.

We cannot establish forms of government in the different nations, however much we might like to have this country or that a republic. Each nation must adopt its own form of government or that government will not stand.

Two years ago when President Wilson spoke of making the world safe for democracy, I suggested that democracy also should be made safe for the world. I did not intend to criticize what the President had said, but I thought that the two ideas should go together. Democracy is not a timid weakling. It is not a violet, something that is crushed by a breath, but it is a great, strong creature with all the power of the combined units of the race and it can take anything that it wants. Therefore, the problem is to make democracy safe for the world, and in order to do that we must endow it with the necessary organs. We must give to this formless mass organization and the opportunity to develop a considered opinion so that it can be delivered from wild leadership that will lead it to quick and violent action and make it in effect an undisciplined mob. We have seen in Russia and other countries some of the things that are done in the name of democracy but which are a disgrace to it—the wicked crimes that have been committed in the name of democracy. The primal thing in government is to have the world established upon such a democratic basis that this basis shall permit a real expression of the will of the people, and everywhere the protection of every man in his rights. This was the aim of our Constitution.

We have something to do in this country with reference to the organization of peace in our own internal affairs. In a time of war nearly everybody who has a hobby gets it out and rides it. We have had things done at Washington by the central government that were unnecessary infringements upon the individual liberties of the men and women of this country. Let them be charged to the war. But now that it is over, let the American people

resume their liberties. Let us get back to the old paths of an ordered liberty. Let us have restored again the right of the American citizen to stand on his feet. Let us secure him in the results of his enterprise and industry. Let us encourage him to do those innocent things, which have been done in the past and which have resulted in making us a great nation.

In the international organization of peace we want our League of Nations. We want it solidly established. We want it to go into force and have effect upon any great crisis that may come among the nations of the future. As to our own country, in the national organization of peace, we want to establish ourselves upon that rock of American liberty which has distinguished us in the past, and which has made us an example to all the nations of the world.

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